菩提道次第廣論卷十七

how to train in insight.

◎如是唯以如前已說正奢摩他,心於一緣如其所欲安置而住無諸分別,復離沉沒具足明顯,又具喜樂勝利差別,不應喜足。

As I have explained, meditative serenity has the features of
(1) non-discursiveness—i.e., when your attention is intentionally set on a single object of meditation, it stays there;
(2) clarity—i.e., it is free from laxity; and
(3) benefit—i.e., delight and bliss. However, you should not be satisfied with just this.

應於實義,無倒引發決定勝慧,而更修習毘缽舍那。

Rather, developing the wisdom that properly determines the meaning of reality, you must cultivate insight.

若不爾者,其三摩地與外道共。

Otherwise, since mere concentration is something Buddhists have in common even with non-Buddhists,

唯修習彼,如外道道,終不能斷煩惱種子,解脫三有。

its cultivation—as with non-Buddhist paths—will not get rid of the seeds of the afflictions. Hence it will not free you from cyclic existence.

如《修次初篇》云﹕「如是於所緣境心堅固已,應以智慧而善觀察,若能發生智慧光明,乃能永害愚癡種子。若不爾者,如諸外道,唯三摩地不能斷惑。」

As Kamalaśīla's 《first Stages of Meditation》 says:
After you have thus stabilized your mind on an object of meditation, you should analyze it with wisdom—it is the dawn of knowledge that obliterates the seeds of confusion. If you do not do this, you cannot abandon the afflictions with concentration alone, just as non-Buddhists cannot.

如經亦云﹕「世人雖修三摩地,然彼不能壞我想,其後仍為煩惱惱,如增上行修此定。」

[The King of Concentrations] Sutra says:
Although worldly persons cultivate concentration, They do not destroy the notion of self. Afflictions return and disturb them, As they did Udraka, who cultivated concentration in this way.

此中說言「雖修三摩地」者,謂如前說,具無分別明等差別妙三摩地,雖修習此,然終不能斷除我執,故云「然彼不能壞我想。」由其我執未能斷故,其後仍當生諸煩惱,故云「其後仍為煩惱惱。」

The phrase "Although worldly persons cultivate concentration" means that worldly persons cultivate a concentration with features such as non-discursiveness and clarity, as explained above. The line "They do not destroy the notion of self" means that despite cultivating that concentration, they cannot eliminate the conception of self. "Afflictions return and disturb them" indicates that worldly persons will still produce afflictions because they have not eliminated the conception of self.

若爾由修何等,能得解脫耶?

What kind of meditation leads to liberation?

即前引經無間又云﹕「設若於法觀無我。」

As cited earlier, the very next [verse of the 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》] says:
If you analytically discern the lack of self in phenomena
And if you cultivate that analysis in meditation
This will cause the result, attainment of nirvāna;
There is no peace through any other means.

謂若觀察無我之法,能生智慧了無我義。

The first line sets out the condition—if, after you have analytically discerned phenomena which are selfless, you develop the wisdom that understands the meaning of selflessness.

又云﹕「既觀察已若修習。」謂已獲得無我見者,若能修習無我正見。

The second line, "And if you cultivate that analysis in meditation," refers to sustaining and cultivating in meditation the philosophical view of selflessness that you have gained.

又云﹕「此因能得涅槃果。」謂此因即能得涅槃果。如由修此能得解脫,若修餘法能解脫否,

The third line, "This will cause the result, attainment of nirvāna," means that this is the cause of attaining the goal— nirvāna, or liberation. Liberation is attained through cultivating that wisdom. Can you also attain liberation without that wisdom, by cultivating some other path?

又云﹕「由諸餘
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因不能靜。」謂除此外而修餘道,若全無此,若及煩惱不能寂靜。

The fourth line of this passage says, "There is no peace through any other means," meaning that even were you to cultivate another path, you would not quell suffering and the afflictions without that wisdom.

此言明顯,唯無我慧乃能永斷三有根本。

This scripture very clearly teaches that only the wisdom of selflessness severs the root of cyclic existence;

《修次論》中,亦引此文破和尚執,故於此義當獲定解。

Kamalaśīla quotes it in his 《second Stages of Meditation》 in order to discredit the assertions of the Chinese abbot Ha-shang. Therefore, you must have certain knowledge of this.

◎外道諸仙亦有定通等德,然由缺乏無我正見,故終不能略越生死。

For even non-Buddhist sages have many good qualities—such as concentration and the superknowledges—but, since they do not have the view of selflessness, they cannot escape cyclic existence at all.

如是前引《菩薩藏經》亦云﹕「未知經說諸真實義,唯三摩地而生喜足,即便於此起增上慢,謂是修習甚深義道,故終不能解脫生死。故我於此密意說云,由從他聞解脫生死。」

In this way the 《Scriptural Collection of the Bodhisattvas》, cited earlier, says:
One who is satisfied with mere concentration, not understanding the reality explained in the scriptures, might develop an inflated sense of pride, mistaking mere concentration for the path of meditation on the profound meaning. Consequently, such a person will not become free from cyclic existence. It was with this in mind that I said, "One who listens to others will be free from aging and death."

此是大師自取密意顯了宣說。從他聞者,謂從他聞解釋無我。又此定為破除邪執,謂外不從善知識所,聽聞思惟無我深義,內自能生,故說「從他聞」等。

The Teacher himself explains clearly what he meant: "listening to others" means to hear the explanation of selflessness from another person. Therefore, it is unquestionable that the Buddha spoke of listening to others in order to refute the idea that you can develop the view of selflessness from within yourself, without the study and reflection that go along with listening to an excellent external spiritual guide explain the meaning of selflessness.

◎總諸佛語,有者直顯真實性義,未直顯者,亦唯間接令於實性趣向臨入。

Generally, among all the Conqueror's scriptures there are some that explicitly teach about reality, and even those that do not explicitly teach it nonetheless indirectly point toward it.

乃至未發真實慧光,不能滅除愚癡黑闇,發則能除。

The darkness of confusion is not overcome until the knowledge of reality dawns, but it is overcome when that knowledge arises.

故唯由其心一境性奢摩他者,智不能淨,亦不能滅愚癡黑闇,

Therefore, meditative serenity—one-pointedness of mind—does not in itself become pure sublime wisdom, nor does it overcome the darkness of confusion.

故當尋求達真實性無我空義,定解智慧。如是思已,定須求慧,

Hence there is no doubt that you must seek wisdom; you should think, "I will seek the wisdom that discerns the meaning of selflessness—reality."

如《修次中篇》云﹕「其次成就奢摩他已,應當修習毘缽舍那。

Kamalaśīla's second Stages of Meditation says: Then, having achieved serenity, you should cultivate insight.

當如是思,世尊所有一切言教皆是善說,或有現前顯示真實,或有間接趣向真實。

You should think, "All the sayings of the Bhagavan were spoken well; directly or indirectly, they all elucidate and point to reality.

若知真實,便能永離一切見綱,如發光明便除黑闇。

If I know reality, I will escape all of the entanglements of dogmatic views, just as darkness is cleared away by the dawn.

唯奢摩他,智不能淨,亦不能遣諸障黑闇。若以智慧善修真實,即能淨智,能證真實。

Meditative serenity alone does not lead to pure, sublime wisdom; nor will it clear away the darkness of the obscurations. However, if I use wisdom to meditate well on reality, I will reach pure, sublime wisdom and know reality.

唯以智慧
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正斷諸障,

Only through wisdom can I really get rid of the obscurations.

是故我當住奢摩他,而以智慧徧求真實,不應唯由奢摩他故便生喜足。

Therefore, I will remain in serenity and use wisdom to pursue reality. I will not be satisfied with meditative serenity alone."

云何真實,謂於勝義一切有事,由補特伽羅及法二我空性。」

What is this reality? Ultimately all things are empty of the two selves — the self of persons and the self of phenomena.

又此真實,是諸度中慧度所證,非靜慮等所能通達。莫於靜慮誤為慧度,更須生慧。

Of all the perfections, it is the perfection of wisdom that knows reality. Since you cannot know it by means of meditative stabilization or the other perfections, you should develop wisdom without mistaking mere meditative stabilization for the perfection of wisdom.

如《解深密經》云﹕「世尊,菩薩以何等波羅密多,取一切法無自性性。觀自在,以般若波羅密多取。」

The 《Sūtra Unravelling the Intended Meaning》 says:
"Bhagavan, through what perfection should bodhisattvas apprehend the absence of an essence in phenomena?"
"Avalokiteśvara, they should apprehend it through the perfection of wisdom."

前引《修信大乘經》,亦於此義密意說云﹕「若諸菩薩不住般若信解大乘,於大乘中隨修何行,我終不說能得出離。」

As quoted earlier, the 《Sūtra of Cultivating Faith in the Mahāyāna》 also makes the same point: "I do not say that those who have faith in the Mahāyāna of bodhisattvas, unless they have wisdom, are delivered—no matter what Mahāyāna practices they may do."

第二學習毘缽舍那之法分四,一 依止毘缽舍那資糧,二 毘缽捨那所有差別,三 修習毘缽舍那之法,四 由修習故毘缽舍那成就之量。  

Since insight is needed, the second section concerns how to train in insight. It has four parts:
1. Fulfilling the prerequisites for insight
2. Classifications of insight
3. How to cultivate insight in meditation
4. The measure of achieving insight through meditation

今初

1. Fulfilling the prerequisites for insight

◎親近無倒了達佛語宗要智者,聽聞無垢清淨經論,由聞思慧引發通達真實正見,是必不可少毘缽舍那正因資糧。

You should listen to the stainless textual systems, relying on a scholar who accurately understands the key points of the scriptures. An indispensable prerequisite for insight is to use the wisdom gained through study and reflection to develop knowledge of reality.

若於實義無決定見,必不能生通達如所有性毘缽舍那故。

For without a decisive view of how things exist, you cannot develop insight that knows the real nature, emptiness.

