Furthermore, the Cittamātrins say that individual, minute particles are not the objects of the sensory consciousnesses because they do not appear to them; an aggregation of many minute particles is also not an object of the sensory consciousnesses because it does not substantially exist. They say that this is like the appearance of two moons.
In answering the first proposition, Bhāvaviveka's 《Blaze of Reasons》 says:
If you are proving that a minute particle alone, not in a composite, is not an object of a sensory consciousness, then you are proving that which is already established.
As an answer to the latter position, he says:
Are you claiming that an aggregation of minute particles of one type in one place is not the cause of a sensory consciousness, giving as your reason, "because such aggregations do not substantially exist"? If you are, then I simply do not accept your reason. Why? It is as follows. Various minute particles of a single type coalesce and contribute to that aggregation, thus constituting the parts of an object. From this there arises a mind to which an image appears, the image of an aggregation of minute particles. We hold that, like minute particles, pots and such are also Substantially existent, for they are composites of minute particles of a single type.
It is the nature of a minute particle to be an aggregation of eight substances, yet you explicitly assert that it is substantially existent. Likewise, therefore, pots and such—which have natures of being aggregations—are also substantially existent. A nonaggregate singularity does not exist.
Thus it appears that he asserts that each of the minute particles of a composite is a cause of a sensory consciousness and is substantially existent.
Since he evidently asserts that each of these is the ultimate of minute particles, he implicitly accepts that partless particles are the perceptual condition for the arising of a sensory consciousness.
Therefore, Bhavaviveka asserts that sensory consciousnesses are non-mistaken if they are affected by neither the internal nor the external causes of error explained earlier. At the conventional level, he agrees with the Sautrāntikas in his assertions about the perceptual condition for the arising of a consciousness.
- p.438 -
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
Some say that the Mādhyamikas accept in conventional terms exactly what the Sautrāntikas advocate ultimately. You should understand that those who say this speak out of sheer ignorance of the reality explained in Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》. Also, there are those who think that Mādhyamikas accept in conventional terms what the Vaibhāsikas advocate ultimately. Those who think this understand nothing at all of the reality set forth in the 《Fundamental Treatise》. For supramundane teachings cannot be likened to worldly teachings in this manner. The learned should know that our system is unique. Thus he does not accept even conventionally the partless subjects and objects that are posited by the distinctive tenets of these schools.
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
It is not right for Buddhist schools to assert substantially existent minute particles as do the Vaiśesikas.
Thus he says that he does not assert partless particles. Candrakirti is referring to things such as partless particles when he says that the Mādhyamikas do not assert in conventional terms what the two schools, Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika, assert ultimately. He does not mean that Mādhyamikas reject, even conventionally, everything those two assert as true,
for while Vaibhāşikas and Sautrāntikas assert that things like forms and sounds are true, Mādhyamikas do accept the mere existence of these conventionally.
In the 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》, Candrakirti refutes the assertion that each minute particle within a collection of minute particles in a sensory faculty is a cause of a sensory consciousness.
He argues that the sensory faculties are not established either as being just those minute particles or as being something other than them.
Thus, the bases of the sensory consciousnesses are sensory faculties that are ascribed in dependence upon those minute particles. Likewise, in the case of objects, he says that the objects of sensory consciousnesses exist as constructs that are contingently constructed.
He also asserts that the consciousness is designated as direct [in the sense of perceiving], but the object of consciousness is actually what is direct [that is, directly before consciousness]. Therefore, although the master Candrakirti and the master Bhāvaviveka are alike in accepting external objects, they seem to differ in how they posit the sensory faculties and their objects.
Earlier, while refuting that the sensory consciousnesses are valid with regard to intrinsic character, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 said that the object of a sensory consciousness is deceptive "because it exists in one way but appears in another." Thus, things like forms and sounds appear to sensory consciousnesses as though they existed by way of their own intrinsic character,
but the intrinsic character that appears to them does not exist even conventionally. Therefore, Candrakirti asserts that these sensory consciousnesses are mistaken even conventionally.
Still, it is not impossible for sensory consciousnesses to be valid cognitions that posit objects such as forms, sounds, and so forth conventionally. The reason why those sensory consciousnesses are posited as mistaken is that there is no object that exists by way of intrinsic character such as appears to them.