又此正見,要依了義而善尋求,不依不了義,故須先知了不了義所有差別,乃能解悟了義經義。

Also, in seeking such a view you must rely not on that which has provisional meaning, but rather on that which is definitive. Therefore, you should differentiate between the provisional and the definitive, and you should then internalize the meaning of the definitive scriptures.

此若不依定量大轍解密意論,如同生盲又無導者而往險處,故當依止無倒釋論。

Moreover, if you do not rely upon the treatises by authoritative trailblazers commenting on the Buddha's thought, you are like a blind person headed toward danger without a guide. Hence, you must rely on accurate commentaries on the Buddha's thought.

為當依止何等釋論,謂佛世尊於多經續明了授記,能解深義聖教心藏,遠離一切有無二邊,

On what sort of commentator should you depend? You should rely on the one whom the Bhagavan Buddha himself very clearly prophesied in many sutras and tantras as a commentator on the heart of the teaching, the profound reality beyond all extremes of existence and nonexistence.

曰聖龍猛徧揚三處,應依彼論而求通達空性見解。
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He is the noble Nāgārjuna, renowned in this world and in those beyond. Therefore, rely upon his texts as you seek the view that is the knowledge of emptiness.

此又分三,一 明了義不了義經,二 如何解釋龍猛意趣,三 决擇空性正見之法。  

With regard to these prerequisites for insight, there are three parts:
1.1 Identifying scriptures of provisional and definitive meaning
1.2 The history of commentary on Nāgārjuna's intended meaning
1.3 How to determine the philosophical view of emptiness

今初

1.1 Identifying scriptures of provisional and definitive meaning

◎諸欲通達真實性者,須依佛語。

Those who wish to know reality must rely on the Conqueror's scriptures.

然諸佛語由種種機,意樂增上亦有種種,當依何等求深義耶,

However, due to the diversity of ideas among the Buddha's disciples, the scriptures vary. Hence you might wonder what sort of scripture you should rely upon in seeking the meaning of the profound reality.

謂當依止了義佛語通達真實。

You must know reality in reliance upon scriptures of definitive meaning.

若爾何等名為了義,何等名為不了義耶。

What sort of scripture is definitive and what sort is provisional?

答,此就所詮安立。詮顯勝義是名了義,詮顯世俗應知即為不了義經。

This is determined by way of the subjects that they discuss. Those that teach the ultimate are considered scriptures of definitive meaning and those that teach conventionalities are considered scriptures of provisional meaning.

如《無盡慧經》云﹕「何等名為了義契經,何等名為不了義經。若有安立顯示世俗,此等即名不了義經,若有安立顯示勝義,此等即名了義契經。若有顯示種種字句,此等即名不了義經,若有顯示甚深難見難可通達,此等是名了義契經。」

In that vein, the 《Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra》 says:
What are sūtras of definitive meaning? What are sūtras of provisional meaning? Those sūtras that teach so as to establish conventionalities are called provisional. Those sutras that teach so as to establish the ultimate are called definitive. Those sūtras that teach by way of various words and letters are called provisional. Those sūtras that teach the profound reality, which is difficult to understand and difficult to know, are called definitive.

◎若由顯示世俗成不了義,顯示世俗其理云何,又由顯示勝義而成了義,顯示勝義復云何顯。

Question: How does a sūtra teach conventionalities so as to be classified as provisional? And how does a sūtra teach the ultimate so as to be classified as definitive?

即彼經中明顯宣說,如彼經云﹕「若有由其種種名言,宣說有我,有情,命者,養者,士夫,補特伽羅,意生,儒童,作者,受者,於無我中顯似有我,此等名為不了義經。

Reply: This also is indicated very clearly in the [Teachings of Aksayamati] Sūtra. It says: Sūtras called provisional are those that teach as though there were an owner where there is none, using various expressions—self, sentient being, living being, nourished being, creature, person, humankind, human, agent, experiencer.

若有顯示空性,無相,無願,無作,無生,不生,無有情,無命者,無補特伽羅,及無我等諸解脫門,此等是名了義契經。」

Sūtras called definitive are those that teach the doors of liberation—emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, no composition, no production, no creation, no sentient beings, no living beings, no persons, and no owners.

此說開示無我及無生等,斷絕戲論是名了義,宣說我等是不了義。

This means that the definitive are those that teach selflessness, no production, and such by eliminating elaborations, while the provisional are those that teach self and so forth.

故亦應知無我無生等是為勝義,生等是世俗。

Therefore, you should understand that no self, no production, and such are the ultimate, while production and so forth are the conventional.

《三摩地王經》云﹕「當知善逝宣說空,是為了義經差別,若說
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有情數取士,其法皆是不了義。」

The 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》 also says:
Understand as instances of definitive sūtras those that teach
In accordance with the emptiness explained by the Sugata.
Understand as of provisional meaning all those teachings
That posit a "sentient being," "person," or "living being."

《中觀光明論》云﹕「是故應知,唯說勝義是名了義,與此相違是不了義。」

Also, Kamalaśīla's 《Illumination of the Middle Way》 says: Therefore, you should understand that only those that discuss the ultimate are of definitive meaning; the others are of provisional meaning.

《入一切佛境智慧光明莊嚴經》云﹕「所有了義是名勝義。」

Also, the 《Ornament for the Light of Wisdom that Introduces the Object of All Buddhas》 says, "The definitive object is the ultimate."

《無盡慧經》說無生等是名了義,故定應知唯無生等說名勝義。

And also the 《Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra》 teaches that the absence of production and so forth "are definitive." Consequently, it is certain that only the absence of production and so forth are called "ultimates."

故中觀理聚及諸解釋,應知如實宣說了義,以廣決擇離生滅等一切戲論真勝義故。

Therefore, the collections of Mādhyamaka arguments as well as the commentaries on them are considered texts that precisely teach the definitive because they demonstrate at length the meaning of the ultimate that is free from all the masses of elaborations, such as production and cessation.

何故如是二種宣說,而名了義不了義耶,謂由此義不能更於餘引轉故名為了義,或義定了。

Why are teachings called "provisional" or "definitive"? A text is called definitive, or of definitive meaning, because it cannot be interpreted to mean something else.

此義即是真實性義,過此已去不可引轉,所決擇事到究竟故。

Its meaning is the end-point of the process of making determinations insofar as it is the meaning of reality itself.

諸餘補特伽羅除此不可引顯餘義,由其具足能成量故。

No one else can interpret it as having some further or different meaning because it is backed up by valid proofs.

如《中觀光明論》云﹕「何等名為了義,謂有正量依於勝義增上而說,此義除此,餘人不能向餘引故」

Thus Kamalaśīla's 《Illumination of the Middle Way》 says: What is a text of definitive meaning? It is one that gives an explanation in terms of the ultimate and is supported by valid cognition, for it cannot be interpreted by someone else as having any other contrary meaning.

由此宣說之力,其不了義亦能了解,

Implicitly, this statement allows you to understand the provisional.

謂若此義不可如言而取,須引餘義釋其密意,或雖可如言而取,然彼非是究竟真實,除彼更須求彼真實,故非了義,或義未了。

The provisional, or that which requires interpretation, is a text that cannot be taken to mean exactly what it says; rather, you must explain what it intends, interpreting it as having some other meaning. Or, it is a text that can be taken literally, but in which this literal meaning is not the final reality, and you must still seek that reality as something other than the conventional phenomena to which the text refers.

◎有作是說,諸了義經是如實說,故若彼經宣說無生無補特伽羅等,應須執為全無有生補特伽羅。若不爾者應非了義,以其言聲非如實故。

Qualm: Since sūtras of definitive meaning are literal, when statements such as "production does not exist" and "persons do not exist" appear in those sūtras, one must conclude that production and persons do not exist at all; otherwise those sūtras would not beliteral, and it would absurdly follow that they are provisional.

然不應理,如是說法大師,現見眾多了義之經,遮生等時加勝義簡別。若有一處已加簡別,於未加者亦應例加,是共法故。又此即是彼法真實,豈能成立如是說者為非了義。

Reply: This does not seem tenable because there are many definitive sūtras in which the Buddha, the teacher who makes these statements, adds the qualification "ultimately" when refuting production and so forth. If he adds such a qualification once, then we must add it even where it does not occur because it is a common attribute of all such refutations. Since the absence of ultimate existence is the reality of phenomena, how could a sūtra teaching this not be definitive?

若不爾者,總破生故亦別破句,故不能立如
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是宣說了義之經。

Otherwise, if these sūtras did refute production in a general sense, then, as far as particulars, they would also refute words, and hence even the definitive Sūtras that teach this could not make their presentations.

故經或論,若不就其前後所說總體之理,唯由其中少分語句不可如言而取義者,應知不壞為了義經。

Therefore, you should understand that a sūtra or a treatise may still be definitive even if what it teaches in a few isolated phrases cannot be read literally when stripped from the context of the general system surrounding it in that scripture.

又若彼語縱可如言而取其義,然亦不成非不了義。

You also should understand that even when the teaching of the very words of a text can be taken literally, the text may still be provisional.

◎第二如何解釋龍猛意趣。

1.2 The history of commentary on Nāgārjuna's intended

般若經等宣說諸法,皆無自性無生滅等,其能無倒解釋經者厥為龍猛。解彼意趣有何次第。

Nāgārjuna gave flawless commentary on scriptures—e.g., the 《Persection of Wisdom sutras》—that teach that all phenomena are without any intrinsically existent production, cessation, and so forth. What is the history of commentary on Nāgārjuna's thought?

答,佛護,清辨,月稱,靜命等大中觀師,皆依聖天為量,等同龍猛。

Both the father [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Aryadeva] are sources for the other Mādhyamikas; even great Mādhyamikas such as the masters Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakirti, and Sãntaraksita took Aryadeva to be as authoritative as the master [Nāgārjuna].