The nonexistence of such an object is established by a reasoning consciousness analyzing whether things exist intrinsically; it is not at all established by conventional valid cognition. Therefore, in terms of conventional consciousnesses, they are not mistaken.
As for consciousnesses that perceive things such as a double moon or a reflection, objects such as those which appear to them— two moons, a reflected face, and the like—do not exist; this is established by conventional valid cognition itself without relying on a reasoning consciousness.
Thus, it is appropriate that these wrong sensory consciousnesses and the five valid sensory consciousnesses be differentiated as incorrect conventional consciousnesses and correct conventional consciousnesses.
- p.439 -
Qualm: We allow that it makes a difference whether a consciousness is known as mistaken in dependence upon reasoning consciousness or conventional valid cognition. However, just as the referent of a perception of a reflected image as a face does not exist, so also the referent of a perception of anything as having intrinsic character does not exist. Just as forms and such which are empty of intrinsic character do exist, so also a reflection that is empty of being a face exists. For this reason, one cannot differentiate those perceptions in terms of their accuracy even in relation to ordinary conventional awareness.
Reply: Indeed, something that exists by way of its intrinsic character and an object in a reflection that exists in accordance with its appearance as a face are alike in not existing conventionally. Also, forms and reflections are alike in existing conventionally.
However, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says: Some dependently arisen things—such as reflections and echoes— are false and appear to be false even to the ignorant. Somethings— blue and other forms as well as minds, feelings, etc.—appear to be true. The final nature of things [that is, emptiness] does not appear in any way to those who are ignorant. Therefore, that nature [i.e., emptiness] and whatever is false even conventionally are not conventional truths.
He thus makes the distinction that blue and so forth are posited as conventional truths, while reflections and such are not. If someone were to challenge this distinction, how could we reply?
This is what I think. Although forms and reflections are alike in appearing to conventional consciousnesses, even a worldly consciousness can know that reflections and such are false; thus, they are not posited as truths for the world, that is, for a conventional consciousness. Blue and such are falsities, but a worldly consciousness cannot understand them as falsities; hence, Candrakirti posits them as truths for the world, that is, for a conventional consciousness.
It is thus possible to distinguish objects as true and false in terms of conventional consciousness. It is likewise possible to distinguish subjects as accurate and inaccurate in terms of conventional consciousness.
Qualm: If a sensory consciousness is accurate in terms of conventional consciousness, this contradicts its being mistaken conventionally.
Reply: There is the "conventional" in terms of which the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken when we say that they are mistaken conventionally. Then again, there is the "conventional" consciousness in relation to which those unimpaired sensory consciousnesses are posited as accurate. If these two were the same, then there would be a contradiction. However, as these two usages of "conventional" are distinct, what contradiction is there?
How are they distinct? Reason refutes the essential or intrinsic existence of forms and such. It cannot do this ultimately [because nothing can be done ultimately in this system which refutes ultimate existence], so it must do it conventionally. For that kind of conventional consciousness, the sensory consciousnesses are mistaken. Apart from that, the sensory consciousnesses are not mistaken as seen by ordinary conventional consciousnesses; thus there is no contradiction.
For example, it is like the worldly convention, "Some are here; some are not here." The term "some" is the same, but no one supposes that the some who are here and the some who are not here are the same.
So also, the "non-mistaken" quality of the sensory consciousnesses is posited in terms of an ordinary worldly consciousness; Mādhyamikas do not assert them to be nonmistaken. It is like the statement by Candrakirti, "Those... are true for the world."
- p.440 -
Therefore, the Mādhyamikas posit the sensory consciousnesses as mistaken. Nonetheless, it is not a contradiction that these sensory consciousnesses posit their false objects. Rather, if a true object were posited, it would be contradictory for us to claim that it was poisted by a mistaken subject.
Conventionally, we assert that all phenomena are like a magician's illusion andare, therefore, false in conventional terms. Still, it is not contradictory to posit them as conventional truths.
[Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》] says, "Because ignorance obscures the nature of phenomena, we call it the concealer." Hence there is no contradiction in something being true for the concealer, that is, ignorance, and false for the conventional consciousness (kun rdzob, samvrti) with which we refute the essential existence in phenomena.
The statement [in Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary] "whatever is false even conventionally is not a conventional truth" refers to a conventional valid cognition which realizes that things like a reflection's being an actual face are false. It cannot refer simply to forms and such being false in conventional terms.
In this way, we Mādhyamikas posit conventionally, within our own system, many presentations of cyclic existence and nirvāna; we also refute the conventional existence of constructs that are put forward as unique assertions by essentialists.
As this is extremely difficult, accurate knowledge of the presentation of the two truths scarcely exists.
Misunderstanding may arise as follows. When we refute the conventional existence of the constructs that the essentialists assert, we must carry out the refutation using rational analysis.
Moreover, in taking their own stance on matters such as the existence of conventional production and cessation, reflective individuals will decide what to assert according to what can be proven, and proof is based in a sequence of reasoning.
Taking this into consideration, some feel that under rational analysis the proposed conventions of production, etc. and the imaginary constructs of essentialists have the same status as either contradicted or not contradicted by reason.
Thus, if they deny the conventional existence of constructs such as a divine creator or a primal essence, then they must also deny the conventional existence of forms and such; if they hold that forms do exist conventionally, then they would also have to accept the existence of a divine creator. They see those two as equivalent.
They say that it is inappropriate for their own system to identify or to assert of any phenomenon, "This is such and such; this is not such and such." They presume that in this they have found the Madhyamaka reality.
Further, in accordance with such understanding, they hold that stabilizing your mind without apprehending anything at all is cultivation of the genuine Madhyamaka view.
There are a great many who assert this. It is evident that such talk does not please the learned. For, having failed to identify the object negated by reason as explained above, those who say this use the arguments that refute intrinsic existence to destroy all presentations of conventionalities.
Consequently, theirs is a highly inaccurate position; it treats the correct view and the wrong view as the same in the degree to which they are mistaken or non-mistaken.
- p.441 -
As a result, prolonged habituation to such a view does not bring you the least bit closer to the correct view. In fact, it takes you farther away from it, for such a wrong view stands in stark contradiction to the path of dependent-arising, the path in which all of the teachings on the dependent-arisings of cyclic existence and nirvana are tenable within our system.
Therefore, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
The self as it is imagined by the non-Buddhist philosophers
Who are disturbed by the sleep of ignorance,
And things that are ascribed to mirages,
Magicians' illusions, and so forth, do not exist even for the world.
He says that what is imagined in the unique assertions of non-Buddhist philosophers—or, according to the earlier citation, in the unique assertions of Buddhist essentialists—does not exist even conventionally in our Madhyamaka system. I will explain this point.
How does one determine whether something exists conventionally?
We hold that something exists conventionally
(1)if it is known to a conventional consciousness;
(2) if no other conventional valid cognition contradicts its being as it is thus known; and
(3) if reason that accurately analyzes reality—that is, analyzes whether something intrinsically exists—does not contradict it. We hold that what fails to meet those criteria does not exist.
In a sense, conventional consciousness operates in a non-inquisitive manner. It operates only within the context of how a given phenomenon appears to it, without analyzing, "Is this how the object actually exists, or does it just appear this way to my mind?" It is called non-analytical consciousness, but it is not the case that it is utterly non-inquisitive.
It operates within the context of how things appear, how they are known, to a worldly or conventional consciousness. It does not operate via analysis of how things actually exist. Therefore, it is called mundane knowledge.
This kind of consciousness occurs in all persons, whether or not they have become involved in philosophical tenet systems. Thus, no matter whose mind-stream it occurs in, this is called "mundane knowledge" or "non-analytical consciousness."
Do not suppose that it exists only in the mind-streams of those worldly persons who are not involved in philosophical tenet systems. Those who are involved in such systems may often have minds that analyze, "Is conventional knowledge accurate?" or "Does this object exist this way in reality?"
Still, how could all of their consciousnesses analyze how things actually exist?
Therefore, if you want to understand what worldly knowledge is, you cannot ask only those worldly elders who hold no philosophical tenets. However, it is sufficient to consider how non-analytical minds operate in the mind-streams of the two parties in a debate. What these consciousnesses know is the perceptual or experiential basis for the construction of conventional language.
- p.442 -
Ordinary people do not understand karma and its effects, the levels and paths, or such matters, but they hear about and experience them, thereby taking them as objects. As this is so, they appear even to ordinary consciousnesses that are not analyzing how things actually exist. We thus avoid the fallacy that these would not be things that the world knows.