故彼父子是餘中觀師所依根源,故諸先覺稱彼二師名根本中觀師,稱諸餘者名隨持中觀師。

Therefore, earlier Tibetan scholars used the term "Mādhyamikas of the fundamental texts" for those two and the term "partisan Mādhyamikas" for the others.

◎又有一類先覺知識作如是言﹕「就立名言而立名者,略於二類大中觀師,謂於名言許外境者,名經部行中觀師,及於名言不許外境者,名瑜伽行中觀師。

In the past, there were some Tibetan teachers who said that when Mādhyamikas are described in terms of how they posit conventionalities, there are two types: Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, who assert that external objects exist conventionally, and Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas, who assert that external objects do not exist conventionally.

就立勝義亦立二名,謂許勝義諦現空雙聚,名理成如幻,及許勝義諦唯於現境斷絕戲論,名極無所住。」

Mādhyamikas are also of two types when described in terms of how they assert the ultimate: the Proponents of Rationally Established Illusion assert that a composite of appearance and emptiness is an ultimate truth, and the Proponents of Thorough Non-Abiding assert that the mere elimination of elaborations with regard to appearances is an ultimate truth.

二中初者許是靜命論師及蓮華戒等。其如幻及極無所住之名,印度論師亦有許者。

These earlier teachers asserted that within this second typology, the first type includes masters such as Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla. There were also some Indian masters who used the terms "illusionlike" and "thoroughly non-abiding" to refer to different types of Mādhyamikas.

總其印藏自許為中觀之論師,雖亦略有如是許者,然僅決擇龍猛菩薩弟子之中大中觀師有何宗派,若諸細流誰能盡說。

Broadly speaking, there were some Indian and Tibetan masters who claimed to be Mādhyamikas who used this kind of terminology for dividing Mādhyamikas. However, here I aim to establish only the systems of the great Mādhyamikas who are followers of the master Nāgārjuna. Who could explain every subtle distinction?

又其覺慧大譯師云﹕「就勝義門所立二宗,是令愚者覺其希有。」此說極善,

Moreover, the great translator Lo-den-shay-rap makes an excellent point when he says that this presentation of two types of Mādhyamikas, distinguished according to how they assert the ultimate, is simply something to impress fools.

以彼所說,唯就理智比量所量之義為勝義諦。理智所量順勝義諦故,假名勝義。
- p.404 -
《中觀莊嚴論》及《光明論》俱宣說故。

For, those who make such a distinction seem be claiming that for Proponents of Rationally Established Illusion such as Śāntaraksita and Kamalasila the mere object that is understood by an inferential reasoning consciousness is an ultimate truth, whereas both Śāntaraksita's Ornament for the Middle Way and Kamalaśīla's Illumination of the Middle Way say that the object understood by a reasoning consciousness is designated "ultimate" due to its being concordant with an ultimate truth.

又諸餘大中觀師,亦不許唯以正理斷除戲論便為勝義諦,故非善說。

Also, the other great Mādhyamikas do not accept as an ultimate truth the mere object that is arrived at when reason eliminates elaborations with regard to an appearance. Therefore, this division is not a good approach.

◎智軍論師云﹕「聖父子所造中觀論中,未明外境有無之理,其後清辨論師破唯識宗,於名言中建立許有外境之宗。

As to the history of commentary on Nāgārjuna's thought, the master Ye-shay-day explains that the masters—the noble [Nāgārjuna] and his spiritual son [Aryadeva]—did not make clear in their Mādhyamaka treatises whether external objects exist; later, the master Bhavaviveka refuted the system of Vijñaptimatra and presented a system in which external objects exist conventionally.

次靜命論師依瑜伽行教,於名言中說無外境,於勝義中說心無性,別立中觀之理。

Then the master Śāntaraksita set forth a different Mādhyamaka system that teaches, based on Yogācāra texts, that external objects do not exist conventionally; it also teaches that the mind ultimately lacks intrinsic existence.

故出二種中觀論師,前者名為經部行中觀師,後者名為瑜伽行中觀師。」

Thus, two forms of Mādhyamaka arose; the former is called Sautrāntika-Mādhyamaka and the latter Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka.

次第實爾,然月稱論師雖於名言許外境有,然不隨順餘宗門徑,故不可名經部行者。

It is evident that this sequence of events as explained by Ye-shay-day is correct. However, while the master Candrakirti does assert that external objects exist conventionally, he does not do so in a manner congruent with the claims of other tenet systems. Thus it is unsuitable to call him a Sautrāntika-Madhya.

如是有說同婆沙師,亦極非理。

Similarly, the claim that he is in accord with the Vaibhāsikas is also very reasonable.

雪山聚中後宏教時,有諸智者於中觀師安立二名,曰應成師及自續師。此順明顯句論非出杜撰。

Scholars of the later dissemination of Buddhist teachings to the snowy land of Tibet use the terms "Prāsangika" and "Svātantrika" for different types of Mādhyamikas. Since this agrees with Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》, you should not suppose that it is their own fabrication.

故就名言許不許外境定為二類。

Therefore, all Mādhyamikas are included within two types— those who do and those who do not assert external objects in conventional terms.

若就自心引發定解勝義空性之正見而立名,亦定為應成自續之二。

If they are distinguished in terms of how they develop within their mind-streams the view that is certain knowledge of emptiness, the ultimate, then again they are all included within two types—Prāsangikas and Svātantrikas.

◎若爾於此諸大論師應隨誰行,而求聖者父子意趣。大依怙尊宗於月稱論師派。

Following whom did those masters seek to understand what the noble Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Aryadeva intended? The Great Elder [Atisha] considered the system of the master Candrakirti to be the main Mādhyamaka system.

又此教授隨行尊者之諸大先覺,亦於此派為所宗尚。

Seeing this, the great gurus of the past who followed Atisha in giving personal instructions on these stages of the path also took Candrakirti's system as the main system.

月稱論師於《中觀論》諸解釋中,唯見佛護論師圓滿解釋聖者意趣,以彼為本,更多採取清辨論師所有善說,略有非理亦為破除,而正解釋聖者密意。

The master Candrakirti saw that among the commentators on Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 on the Middle Way (MulaMādhyamaka-kārikā), it was the master Buddhapālita who had fully elucidated what the noble Nāgārjuna intended. So he commented on the noble Nāgārjuna's intended meaning using his system as a basis; he also took many good explanations from the master Bhāvaviveka, while refuting those that seemed a little inaccurate.

彼二論師所有釋論,解說聖者父子之論最為殊勝,故今當隨行佛護論
- p.405 -
師月稱論師,決擇聖者所有密意。

Inasmuch as the commentaries of master Buddhapalita and the glorious Candrakirti are seen to be excellent explanations of the texts of the noble Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Aryadeva, I will follow them in making determinations about what the noble Nāgārjuna intended.

第三決擇空性正見之法分二,一 悟入真實義之次第,二 正決擇真實義。  今初

1.3 How to determine the philosophical view of emptiness. This has two parts:
1.3.1 The stages of entry into reality
1.3.2 The actual determination of reality

今初

1.3.1 The stages of entry into reality

◎何者名為所應現證實性涅槃及能證得涅槃之方便,其悟入真實又從何門而悟入耶。

Question: Nirvāna is the reality one seeks to attain, but what is nirvāna? If "entry into reality" means a method for attaining it, then how do you enter?

答,若內若外種種諸法,實非真實現似真實,即此一切並諸習氣永寂滅故,於一切種悉皆滅盡我我所執,是為此中所應證得實性法身。

Reply: The reality that you seek to attain—the embodiment of truth—is the total extinction of conceptions of both the self and that which belongs to the self, specifically by stopping all the various internal and external phenomena from appearing as though they were reality itself—which they are not—along with the latent predispositions for such false appearances.

如何悟入真實之次第者,謂先當思惟生死過患令意厭離,於彼生死生棄捨欲。

The stages by which you enter that reality are as follows: First, having contemplated in dismay the faults and disadvantages of cyclic existence, you should develop a wish to be done with it.

次見若未永滅其因,則終不能得還滅果,便念何事為生死本。

Then, understanding that you will not overcome it unless you overcome its cause, you research its roots, considering what might be the root cause of cyclic existence.

由求其本,便於薩迦耶見或曰無明,為受生死根本之理。須由至心引生定解,發生真實斷彼欲樂。

You will thereby become certain from the depths of your heart that the reifying view of the aggregates, or ignorance, acts as the root of cyclic existence. You then need to develop a sincere wish to eliminate that.

次見若滅薩迦耶見,必賴發生智慧,通達無彼所執之我,故見必須破除其我。

Next, see that overcoming the reifying view of the perishing aggregates depends upon developing the wisdom that knows that the self, as thus conceived, does not exist. You will then see that you have to refute that self.

次依教理觀察其我,有則有害,能成其無而獲定解,是求解脫者,不容或少之方便。

Be certain in that refutation, relying upon scriptures and lines of reasoning that contradict its existence and prove its nonexistence. This is an indispensable technique for anyone who seeks liberation.

◎如是於我我所無少自性獲定見已,由修此義而得法身。

After you have thus arrived at the philosophical view that discerns that the self and that which belongs to the self lack even a shred of intrinsic nature, you should accustom yourself to that; this will lead to the attainment of the embodiment of truth.

如《明顯句論》云﹕「若諸煩惱業身作者及諸果報,此等一切皆非真實,然如尋香城等惑諸愚夫,實非真實現真實相。又於此中何為真實,於真實義云何悟入耶。

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Question: You say that all of these afflictions, karma, bodies, agents, and effects are not reality. Still, though they are not reality, they appear to the childish in the guise of reality—like a phantom city and so forth. If this is so, then what is reality and how do you enter that reality?

茲當宣說,由內外法不可得故,則於內外永盡一切種我我所執,是為此中真實性義。悟入真實者,慧見無餘煩惱過,皆從薩迦耶見生,通達
- p.406 -
我為此緣境,故瑜伽師當滅我,此等應從入中論求。」

Reply: Reality is the total extinction of the conceptions of both the self and that which belongs to the self in regard to the internal and the external, this being a result of the non-apprehension of internal and external things. As for entry into reality, look in the 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》, which says:
In their minds, yogis perceive that all afflictions
And all faults arise from the reifying view of the perishing aggregates,
And, knowing that the self is the object of that view,
They refute the self.

又云﹕「修觀行者,若於真實起悟入欲,而欲無餘永斷煩惱及諸過失,應如是觀何者為此生死之本。

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 also says:
Yogis who wish to enter reality and who wish to eliminate all afflictions and faults examine the question, "What does this existence have as its root?"

彼若如是正觀察已,則見生死以薩迦耶見而為其本。又見我是薩迦耶見所緣境界,由我不可得故,則能斷除薩迦耶見。由斷彼故,永斷煩惱及諸過失。

When they thoroughly investigate this, they see that cyclic existence has as its root the reifying view of the perishing aggregates, and they see that the self is the object observed by that reifying view of the perishing aggregates. They see that not observing the self leads to eliminating the reifying view of the perishing aggregates, and that through eliminating that, all afflictions and faults are overcome.

故於最初唯應於我諦審觀察,何為我執所緣之境,何等名我。」

Hence, at the very beginning they examine only the self, asking, "What is the 'self' that is the object of the conception of self?"

◎又於無量各別之法,佛說無量破除自性之理,然修觀行者悟入之時,應略決擇修習我及我所悉無自性。

Scripture sets forth many arguments refuting the intrinsic existence of a limitless number of individual things. However, when yogis initially engage in practice, they meditate in an abridged way, determining that both the self and that which belongs to the self lack intrinsic nature.

此是中論第十八品之義,月稱論師依佛護論師所說而建立。

The master Buddhapālita says that this is the meaning of the eighteenth chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》. The master Candrakirti bases his own commentary on this statement by Buddhapālita.

《入中論》說補特伽羅無我,亦即《廣釋》第十八品之義。

Also, the teachings on the selflessness of the person in Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 are just extended explanations of the eighteenth chapter of Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Treatise.

若謂此中,豈非宣說悟入大乘真實之法,故唯滅盡我我所執,非是所得真實性義。

Qualm: Are you not teaching how to enter the reality of the Mahāyāna? In that case, the reality that one seeks to attain cannot be the mere extinction of the conceptions of both the self and that which belongs to it.

又唯決擇我及我所悉無自性,亦未決擇諸法無我,故名悟入真實之道不應正理。

Also, since a simple determination that both the self and that which belongs to it lack intrinsic nature does not entail a determination that objects, as distinct from persons, lack self, it is wrong to posit it as the path for entering into reality.

答曰﹕無過。於一切種永滅我我所執略有二種,一若以煩惱更不生理而永斷者,雖於小乘亦容共有,然由永斷內外諸法戲論之相,皆無可得,即是法身。

Reply: There is no problem here, for there are two types of total extinction of the conceptions of both the self and that which belongs to it. Even Hinayanists may have the first type, the utter elimination of the afflictions so that those afflictions will never recur; however the second is a buddha's embodiment of truth. It is the elimination—through utter non-apprehension—of all signs which are elaborations of external and internal phenomena.

又若通達我無自性,於彼支分諸蘊亦能滅除有自性執,譬如燒車則亦燒毀輪等支分。

Also, when you know that the self does not exist intrinsically, you also overcome the conception that the aggregates which are its components exist intrinsically—just as when a chariot is burned, the wheels and such that are its parts are also burned.

如《明顯句論》云﹕「依緣假立,諸具無明顛倒執者著為我事,即是能取五蘊為性,然所執我為
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有蘊相耶,為無蘊相耶,求解脫者當善觀察。

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
The self is imputed dependently; it is what those who have the error of ignorance cling to fiercely; it is regarded as the appropriator of the five aggregates. Those who seek liberation analyze this self has the character of the aggregates.

若一切種善觀察已,求解脫者見無所得。故於彼云﹕『我性且非有,豈能有我所。』

When those who seek liberation have analyzed it in every way, they do not observe a self, and thus [Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》] says:
If the self does not exist
How could that which belongs to the self exist?

由我不可得故,則其我所我施設處亦極不可得,猶如燒車,其車支分亦為燒毀,全無所得。如是諸觀行師,若時通達無我,爾時亦能通達蘊事我所皆無有我。」

Because they do not observe the self, they also do not at all observe the aggregates which belong to the self—the basis on which the self is designated. When a chariot is burned, its parts also are burned and thus are not observed; similarly, when yogis know that the self does not exist, they will know that what belongs to the self, the things that are the aggregates, are also devoid of self.

此說於我達無性時,亦能通達我所諸蘊無我無性。

Thus Candrakirti says that when you know that the self lacks intrinsic nature, you also know that the self's aggregates lack self— that is to say, they lack intrinsic nature.

《入中論釋》云﹕「由緣色等自性成顛倒故,亦不能達補特伽羅無我,以於諸蘊施設我事而緣執故。如云,乃至有蘊執,爾時有我執。」

Also, Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says: Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas following Hīnayāna tenets are inaccurate because they apprehend an essence in things such as form. Therefore, they do not know even the selflessness of persons. This is because they hold conceptions of the aggregates, the basis that is designated as the self. [Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》 ] says: As long as you conceive of the aggregates, You will conceive of them as "I."

此說未達蘊無自性,不能通達補特伽羅無我性故。

Thus he says that if you do not know that the aggregates lack intrinsic nature, you do not know the selflessness of the person.

◎若即通達補特伽羅無自性慧,而是通達蘊無性慧,則有通達二種無我二種覺慧成一之過。

Qualm: If the same awareness that knows that the person lacks intrinsic existence also knows that the aggregates lack intrinsic existence, then there is a fallacy—the two awarenesses that know the two types of selflessness would be the same.

法與補特伽羅二各別故,能達彼二無性,二慧亦應各別,如達瓶柱無常之慧。

However, since objects and persons are distinct, the awarenesses that know that they lack intrinsic existence are also distinct, as in the case of the awarenesses that know the impermanence of a pot and that of a pillar.

若即通達補特伽羅無自性慧,不能通達蘊無自性,則正通達補特伽羅無我之時,如何安立亦能通達蘊無自性耶。

If the awareness that knows that the person lacks intrinsic existence does not know that the aggregates lack intrinsic existence, then how can Candrakirti claim that one will know that the aggregates lack intrinsic existence when one knows the selflessness of the person?

初問非許,當釋後問。

Reply: Since we do not assert this, I will answer your final question.

謂正通達補特伽羅無自性慧,雖不即執蘊無自性,然即由此慧不待餘緣能引定智,決定諸蘊皆無自性,能斷蘊上增益自性諸增益執。

The awareness that knows that the person lacks intrinsic existence does not think, "The aggregates do not intrinsically exist." However, without relying on anything else, that very awareness can induce certain knowledge that the aggregates lack intrinsic existence, thereby eliminating the reification of intrinsic existence that has been superimposed upon the aggregates.

故說通達補特伽羅無自性時,亦能通達蘊無自性。

Therefore, Candrakirti says that when you know that the person lacks intrinsic existence, you also know that the aggregates lack intrinsic existence.

如《佛護論》云﹕「屬我所有名曰我所,若我且無,由無我故何能更云此是我之所有。」

Also, Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 says: What the so-called self possesses is called "that which belongs to the self." That self does not exist; if it does not exist, how can it be right to speak of what belongs to it?

譬如定知無石女兒,雖不即由此慧執云無彼
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耳等,然能斷除計有耳等增益妄執。

This is how you should understand it. For example, when reflecting that the son of a barren woman does not exist, that very awareness does not think, "His ears and such do not exist." However, that awareness can eliminate any reifying thought that might imagine that his ears exist.

故若定知無真實我,則能滅除執彼眼等真實有故。

Similarly, when you know that the self does not exist in reality, you stop any notion that its eyes and such exist in reality.

◎若爾自部說實事宗,許補特伽羅為假有者,亦皆不許補特伽羅為勝義有,則彼諸師亦當通達眼等諸法皆無自性。

Objection: There are Buddhist essentialists who hold that the person exists as an imputation; they do not assert that the person exists ultimately. Therefore, even they would know that eyes and such lack intrinsic existence.

若如是者,眼及苗等諸粗顯法,彼等亦皆許為假有,亦應通達皆無自性。

Reply: You are arguing that since they assert that gross objects such as eyes and seedlings exist as imputations, they would know that those objects lack intrinsic existence. If you accept that this is so, then you contradict your own assertion that these are essentialists, proponents of true existence.

若謂實爾,違汝自許,應不更成苗等無實。

If essentialists did know the absence of intrinsic existence, then it would not be necessary for Mādhyamikas to prove to them that seedlings lack true existence.

善惡業道亦應建立於相續上,應許相續是無自性。

Further, the process of completing a virtuous or nonvirtuous action is a continuum, and if essentialists accepted that a continuum lacks intrinsic existence, then why would they challenge the Mādhyamaka position that a continuum, like a dream, lacks true existence?

如《顯義論》云﹕「若同夢者,無十不善及布施等,則未睡時豈非同於已睡之時。」

Yet this is what we find in Haribhadra's 《Little Commentary on the "Ornament for Clear Knowledge"》 :
[The essentialists say to us Mādhyamikas:] If all phenomena are like dreams, then the ten nonvirtues, giving, and so forth would not exist. Hence even when you are not asleep, it would be as though you were.

則中觀師說彼如夢無實之時應無駁難,故說實事自宗說勝義世俗成與不成,與中觀宗說世俗勝義成與不成極不相順。

Therefore, there is a huge disparity between an essentialist system and a Mādhyamaka system with respect to whether things exist, either ultimately or conventionally.