Other conventional valid cognitions do not contradict that which exists conventionally. For example, a consciousness that does not analyze how things actually exist may think that a rope is a snake or that a mirage is water. However, conventional valid cognition does contradict the objects apprehended by such consciousnesses, so those objects do not exist even conventionally.
A reasoning consciousness that accurately analyzes whether something intrinsically exists does not contradict that which exists conventionally. What is posited conventionally must be established by conventional valid cognition. In addition, reasoning consciousnesses that accurately analyze whether it intrinsically exists definitely must not contradict it in any way.
Whatever such reasoning establishes as existing must exist essentially, so it is contradictory for such to be a conventional object.
Because of this, it is wrong to confuse (1) not being contradicted by a reasoning consciousness and (2) being established by a reasoning consciousness. Such confusion is the basis for the misconception that the following two propositions stand equally, either both true or both false:
1. Pleasure and pain arise conventionally from virtue and nonvirtue.
2. Pleasure and pain arise from a divine creator and a primal essence.
This misconception is incorrect. The two propositions are equivalent to the extent that a line of reasoning that accurately analyzes whether things intrinsically exist will establish neither, but the two are not alike in all respects—one is contradicted by reason and the other is not.
A partless object and subject, a self, a primal essence, a divine creator—such things are imaginary constructs put forward in the unique assertions of Buddhist and non-Buddhist essentialists. When they posit such, they do so after rational analysis of whether such things essentially exist; they think that this sort of rational analysis will discover these things.
Thus, because they assert that these things can withstand rational analysis, they have to accept that others outside of their schools can perform such rational analysis in order to discover whether these things intrinsically exist.
When analyzed in this way, such things cannot withstand the pressure of inquiry by impeccable reasoning. Thus, when reason does not find them, they stand refuted—for if they did exist, such reasoning would have to find them.
We posit forms, sound, and such only as they are known to conventional consciousnesses that are not impaired by internal or external causes of error.
- p.443 -
We do not assert them as part of a system in which an analysis of whether they are mere conventions or instead have objective existence will find that they are essentially or intrinsically existent.
Thus, rational analysis of whether they intrinsically exist is irrelevant because we do not assert that these objects can withstand rational analysis.
For example, if someone claims, "This is a sheep," it is inappropriate to analyze this claim by asking, "Is it a horse or is it an elephant?" This is similar.
There are things that have been "known to the world" from beginningless time, and yet do not exist even conventionally inasmuch as reason contradicts them. As examples, one can cite the essence that ignorance superimposes on things, the essentially existent "I" and "mine" conceived by the reifying view of the perishing aggregates, or the object of the conception that yesterday's mountain is today's mountain. Therefore, it is not the case that Mādhyamikas conventionally accept everything that is known to the world.
Some argue that in terms of conventional existence, forms, sounds, and so forth are not equivalent to the constructs of non-Buddhist philosophers for the reason that the former are known to all the world whereas the latter are known only to advocates of philosophical tenets.
Those who hold this position have failed to make careful distinctions. Otherwise, they would see the many unwanted implications of their argument, such as: In conventional terms, forms and such could not be like illusions; rather, at the conventional level they would have to exist essentially.
Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning"》 says:
The inaccurate are those that apprehend these things in cyclic existence only as blissful and so forth, because even conventionally these things do not have this nature. The accurate are those that apprehend these things as suffering and so forth because these things have such a nature conventionally.
He explains that although the permanence and so forth of the things of cyclic existence is "common knowledge" in the world, such conceptions are inaccurate even conventionally. Also, even though their impermanence and so forth are not known to all the world, such conceptions are accurate.
Thus, a conceptual consciousness which apprehends the aggregates as impermanent and so forth is mistaken with regard to its appearing object, but we call it accurate, or non-mistaken, insofar as What it discerns is not contradicted by valid cognition.
Sensory consciousnesses are mistaken with regard to their appearing objects, and we do not call them non-mistaken since they have no other factor that is non-mistaken.
All sensory consciousnesses are alike in being mistaken with regard to what appears to them. However, sensory consciousnesses such as those to which a reflection appears are incorrect conventional consciousnesses; other, unimpaired sensory consciousnesses are correct conventional consciousnesses.
This is based on whether there is an object compatible with what appears to the worldly perspective of that sensory consciousness.