故彼諸師世俗所許諸法,由中觀師自量斷之成勝義有,彼師許為勝義有者,中觀義成世俗有,

What they consider conventional existence amounts to ultimate existence from a Mādhyamaka perspective and what they consider ultimately existent exists only conventionally according to Mādhyamaka.

全無所違,應詳辨別。

There is nothing contradictory about this. Hence, you need to draw distinctions.

又彼諸師所許假有補特伽羅與此論師所許假有補特伽羅,二名雖同,其義各異。

Furthermore, although the imputedly existent person of these Buddhist essentialists and the imputedly existent person of the master Candrakirti are similar in name, their meanings are not the same.

以此論師說彼諸師,皆無通達補特伽羅無我見故。

For, Candrakirti maintains that these Buddhist essentialists do not have the view which is the knowledge of the selflessness of the person.

由未通達諸法無我,亦不能達補特伽羅無我義故。

This is because he asserts that if you have not known the selflessness of objects, then you have not known the selflessness of the person.

故此論師,許其乃至未捨諸蘊實有之宗,亦執補特伽羅實有,彼宗諸師未能通達補特伽羅勝義無故。

Therefore, Candrakirti asserts that they will continue to apprehend the person as substantially existent as long as they do not give up the tenet that the aggregates are substantially existent. Hence essentialists do not know that the person does not ultimately exist.

第二正決擇真實義分三,一 正明正理所破,二 破所破時應成能立以誰而破,三 依其能破於相續中生見之法。

1.3.2 The actual determination of reality.
The section on actually determining the view of reality has three parts:
1.3.2.1 Identifying the object to be negated by reason
1.3.2.2 Whether to carry out that refutation with a Svātantrika procedure or with a Prāsangika procedure.
1.3.2.3 How to use that procedure to generate the right philosophical view within your mind-stream.

初又分三,一 必須善明所破之因相,二 遮遣餘派未明所破而妄破除,三 自派明顯
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所破之理。

Identifying the object to be negated by reason. This has three parts:
1.3.2.1.1 Why the object of negation must be carefully identified
1.3.2.1.2 Refuting other systems that refute without identifying the object to be negated
1.3.2.1.3 How our system identifies the object of negation

今初

1.3.2.1.1 Why the object of negation must be carefully identified.

◎譬如說此補特伽羅決定無有,必須先識其所無之補特伽羅,如是若說無我無性決定此義,亦須善知所無之我及其自性。

In order to be sure that a certain person is not present, you must know the absent person. Likewise, in order to be certain of the meaning of "selflessness" or "the lack of intrinsic existence," you must carefully identify the self, or intrinsic nature, that does not exist.

若未現起所破總相,則其破彼亦難決定是無顛倒故。

For, if you do not have a clear concept of the object to be negated, you will also not have accurate knowledge of its negation.

《入行論》云﹕「未觸假設事,非能取事無。」

For Santideva's 《Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds》 says:
Without contacting the entity that is imputed
You will not apprehend the absence of that entity.

其所破之差別雖無邊際,然於總攝所破根本而破除者,則能滅一切所破除。

There is limitless diversity among objects of negation, but they come together at the root; when you refute this, you refute all objects of negation.

又若不從究竟微細所破樞要而滅除者,有所餘存便墮有邊耽著實事,終久不能解脫三有。

Moreover, if you leave some remainder, failing to refute the deepest and most subtle core of the object of negation, then you will fall to an extreme of true existence. You will cling to the idea of real things, whereby you will not be able to escape cyclic existence.

若未了知所破量齊破太過者,失壞因果緣起次第,墮斷滅邊,即由彼見引入惡趣,故應善明所破為要。

If you fail to limit the object of negation and overextend your refutation, then you will lose confidence in the causal progressions of dependent-arising, thereby falling to a nihilistic extreme. This nihilistic view will lead you to rebirth in a miserable realm. Therefore, it is crucial to identify the object of negation carefully,

此未善明,決定發生或是常見或斷見故。

for if it is not identified, you will certainly develop either a nihilistic view or an eternalistic view.

第二遮破他派未明所破而妄破除分二,一 明所破義遮破太過,二 明所破義遮破太狹。

1.3.2.1.2 Refuting other systems that refute without identifying the object to be negated.
This has two parts:
1.3.2.1.2.1 Refuting an overly broad identification of the object to be negated
1.3.2.1.2.2 Refuting an overly restricted identification of the object to be negated

初又分二,一 說其所欲,二 顯其非理。  今初

Refuting an overly broad identification of the object to be negated. This has two parts:
1.3.2.1.2.1.1 Stating others' assertions
1.3.2.1.2.1.2 Showing that those assertions are wrong

今初

1.3.2.1.2.1.1 Stating others' assertions

◎現自許為釋中觀義者,多作是言,就真實義,觀察生等有無之理,從色乃至一切種智一切諸法,皆能破除。

Most of those who today claim to teach the meaning of Mādhyamaka say that all phenomena ranging from forms through omniscient consciousness are refuted by rational analysis of whether production and such exist as their own reality.

隨許何法,若以正理而正觀察,皆無塵許能忍觀察。

For when reason analyzes anything that is put forward, there is not even a particle that can withstand analysis.

由破一切有無四邊,非有一法此不攝故。

Also, all four possible ways that something could be produced—as an existent effect, a nonexistent effect, and so forth—are refuted, and there is nothing that is not included in those four.

又見真實之聖智,全不見有生滅繫縛解脫等法,如彼所量應是真實,故無生等。

Moreover, these persons assert that a noble being's sublime wisdom which perceives reality perceives production, cessation, bondage, freedom, and so forth as not existing in the least. Therefore, since things must be just as this sublime wisdom knows them, production and such do not exist.

設許生等為能忍否觀察實性正理觀察,若能忍者,則有堪忍正理所觀之事,
- p.410 -
應成實事,若不堪忍,則理所破義而云是有,如何應理。

When we assert that production and such do exist, these persons ask, "Are these capable of withstanding rational analysis of their reality? If so, then there would be things that can withstand rational analysis, and thus there would be truly existent things. If not, then how is it possible for something that has been rationally refuted to exist?"

如是若許有生等為量成不成,若有量成不應正理,見實性智見無生故。

Similarly, when we hold that production and such exist, these persons ask, "Does valid cognition establish them?" If we claim that it does, they reply that since the sublime wisdom perceiving reality perceives production as nonexistent, it is impossible for that wisdom to establish production.

若許由名言眼識等成者,彼是能成之量不應道理,彼等是量已被破故。

Further, if we argue that production is established by conventional visual consciousnesses and such, they reply that it is impossible for such conventional consciousnesses to be valid cognitions that establish production, because scriptural sources refute the claim that those conventional consciousnesses are valid cognitions.

如《三摩地王經》云﹕「眼耳鼻非量,舌身意亦非,若諸根是量,聖道復益誰。」

The 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》 says:
The eye, ear, and nose consciousnesses are not valid cognitions.
The tongue, body, and mental consciousnesses are also not valid cognitions.
If these sensory consciousnesses were valid cognitions,
Of what use to anyone would the noble beings' path be?

《入中論》云﹕「世間皆非量。」

Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says: "The world is not valid in any way."

若雖無量成而許是有,既非自許亦非正理,故亦不成。

They argue that we cannot say that production exists without valid establishment, for we ourselves do not assert this and it is not reasonable.

又若許生,非勝義許須世俗許,此亦非理。

They also argue that if we are to assert production, since it cannot be asserted ultimately in Mādhyamaka, we will have to assert it conventionally, but that is unreasonable

《入中論》云﹕「於實性時由何理,破自他生不應理,即由彼理於名言,非理汝生由何成。」

because Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
The argument which shows that production from self and from other
Are untenable in the context of ultimate reality
Also shows that production is untenable even conventionally.
As this is so, what argument will demonstrate the production you believe in?

此說由於勝義破生正理,於名言中亦能破故。

Thus, they say that the argument refuting ultimate production also refutes conventional production.

又若不許從自他等四句而生,則於勝義觀察四句破除生時應不能破,以除彼等有餘生故。

Furthermore, these persons say that if we assert that production exists despite the lack of an effect which is produced from any of the four—itself, something other, and so forth—then, when we try to carry out the Mādhyamaka refutation of production through investigating those four alternatives, we will fail. For we ourselves would have already allowed a type of production which is not among those four.

若從四句隨一而生,不許餘三應從他生,此不應理。

Also they say that if there were production from any of those four, then it would have to be production from a cause which is something other than the effect, for we do not accept the remaining three [production from self, both self and other, or causelessly].

《入中論》云﹕「世間亦無從他生。」

However this is not reasonable because Candrakirti's 《Comment on the "Middle Way"》says, "Production from another does not exist even in the world."

故破生時不應更加勝義簡別,《明顯句論》破加勝義簡別語故。

Therefore these persons say that you should not add the qualifying word "ultimate" when refuting production, for Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 refutes the addition of this qualification.

此有一類雖於名言亦不許生等,餘者則於名言許有,然彼一切皆作如是暢亮宣說。 由諸正理於諸法上破除自性,是此論師所宗無可疑賴,以雙於二諦破自性故。如是無性復有何法,故於所破冠加勝義簡別語者,唯是中觀自續師軌。

Among those who argue in this way, there are some who say that they do not accept production and such even conventionally, while others accept that production and such do exist conventionally. However, all of them stick out their necks and argue: "It is undeniable that the system of the master Candrakirti is a rational refutation of essential or intrinsic nature, for he refutes intrinsic existence in terms of both truths. Thus, if something does not intrinsically exist, how else could it exist? Therefore, adding the qualification "ultimate' to the object of negation is the procedure only in the Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka system."