Since the objects conceived by conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend the aggregates as permanent and so forth do not exist Conventionally, reason can refute them. However, the referent objects of the conceptions of the aggregates as impermanent, etc. do exist conventionally; hence, reason cannot refute them.
- p.444 -
There is no ultimate or essential permanence and so forth; likewise, there is no ultimate or essential impermanence and so forth. Therefore the conceptions of those eight as existing in reality are identical in their degree accuracy.
Thinking of this, the Buddha said [in the Perfection of Wisdom sutras] that you are meditating on signs of true existence whether you meditate upon forms as permanent or impermanent, as blissful or painful, as having self or not having self.
Qualm: Ignorance superimposes intrinsic nature on things. For you to use reason to overcome its perspective, yet not to refute conventional objects—this is a contradiction,
because Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" says:
The Sage said that because ignorance obscures the nature of phenomena,
It is a "concealer" (kun rdzob, samvrti).
The fabrications that it perceives as true
Are called "truths-for-a-concealer".
Thus Candrakirti says that forms, sounds, and so forth are posited as conventional truths through the force of ignorance.
Reply: There is no fault here.
When we posit things such as forms and sounds as conventional truths, "truth" means that they are true through the force of a particular thought.
Since that thought must be considered a conception of true existence, forms, sounds, and so forth are truths for the ignorance that superimposes intrinsic existence on them.
Therefore, Candrakirti refers to the two types of arhats who have eliminated afflicted ignorance and to bodhisattvas on the eighth level and above when he says, "They see these appearances as fabrications and not as true because they do not have an exaggerating conception of true existence."
For this reason, Candrakirti says that for those who do not have the conception of true existence, forms and so forth are "mere conventionalities."
Therefore, the truth of forms, sounds, and such is posited in the perspective of ignorance, but ignorance does not posit things such as forms and sounds. For example, from the perspective of a wrong consciousness that apprehends a rope as a snake, the rope is a snake, but this wrong consciousness does not posit the rope.
Since the minds that posit things like form and sound are the six unimpaired consciousnesses associated with the eye, etc.,
the objects they establish do exist conventionally, and thus reason does not refute them. However, even conventionally they do not exist as ignorance apprehends them. This is because ignorance superimposes an essential or intrinsic nature on things, and this intrinsic nature does not exist even conventionally.
Therefore, reason conventionally refutes what ignorance apprehends; if it did not, then you could not prove that, at the conventional level, things are like illusions.
Ignorance superimposes an intrinsic nature on things; from this, attachment, hostility, and so forth arise, further superimposing features such as attractiveness or unattractiveness upon that intrinsic nature. Therefore, reason can also be used to eradicate the way that attachment and such apprehend objects.
- p.445 -
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
Attachment and so forth superimpose features such as attractiveness or unattractiveness only upon the intrinsic nature of things that ignorance has superimposed. Therefore they do not work apart from ignorance; they depend upon ignorance. This is because ignorance is the main affliction.
These are the innate afflictions that have operated from beginningless time. However, because reason can eradicate the way that they apprehend things, their referent objects do not exist even conventionally.
Therefore, objects of innate minds are of two types: those that reason can refute and those that reason cannot refute.
The objects of the innate conventional valid cognitions that posit things like form and sound do exist conventionally; hence, reason does not refute them.
Accordingly, since we refute essential or intrinsic existence even conventionally in the system of the masters Buddhapālita and Candrakirti, it seems to be very difficult to posit conventional objects.
If you do not understand how to posit these well, without contradiction, then you will not be fully certain about the practices on the performance class." It seems that this causes most individuals to fall into an overly negative view. Therefore, the intelligent should master this system's procedure for positing conventionalities. At this point, I am afraid I may have said more than enough about this; I will not elaborate any further.
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.3 You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are produced in one of four alternative ways.
Objection: Madhyamaka refutes production from self, from another, and from both, as well as causeless production. Does this refute production? If you claim that it does, then since these four alternative types of production do not exist even conventionally in this Madhyamaka system, there is no need to add any qualifying phrase to the refutation of production.
If you claim that it does not, then your refutation of the four alternatives of production fails to refute ultimate production.
Reply: We do not accept the former of these two positions, so I will explain the answer to the latter.