第二顯其非理分二,一 顯彼破壞中觀不共勝法,二 顯所設難皆非能破。

1.3.2.1.2.1.2 Showing that those assertions are wrong. This has two parts:
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1 Showing that those systems contradict the unique feature of Mādhyamaka
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.2 Showing that the Mādhyamaka critique does not eradicate conventional existence

初又分三,一 明中觀勝
- p.411 -
法,二 彼如何破壞,三 諸中觀師如何答彼。

Showing that those systems contradict the unique feature of Mādhyamaka has three parts:
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.1 Identifying the distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.2 Showing that those systems contradict this distinguishing feature
1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.3 How a Mādhyamika responds to those who negate the distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka

今初

1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.1 Identifying the distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka

◎如《六十正理論》云﹕「此善願眾生,集修福智糧,獲得從福智,所出二殊勝。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
Through this virtue may all beings
Amass the collections of merit and wisdom
And attain the two sublime embodiments
That arise from merit and wisdom.

由大乘行,令所化機於果位時獲二勝事,謂勝法身及勝色身。

What this means is that disciples who progress by way of the Supreme Mahāyāna vehicle will attain, upon reaching their goal, both the sublime embodiment of truth and the sublime embodiment of form.

此於道時,須如前說方便般若,未單分離積集無量福智資糧。

This attainment, as explained earlier, is based on their having amassed along the path immeasurable collections of merit and sublime wisdom, collections within which method and wisdom are inseparable.

此復觀待至心定解世俗因果,從如此因生如此果,勝利過患信因果系,即於盡所有性獲得定解,及由至心定解諸法皆無自性如微塵許,即於如所有性獲得定解。

That, in turn, definitely relies upon attaining certain knowledge of the diversity of phenomena. This profound knowledge understands that the relationship of cause and effect—conventional cause and effect—is such that specific beneficial and harmful effects arise from specific causes. At the same time, amassing the collections of merit and wisdom also definitely relies on attaining certain knowledge of the real nature of phenomena. This means reaching a profound certainty that all phenomena lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature.

若無此二,則於雙具方便智慧二分之道,不能至心而修學故。

Certain knowledge of both diversity and the real nature is needed because without them it is impossible to practice the whole path, both method and wisdom, from the depths of your heart.

如是果位能得二身之因,有賴根本決擇正見,道無錯誤。

This is the key to the path that leads to the attainment of the two embodiments when the result is reached; whether you get it right depends on how you establish your philosophical view of the basic situation.

其決擇正見之法,即無間所說雙於二諦獲決定解,除中觀師,任何補特伽羅皆見相違,無慧宣說無違之理。

The way to establish that view is to reach certain knowledge of the two truths as I have just explained them. Except for Mādhyamikas, other people do not understand how to explain these two truths as non-contradictory; they see them as a mass of contradictions.

唯具深細賢明廣大觀慧中觀智者,善巧方便通達二諦,決擇令無相違氣息能得諸佛究竟密意。

However, experts possessed of subtlety, wisdom, and vast intelligence — experts called Mādhyamikas — have used their mastery of techniques for knowing the two truths to establish them without even the slightest trace of contradiction.

由此因緣,於自大師及佛聖教,生起希有最大恭敬,發清淨語,以大音聲數數宣告,「諸具慧者應知性空之空義,是緣起義,非作用空無事之義。」

In this way they reach the final meaning of what the Conqueror taught. This gives them a wonderful sense of respect for our Teacher and his teaching. Out of that respect they speak with utter sincerity, raising their voices again and again: "You who are wise, the meaning of emptiness—emptiness of intrinsic existence—is dependent-arising; it does not mean that things do not exist, it does not mean that they are empty of the capacity to function."

◎諸說實事自部智者,雖善修習眾多明處,猶不能許中觀正見。

Scholars who are Buddhist essentialists may have great training in many topics of learning, but they do not accept the Mādhyamaka view,

故於中觀師作如是諍,若一切法皆無自性自體空者,則繫縛解脫生死涅槃一切建立皆無立處。

and their dispute with the Mādhyamikas is as follows: "If all phenomena are empty, lacking any essential or intrinsic nature, then all of the teachings on cyclic existence and nirvana—bondage, freedom, and so forth—are untenable."

如《中論》云﹕「若
- p.412 -
此悉皆空,應無生無滅,則諸四聖諦,於汝皆應無。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 states their view:
If all these were empty,
There would be no arising and no disintegration;
It would follow that for you
The four noble truths would not exist.

此說若自性空,生滅四諦皆不應理。

They say that if this is empty of intrinsic existence, then production, disintegration, and the four truths would not be tenable.

《迴諍論》云﹕「設若一切法,皆非有自性,汝語亦無性,不能破自性。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 also states an essentialist's objection:
If all things
Are completely without intrinsic nature,
Then your words also lack intrinsic nature
And cannot refute intrinsic existence.

此說諍論若語無性,則不堪能破除自性成立無性。

They say that if words lack intrinsic nature, then they can neither refute intrinsic nature nor prove its absence.

若無自性,則能生所生能破能立之作用皆不應理。

They argue from the supposition that if there is no intrinsic nature, then the agents and objects of production are not tenable, and neither are the processes of refutation and proof.

此是由覺破自性理,能破一切能作所作,故相辯諍。

Hence they dispute with us on the grounds that the arguments which refute intrinsic existence will refute all functionality.

故實事師與中觀師諍論二宗不共之事,唯諍性空可否安立生死涅槃一切建立。

Therefore, when essentialists and Mādhyamikas debate about their disparate tenets, they debate exclusively about whether all the teachings about cyclic existence and nirvana can be appropriate for that which is empty of intrinsic existence.

故無塵許自性之自體,然能許可能生所生及破立等生死涅槃一切建立,是乃中觀之勝法。

Hence, the distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka is the admissibility of all the teachings about cyclic existence and nirvana— the agents and objects of production, refutation, proof, and so forth—in the absence of even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature.

如《中論》第二十四品云﹕「應成諸過失,於空不成過,汝破空成過,彼於我無過。若誰可有空,於彼一切成,若誰不許空,於彼皆不成。」

The twenty-fourth chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
The reductio expressing the fallacy that all is untenable
Is not right about emptiness;
Thus, forsaking emptiness, as you have,
Is not right for me.
For those to whom emptiness makes sense
Everything makes sense;
For those to whom emptiness does not make sense
Nothing makes sense.

此說於無性者,非但不犯「若一切皆空」等過,且於性空之宗有生滅等,於自性非空之宗反皆不成。

Nāgārjuna says that fallacies adduced by the essentialists, such as, "If all these are empty, there would be no arising and no disintegration...," do not apply to those who advocate the absence of intrinsic nature. Moreover, he also says that things such as production and disintegration are tenable within the position of emptiness of intrinsic existence, whereas they are not tenable within the position that phenomena are not empty of intrinsic existence.

如《明顯句論》云﹕「於我宗中,非但不犯所說眾過,其四諦等一切建立且極應理。」

Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 cites that passage and explains: Not only does the fallacy expressed in the reductio stated by the essentialists simply not apply to our position, but it is also the case that within our position all of the teachings on the four noble truths, etc. are quite correct.

為顯此故,頌云「若誰可有空」引文而釋。

In order to indicate this, Nāgārjuna said, "For those to whom emptiness makes sense...."

又中觀論第二十六品,顯示十二緣起,順轉生起次第及逆轉還滅之次第,

The twenty-sixth chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 teaches the stages of production in the forward progression of the twelve factors of dependent-arising and the stages of their cessation in the reverse progression.

第二十五品重破自性,

The other twenty-five chapters mainly refute intrinsic existence.

第二十四觀聖諦品,極廣決擇,自性不空,其生滅等生死涅槃一切建立不成之理,及自性空,彼等一切可成之理。

The twenty-fourth chapter analyzes the four noble truths. It demonstrates at length that none of the teachings about cyclic existence and nirvāna—arising, disintegration, etc.—makes sense in the context of non-emptiness of intrinsic existence, and how all of those do make sense within the context of emptiness of intrinsic existence.

故應了知,持此品義徧一切品。

Hence, you must know how to carry the implications of this twenty-fourth chapter over to the other chapters.

故現自許講中觀義者,說無性中能生所生等一切因果悉不得成,乃說實事之宗。

Therefore, those who currently claim to teach the meaning of Mādhyamaka are actually giving the position of the essentialists when they hold that all causes and effects—such as the agents and objects of production—are impossible in the absence of intrinsic existence.

- p.413 -

◎龍猛菩薩之所許,謂依如此如此因緣,生滅如此如此眾果,即應依此因果建立而求性空及中道義。

Thus, Nāgārjuna the Protector holds that one must seek the emptiness of intrinsic existence and the middle way on the very basis of the teachings of cause and effect—that is, the production and cessation of specific effects in dependence upon specific causes and conditions.

如第二十四品云﹕「若緣起所生,即說彼為空,即依他假設,亦即是中道。若非依緣起,是法全非有,故若非性空,全非有是法。」

The twenty-fourth chapter [of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》] says:
That which arises dependently
We explain as emptiness.
This [emptiness] is dependent designation;
This is the middle way.
Because there is no phenomenon
That is not a dependent-arising,
There is no phenomenon
That is not empty.

此說性空能遍緣起,莫故違說,凡因緣生定有自性。

Thus, Nāgārjuna says that dependent-arisings are necessarily empty of intrinsic existence. Do not turn this statement on its head by claiming that what is produced in dependence on causes and conditions must intrinsically exist.

《迴諍論》云﹕「若誰有此空,彼有一切義,若誰無空性,彼一切非有。諸說空緣起,中道為一義,無等第一語,敬禮如是佛。」

Similarly, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
For whomever emptiness makes sense,
Everything makes sense;
For whomever emptiness makes no sense,
Nothing makes any sense.
I bow down to the Buddha,
The unequaled supreme teacher,
Who taught that emptiness, dependent-arising,
And the middle way hold a single meaning.

《七十空性論》云﹕「由一切諸法,自性皆是空,諸法是緣起,無等如來說。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness》says:
The unequaled Tathâgata taught
That because all things
Are empty of intrinsic existence,
Things are dependent-arisings.