Those who assert ultimate production must assert that it with stands analysis by reasoning that analyzes reality.
As this is so, they must use reason to analyze production so as to discover which it is among the four alternatives—production from self, other, and so forth. Hence, those who assert ultimate production are definitely required to assert that it can be analytically fixed within one of the four alternatives.
Because we assert mere production—the arising of particular effects in dependence on particular causes and conditions—we do not assert real production.
Since we do not assert real production, why would we use reasoning that analyzes reality to analyze production as to which it is—production from self, other, and so forth? For, we are not required to assert that production withstands rational analysis.
Moreover, dependent production itself refutes the four alternative types of production. As Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Because things arise dependently These mistaken conceptions cannot bear scrutiny. Therefore, the reasoning of dependent-arising Cuts all the entanglements of bad views.
Therefore, Candrakirti asserts that dependent production refutes the four alternative types of production. However, you claim that if there is no production from among the four alternative types, then even mere production does not exist. Hence it seems that what you propose is the opposite of what Candrakirti asserts.
Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" also says:
Because things are not produced
Causelessly, or from causes such as a divine creator,
Or from self, other, or both self and other,
They are produced dependently.
- p.446 -
However, according to you, it would be contradictory for Candrakirti to say this. Therefore, dependently produced dependent-arisings are free from the four extreme types of production.
So do not ask, "That which is free from extremes—which of the four extremes is it?" Once again, these opponents go wrong by not distinguishing "no intrinsic production" from "no production."
Qualm: How do you explain the statement in Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way":
The argument which shows that production from self and from other
Are untenable in the context of ultimate reality
Also shows that production is untenable even conventionally.
Reply: This means that if you assert substantially existent production, or production that exists by way of its intrinsic character, then those arguments refute it even conventionally. It does not at all indicate a refutation of mere production,
for in the transition to that passage, [Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》] says:
Objection: The things that serve as the causes of afflicted and pure phenomena must produce substantially existent entities.
Reply: If this were so, then the very words of your statement would not remain. Why?
At this point Candrakirti gives the verse cited above, "The argument which shows that production from self and from other...." Commenting on that verse, he says: You must therefore admit, albeit unwillingly, that production by way of intrinsic character does not exist in terms of either of the two truths.
Thus, insofar as essentially existent production is ultimate production, when others assert it—even if they assert it conventionally— you must refute its propriety just as you refute ultimate production.
Since this is the excellent assertion of the master Candrakirti, you should not assert essentially existent production even conventionally.
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
The self-generation of the son of a barren woman
Exists neither in reality nor in the world.
Similarly, all these things lack essential production
Both for the world and in reality.
Some hold that the lack of intrinsic production—production's lack of intrinsic existence—must mean that production does not exist. They argue that dependent production and the absence of intrinsic production are contradictory. Candrakirti says [in the Commentary on the "Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" that those who say this have no ears or heart.
In saying that they have no ears, he means that they do not hear the qualification "intrinsic" when we refer to the lack of intrinsic production; they hold that we have said, "lack of production." In saying that they have no heart, he means that even if they hear it they have no comprehension of the meaning of the word "intrinsic."
Nāgārjuna's 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
The supreme knower of reality e
Said that dependent production is not production.
Commenting on that passage, Candrakirti's Commentary on the 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》 says:
When you see dependent-arising, you do not perceive things as intrinsically existent. This is because the dependently produced is not intrinsically produced, like a reflection.
Objection: Is it not the case that the dependently produced is only produced? How can you say that it is not produced? If you say that something is not produced, then you should not say that it is dependently produced. Therefore, because these are mutually exclusive, your position is incorrect.
Reply: Poor thing! With neither ears nor heart, you still argue. This puts us in a difficult situation. We contend that dependently produced things are, like reflections, not produced intrinsically. As this is the case, how can your objection stand a chance?
Thus you should cherish these distinctions.
- p.447 -
Also, the 《Question of the Nāga King Anavatapta》 says:
Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced;
It is not intrinsically produced.
Whatever depends upon conditions, I consider empty;
One who knows emptiness is diligent.
After the Buddha has stated in the first line, "Whatever is produced from conditions is not produced," he indicates with the second line the manner of non-production, "It is not intrinsically produced." Thus, adding a qualifying phrase to the object of negation, the Buddha says that things are not produced intrinsically.
Some hear these words and do not understand them; they say, "Only the produced is not produced; only the dependent does not depend." They evidently think that aggressively advocating this mass of contradictions constitutes an advanced view.
This is also stated very clearly in the 《Descent into Lanka Sūtra》 as quoted by Candrakirti in his 《Clear Words》:
Mahamati, thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced.
This actually answers the question whether the qualification "ultimately" should be added to the refutation of production and so forth. However, I will answer this question more specifically below.
These points explained above indicate that none of the refutations set forth by opponents can refute this procedure for positing things such as cause and effect in the absence of intrinsic existence.
In general, the height of false refutation is an argument that obliterates the analysis that was supposed to refute the opponent, leaving no trace.
Thus, your statement is the height of false refutation. This is because the method you use to refute your opponent's position, analyzing whether reason contradicts it and so forth, can be turned against you and used to refute your critique.
Qualm: You assert the existence of forms and such, so the analysis of them in terms of the four alternatives does bear upon your position. We, however, have no position of our own, so such analysis does not apply to us.
Reply: This argument cannot avoid those fallacies. I will explain this later in the section on whether the view is established through reductio ad absurdum arguments or through autonomous syllogisms.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.4 A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena
Qualm: The Madhyamaka texts refute all four parts of the tetralemma—a thing or intrinsic nature (1) exists, (2) does not exist, (3) both exists and does not exist, and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four.
Reply: As indicated earlier, "thing" has two meanings. Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however, at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions.
As for non-things, if you hold that non-compounded phenomena are essentially existent non-things, then we also refute such non-things. We likewise refute something that is both such a thing and such a non-thing, and We also refute something that essentially exists as neither.
- p.448 -
Thus, you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as "essentially."
Suppose that you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;
you then say, "It is not the case that they both exist and do not exist."
If you now continue with the refutation, saying, "It is also not the case that they are neither existent nor nonexistent," then you explicitly contradict your own position.
If you then stubbornly insist, "Even so, there is no fallacy," then the debate is over because we do not debate with the obstinate.
Furthermore, when you refute essential or intrinsic nature, or self, With regard to the aggregates, this gives rise to a wisdom consciousness thinking, "Intrinsic nature, or self, does not exist."
If you also refute the lack of intrinsic nature that is the object of that wisdom consciousness, then you are refuting the Madhyamaka view. This is because you have refuted the object of the wisdom consciousness that knows that phenomena lack intrinsic nature.
This is what I ask of those who claim to refute both intrinsic nature and the absence of intrinsic nature: Please tell me how you refute the absence of intrinsic nature that is the object of the wisdom consciousness ascertaining that the aggregates do not intrinsically exist.
Qualm: Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
If there were the slightest trace which is non-empty,
Then a trace of emptiness would exist as well;
As there is no trace that is non-empty,
How could there be a trace of emptiness?
Therefore, because there is nothing that is not empty, the emptiness that is the absence of intrinsic existence also does not exist.
Reply: Here in the 《Fundamental Treatise》, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end.
Thus "not empty of intrinsic nature" means "having intrinsic nature." What could be more ridiculous than your position that since there is no intrinsic nature, the emptiness that is the absence of intrinsic nature also does not exist!
Furthermore, the definite knowledge which apprehends that something such as a seedling lacks essential or intrinsic nature apprehends that there is no intrinsic nature in the seedling. It does not think, "This absence of intrinsic nature exists," nor does it think, "This absence of intrinsic nature does not exist." Close your eyes, turn inward, and know this; it is very easy to understand.
It would not be appropriate to apprehend the absence of intrinsic nature as existing in that way.
Suppose that this did mean that it is proper to use reason to refute the existence of emptiness in order to overcome the conception that the absence of intrinsic nature exists. You would still have to hold that you are refuting the object of some other mind which apprehends the absence of intrinsic nature as something that exists; it would be quite wrong to refute the object of the wisdom that realizes that a seedling does not intrinsically exist.
When we refute the essential or intrinsic nature of a seedling, we have definite knowledge that the seedling does not intrinsically exist. Then, even if some other awareness apprehends that absence of intrinsic nature as existing, reason does not refute the object of that other mind.
However, if that mind holds that emptiness exists essentially, then reason does refute that.
Qualm: How could someone develop an apprehension that the absence of intrinsic nature intrinsically exists?