《六十正理論》云﹕「諸不許緣起,著我或世間,彼遭常無常,惡見等所劫。若有許緣起,諸法有自性,常等過於彼,如何能不生。若有許緣起,諸法如水月,非真非顛倒,彼非見能奪。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
Those who cling to the self or to the world
As though these were not contingent
Are captivated by extreme views
Of permanence and impermanence.
Those who claim that dependent things
Exist in reality—
How can they avoid the fallacies
Of permanence and so forth?
Those who hold that contingent things,
Like a moon reflected in water,
Are neither real nor unreal–
They are not captivated by such wrong views.

《出世讚》云﹕「戲論說眾苦,自作及他作,俱作無因作,佛則說緣起。若法從緣起,佛即許是空,說法無自性,無等獅子吼。」

Also, Nāgārjuna's Praise of the Transcendent One says:
Logicians claim that suffering
Is produced from itself, or from something other,
Or from both of those, or without a cause;
You said it arises dependently.
You hold that whatever arises
Dependently is empty;
There is nothing to match your roar,
"Things do not exist on their own!"

此等唯說由緣起因故自性空,故緣起義現為無性空性之義,即是龍猛菩薩不共之宗。

Thus Nāgārjuna says that it is precisely because of being dependent-arisings that phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence. This explanation that dependent-arising is the meaning of emptiness— that is to say, the absence of intrinsic existence—is the unique system of Nāgārjuna the Protector.

◎若謂無性之空,是就中觀自宗安立,而緣起因果之建立,於自宗中不善安立,便謂就他而假立者,非緣起義。如云﹕「若誰可有空,於彼一切成。」此說何宗許無自性,即於彼宗生死涅槃一切緣起,皆應理故。

Therefore, dependent-arising does not mean accepting emptiness—the absence of intrinsic existence—for oneself as a Mādhyamika, while leaving teachings on dependently arisen cause and effect to others because one is uncomfortable with having them in one's own system. For Nāgārjuna's statement in the 《Fundamental Treatise》, "For those to whom emptiness makes sense...," means that all of the dependent-arisings of cyclic existence and nirvāna are admissible in a system that teaches the absence of intrinsic existence.

若爾,許空性宗生死涅槃如何成耶。

How is it that all of cyclic existence and nirvâna is possible in a system that asserts emptiness?

答,一切諸法自性空者,
- p.414 -
是由依因緣生起之理,故說彼空,後當廣釋。

As I will explain below, proponents of the view that all things are empty of intrinsic existence argue that this is possible by reason of things' arising in dependence on causes and conditions.

故於此宗緣起成立,此成立故苦亦成立,苦依因緣緣起建立,若無緣起,苦不成故。

This being the case, dependent-arising is tenable within emptiness of intrinsic existence, and when dependent-arising is tenable, suffering is also tenable—for suffering may be attributed only to what arises in dependence on causes and conditions; it cannot be attributed to what does not arise dependently.

若有苦諦,生苦之集,滅苦之滅,能滅之道,亦皆應理,故有四諦。

When true suffering exists, then the origins from which it arises, the cessation that is the stopping of that suffering, and the paths leading to those cessations are tenable; thus, all four truths exist.

若有四諦,則於四諦,知斷證修亦皆成立。

When the four truths exist, then it is possible to understand, to eliminate, and to actualize the first three truths respectively, and it is possible to cultivate true paths;

若有知等,則三寶等一切皆成。

when such practices exist, then everything—the three jewels and so forth—is tenable.

如《明顯句論》云﹕「若於誰宗,有一切法皆自性空,即於彼宗如所宣說此等一切皆可得成。云何得成,

As Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
For those to whom this emptiness of intrinsic existence of all things makes sense, everything that has been mentioned also makes sense. Why?

答,我因緣起故說是空,故誰有空,即有緣起,誰有緣起,則四聖諦於彼應理。

Because we call dependent-arising "emptiness". thus, dependent-arising makes sense in a system in which emptiness makes sense... and the four noble truths are reasonable for those to whom dependent-arising makes sense.

云何應理,

Why?

答,謂由緣起故乃有苦諦,非無緣起,彼無性故即為性空。

Because only what arises dependently can be suffering, not what does not arise dependently. Since what arises dependently lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty.

若有苦者,苦集苦滅趣苦滅道,皆可成立,故知苦斷集證滅修道,亦得成立。

Once there is suffering, then the origins of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the paths leading to the cessation of suffering also make sense. Therefore, thorough understanding of suffering, elimination of origins, actualization of cessation, and cultivation of paths also make sense.

若有知苦諦等,則有諸聖果,若有諸果住果亦成,若有住果則有諸向,若有住果及向即有僧寶。

When there is thorough understanding, etc. of the truths—suffering, etc.—then it makes sense that there will be spiritual results. Once there are results, then it makes sense that there are people who have achieved those results; this in turn implies the possibility of people who are approaching those results. Once there are people who are approaching and achieving these results, then the community is possible.

有諸聖諦,即有正法,若有正法及僧伽者,佛亦得成。

When the noble truths exist, then the sublime teaching also makes sense, and when the sublime teaching and community exist, then buddhas are possible as well.

是故三寶亦得成立,則世出世一切諸法差別證德一切皆成。

Therefore, the three jewels also make sense. All profound knowledge of everything mundane and supramundane makes sense.

諸法非法及其果報,並其世間一切名言亦皆得成。

Proper and improper conduct, the results of that [happy and miserable rebirths], and all worldly conventions make sense as well.

故云﹕『若誰可有空,於彼一切成,』若誰無空則無緣起,故一切不成。」

Therefore, in that way, Nāgārjuna says, "For those to whom emptiness makes sense, everything makes sense....". If emptiness did not make sense, then dependent-arising would not exist, and so nothing would make sense.

言成不成,應知是說彼等有無。

Therefore, you should understand that "what makes sense" and "what does not make sense" here refer to whether those things exist.

又前引迴諍論之諍,龍猛菩薩明顯答云,於無自性能作所作皆悉應理。

As cited earlier, an objection by essentialists appears in Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》:
If all things
Are completely without intrinsic nature,
Then your words also lack intrinsic nature
And thus cannot refute intrinsic existence.
The master Nāgārjuna clearly answers that functionality is tenable within the context of the absence of intrinsic existence.

《迴諍論》云﹕「若法依緣起,即說彼為空,若法依緣起,即說無自性。」

The 《Refutation of Objections》:
We propound that the dependent-arising
Of things is called "emptiness";
That which arises dependently
Has no intrinsic nature.

自釋中云﹕「汝由未解諸法空義,故汝難云,『汝語無性故,應不能破諸法自性。』

Also, Nāgārjuna's own 《Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"》 here says: Failing to comprehend the emptiness of things, you essentialists look for something to criticize, and argue against the Mādhyamikas, saying, "Your words lack intrinsic nature and therefore cannot refute the intrinsic existence of things."

然此是說,諸緣
- p.415 -
起法即是空性,何以故,是無自性故。諸緣起法其性非有,無自性故。何故無性,待因緣故。若法有性,則無因緣亦應恆有,然非如是,故無自性,故說為空。

Here in Mādhyamaka, the dependent-arising of things is emptiness. Why? Because they lack intrinsic nature. Those things that arise dependently are not associated with intrinsic nature because they lack intrinsic nature. Why? Because they rely on causes and conditions. If things had intrinsic nature, then they would exist even without causes and conditions; since such is not the case, they lack intrinsic nature. Therefore, we speak of them as "empty."

如是我語亦是緣起,故無自性,無自性故說空應理。如瓶衣等,是緣起故自性雖空,然能受取蜜水乳糜,及能遮蔽風寒日曝。如是我語,是緣起故雖無自性,然能善成諸法無性。故說『汝語無自性故,應不能破除一切法自性』,皆悉不成。」

Similarly, my words also are dependent-arisings and therefore are without intrinsic nature. Because they lack intrinsic nature, it is reasonable to say that they are "empty." Because things such as pots and cloth are dependent-arisings, they are empty of intrinsic nature. Yet a pot can receive and hold honey, water, and soup; a cloth can protect one from the cold, wind, and sun." And so it is with my words. Because they are dependent-arisings, they lack intrinsic nature; yet they are fully capable of establishing that things lack intrinsic existence. Therefore, it is inappropriate for you to give the argument, "Because your words lack intrinsic nature, it is not tenable that they refute the intrinsic existence of all things."

此極顯說,若有自性不待因緣,若待因緣定無自性,順行逆返及無性語,而能作為破立等事。

Thus Nāgārjuna speaks very clearly about the pervasion that whatever relies on causes and conditions lacks intrinsic nature and the counter-pervasion that whatever has intrinsic nature does not rely on causes and conditions; he very clearly says that words without intrinsic nature can carry out refutations and proofs.

由依因緣,染淨諸法生滅緣起與無自性隨順和合,固不待言,即此緣起,為達無性最無上因,當知唯是中觀智者所有勝法。

Is it even necessary to point out that dependent-arising—the production and cessation of afflicted and pure phenomena in dependence on causes and conditions—is located right together with the absence of intrinsic existence? Dependent-arising is the best reason to use in order to know the absence of intrinsic existence. You should be aware that only the Mādhyamika experts have this unique approach.

◎若執緣起生滅定有自性,破自性理而破生滅緣起,如天變成魔,於能如實得中觀義作大障碍。

If you hold that dependent production and dependent cessation would have to be essentially existent, and you use the arguments against intrinsic existence to refute the dependent-arising of production and cessation, then those arguments—like a god transformed into a demon—will be a tremendous obstacle to finding an accurate understanding of Mādhyamaka.

故於諸法若見無有塵許自性引生定解,而就自宗於因果系全無引生定解之處,須就他許。

In that case, when you develop a sense of certainty that phenomena lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature, you will then have no basis for developing certain knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect within your own system; you will have to posit those as others see them, etc.

若就自宗於因果上善引定解,而於無性自宗全無定解之處,而於無性取密意者,應知未得中觀正見。

Or, if you do develop a sense of certainty about cause and effect within your own system, then it will be impossible for your system to foster certain knowledge of the absence of intrinsic existence. You will have to find some other way to construe what the Buddha meant in speaking of the absence of intrinsic existence. If this is the case, then you must understand that you have not yet found the Mādhyamaka view.

應於能得正見之因,淨護所受淨戒為本,多門策勵積集資糧,淨治罪障,親近善士勤求聞思。

What will help you to find the right view? As a basis, you should be pure in upholding your ethical commitments. Then strive in many ways to accumulate the collections of merit and wisdom and clear away obscurations. Rely on the learned, making efforts to study and to reflect upon their instructions.

能於如是現空二事雙引定解者,至極少際,故極難得中觀正見。

Since certainty about appearances and certainty about emptiness almost never develop together, it is extremely difficult to find the Mādhyamaka view.

中論二十四品密意說云﹕「由知諸劣慧,難達此深法,故於說正法,能仁心退捨。」

This is what Nāgārjuna meant in the twenty-fourth chapter of the 《Fundamental Treatise》:
Therefore, knowing that those of limited intelligence
Would have difficulty understanding the depths of his teaching,
The mind of the Sage turned away
From giving this teaching.

《寶鬘
- p.416 -
論》云﹕「且此不淨身,粗惡是現境,恆常而顯現,若尚不住心,爾時此正法,無所住深細,非現最甚深,於心何易轉,此法甚深故,知眾生難悟,故能仁成佛,欲捨不說法。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》 says:
When the impurity of this body—
Which is coarse, directly observable,
And continuously appearing—
Does not stay with the mind,
Then how could the excellent teaching—
Which has no basis, is not immediately apparent,
And is most subtle and profound—
Easily come to mind?
Realizing that because of its profundity
This teaching is difficult to understand,
The Sage, when he became a buddha,
Turned away from giving this teaching.

經論皆說極難通達。

Thus, treatises and scriptures state that it is very difficult to understand the profound view.

若不如是,僅於少數堪為定量之論,見說觀察瓶等與自支分,以一異理决擇無性而起誤解。

Failing to reach such knowledge of both appearances and emptiness, some mistake the meaning of statements in certain authoritative texts that demonstrate the absence of intrinsic existence via rational analysis of whether pots and such are one with or different from their parts.

便觀瓶等,於自支分嘴項等中為是何事,若於彼中全無所得便起定解,謂瓶非有。

Analyzing whether something such as a pot is any of its parts—such as its lip or neck—they do not find it to be any of those; this leads them to a sense of certainty that "there is no pot here."

次於觀者亦如是觀,則覺觀者亦定非有。

Then, applying the same analysis to the analyzer, they become certain that "there is also no analyzer here."

爾時觀者且無所得,又由誰知瓶等為無。

They then wonder, "If the analyzer is not to be found, then who is it that knows that pots and such do not exist?"

由是便謂非有非無,以相似理引顛倒解。若安立此為得正見誠乃易事。

So they say, "Things are neither existent nor nonexistent." If the false certainty brought on by this sort of counterfeit reasoning were considered a case of finding the Mādhyamaka view, then gaining that view would seem to be the easiest thing in the world.

故具慧者應於了義經,及中觀等清淨釋論所說空義即緣起義,

Therefore, the intelligent should develop an unshakable certainty that the very meaning of emptiness is dependent-arising. This is what is said in the definitive scriptures and in the pure Mādhyamaka texts, the treatises that comment on the intended meaning of those definitive scriptures.

中觀智者所有勝法,尤於佛護論師月稱論師,無餘盡解聖者父子所有密意,最微細處,謂依緣起,於無自性生定解法,及性空法現為因果之理。當生定解,他莫能轉。

This is the distinguishing feature of the Mādhyamika experts. Specifically, this is the subtle point that the noble Nāgārjuna and his spiritual son Aryadeva had in mind and upon which the master Buddhapalita and the glorious Candrakirti gave fully comprehensive commentary. This is how dependent arising bestows certain knowledge of the absence of intrinsic existence; this is how it dawns on you that it is things which are devoid of intrinsic existence that are causes and effects.

◎第二彼說如何破此之理。

1.3.2.1.2.1.2.1.2 How those systems contradict this distinguishing feature of Mādhyamaka

如是龍猛菩薩之宗,謂諸法全無塵許自性,

Thus, the system of Nāgārjuna the Protector is that phenomena do not have even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature.

若由自性,生死涅槃一切建立皆不得成。

Also, if there were intrinsic existence, then all of the teachings on cyclic existence and nirvāna would be impossible.

然此建立不可不有,其縛脫等一切建立皆當安立,故亦定須許無自性。

Since it is inappropriate not to give those teachings, all the teachings on bondage, freedom, etc. should be set forth. Thus, you definitely must assert the absence of intrinsic existence.

然汝等說,若一切法皆無自性,餘復何有,破除縛脫及生滅等不須更加勝義簡別,即由破除自性正理而能破除。

However, you misinterpreters of Mādhyamaka seem to say, "As things have no essential or intrinsic nature, then what else is there? Therefore, it is not necessary to add a qualification such as 'ultimate' when refuting bondage, freedom, production, cessation, etc. Bondage, etc. are refuted by the arguments that refute intrinsic existence."

故於無性安立縛脫及生滅等,應當審思云何非破。

If you say this, think about how you should not contradict that which allows you—in the absence of intrinsic existence—to posit bondage, freedom, arising, disintegration, and so forth.

若謂論
- p.417 -
師就名言許繫縛解脫生死涅槃一切建立,我於名言亦許彼等故無過失。

Objection: The master Candrakirti holds that teachings on cyclic existence and nirvana—bondage, freedom, etc.—are made conventionally, and we also accept these conventionally. Hence, there is no fault.

此非應理。月稱論師於名言中,亦許諸法全無自性,汝亦共許,若爾破除自性之理,於名言中亦須破彼自性故。

Reply: This is not reasonable. For you also accept the master Candrakirti's assertion that phenomena have no essential or intrinsic nature even conventionally. The argument refuting intrinsic existence must refute it even conventionally

又許破自性之理,能破繫縛及解脫等,故於名言亦破繫縛及解脫等,極為明顯

and you claim that the argument refuting intrinsic existence also refutes bondage, freedom, and so forth. Therefore, it is quite clear that in your system bondage, freedom, and so forth are refuted even conventionally.

總許無性與繫縛解脫生滅等相違,則於性空之空,生死涅槃一切建立而應理者,隨於二諦皆不得成。

In brief, if you claim that the absence of intrinsic existence contradicts bondage, freedom, production, cessation, etc., then it will be impossible—in terms of either truth—to give the full and correct teachings on nirvana and cyclic existence within emptiness, the emptiness of intrinsic existence.

故汝破壞中觀所有唯一勝法。

You have therefore denied the unique feature of Mādhyamaka.

若不許彼為相違者,許於所破全不簡別,以破自性之理而破生滅繫縛解脫等,全無正因。

If you claim that the absence of intrinsic existence does not contradict bondage and such, then you are left without any good reason with which to support your claim that—without having to add any qualification such as "ultimate" to what is negated—the argument refuting intrinsic existence also refutes production, cessation, bondage, freedom, etc.

若以破自性之理而破因果,則無性中無生滅等,

Therefore, if the argument refuting intrinsic existence refutes cause and effect, then you are asserting that production, disintegration, and such are impossible in the absence of intrinsic existence.

是與第二十四品「若此等皆空,應無生無滅,則諸四聖諦,於汝應皆無,」實事師宗所起諍論,及迴諍論中「設若一切法,皆非有自性,汝語亦無性,不能破自性,」實事師宗所起諍論,顯然無別。

In that case, it is quite clear that your position does not differ in the slightest from the essentialist argument set forth in the twenty-fourth chapter [of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》]:
If these were all empty,
There would be neither arising nor disintegration;
It follows that for you
The noble truths would not exist.
Nor does your position differ at all from the essentialist argument set forth in Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》:
If all things
Are completely without intrinsic nature,
Then your words also lack intrinsic nature
And thus cannot refute intrinsic existence.

若謂性空不空,其生滅等皆不得成,我俱不許性空不空,故無過失者,此定非論義。

Objection: Production, disintegration, and so forth are possible neither within emptiness of intrinsic existence nor within non-emptiness of intrinsic existence; since we assert neither emptiness of intrinsic existence nor non-emptiness of intrinsic existence, we have no faults.

《明顯句論》云﹕「其生滅等非但於我無不成過,其四諦等且極應理。」

Reply: This reading of the Mādhyamaka texts is utterly inappropriate, as Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 proves: We avoid the fallacy that arising, disintegration, and such would not be tenable. What is more, the four truths, etc. are tenable.

本論亦善分辨性空之宗,彼等皆成,不空之宗則皆不成。

Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 makes a clear distinction between the tenability of the four truths in the context of emptiness of intrinsic existence and their untenability in the context of non-emptiness.

《入中論》云﹕「事空如像等,依緣非不許,如從空像等,能生彼相識,如是諸法空,然從空事生。」

Further, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Empty things, such as reflections, depend on a collection of causes–
It is not as though this were not well known.
From those empty reflections and so forth
Arise consciousnesses that bear their image.
Similarly, even though all things are empty,
From those empty things, effects are definitely produced.

◎又以正理破縛脫等,非於勝義而能破除, 須於世俗中破,然於名言破除生死涅槃一
- p.418 -
切建立之中觀論師,誠為先所未有者。

Moreover, when reason refutes bondage, freedom, and so forth, according to your assertion it is not suitable to refute those ultimately and thus they must be refuted conventionally. In that case, one would be refuting all teachings on cyclic existence and nirvana even conventionally. Such a Mādhyamaka is without precedent.

- p.419 -

菩提道次第廣論卷十七終