Reply. In perceiving the seedling's lack of intrinsic nature, you do not establish this lack as the seedling's intrinsic nature. Still, you might develop the idea that the absence of intrinsic nature is the intrinsic nature of that seedling.
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For example, in the absence of a pot, you would not develop the idea, "The truth is that there is a pot," but you might develop the idea, "The truth is that there is no pot."
Accordingly, since there is nothing at all that is not empty of intrinsic existence, it is perfectly reasonable to say that even the emptiness which is a seedling's lack of intrinsic nature lacks essential existence.
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 speaks of refuting the essential existence of emptiness:
If that which is called emptiness did have some essential existence, then things would have intrinsic nature.
However, it does not. In order to indicate this, Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
As there is nothing that is not empty,
From what can emptiness arise?
As there is nothing to oppose,
How can there be a remedy?
If you disagree, and you refute the existence of the emptiness which is the absence of intrinsic nature, then the absence of intrinsic nature would not exist.
In that case, since essential or intrinsic nature would exist, it would be totally inappropriate to refute intrinsic nature.
For, in this vein, Nāgārjuna's 《Refutation of Objections》 says:
How could the absence of intrinsic nature in my words
Refute my claim that things lack intrinsic nature?
If the absence of intrinsic nature were refuted,
Then the presence of intrinsic nature would be proven.
And, Nāgārjuna's 《Commentary on the "Refutation of Objections"》, commenting on that, says very clearly:
Objection: Just as someone might stop sound with the sound, "Don't make a sound," so the absence of intrinsic existence in your words refutes your claim that there is no intrinsic nature in things.
Reply: The example is correct, but your point is not. Here, words that have no intrinsic nature do refute the intrinsic existence of things. If the absence of intrinsic nature in words could refute the absence of intrinsic nature in things, then this would refute the absence of intrinsic nature itself. Therefore, things would have intrinsic nature, and because of having intrinsic nature, they would not be empty.
Therefore—just after the passage in the 《Fundamental Treatise》 cited above, "How could there be a trace of emptiness?"
The Conqueror said that emptiness
Eradicates all dogmatic views;
As for those who take a dogmatic view of emptiness,
He said that they are incurable.
Again, having a dogmatic view of emptiness does not mean taking the view that things are empty of intrinsic nature. It means thinking of emptiness, emptiness of intrinsic nature, as truly existent or viewing it as a real thing.
For, Buddhapālita's 《Commentary on the "Fundamental Treatise"》 says this very clearly, giving an example: It is possible to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that things exist essentially. You can explain emptiness and show them that things are empty of essence, saying, "As these are dependent-arisings, they are designated as this or that thing through the force of causes and conditions; things do not exist essentially." However, there is no way to overcome the misconceptions of those who think that emptiness is a real thing. For example, if you tell someone, "I have nothing," and that person then says, "Give me that nothing," how could you make that person understand that you have nothing?
If it is not taken in this way, the example would also be inappropriate. Suppose you say to me, "Give me some money," and I reply, "I have no money." If you conclude, "This person has no money," then there is no problem.
However, if you think of "no money" as a kind of money, then there is no way that I can assure you that I have no money.
- p.450 -
In just the same way, suppose you ask, "Do things have intrinsic nature or not?" and I say, "They do not have intrinsic nature." If you then think, "Things do not have intrinsic nature," how could that be a problem? I wanted you to get this idea.
However, if you think that things' lack of intrinsic nature is itself intrinsically existent, then this is a problem.
According to your interpretation, when you hear me say that I have no money and then develop the idea, "This person has no money," then even that idea must be refuted. So it would be wonderful for you to rely on what I have said.
Also, in the 《Clear Words》 Candrakīrti speaks of clinging to emptinessas a real thing, hence, he is not refuting emptiness itself, and there is no fault in simply having the view of emptiness.
The 《Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines》 says:
A bodhisattva who thinks, "The aggregates are empty," is meditating on signs and lacks faith in the realm of non-production.
Also, Nāgārjuna's 《Precious Garland》 says:
Therefore the Great Sage refuted
Views of self and selflessness.
Although these and other scriptures and treatises say that it is wrong to have a view of emptiness or selflessness, you should understand them as I have explained above.
Otherwise, they would contradict a great many statements in other texts. In the 《Heart Sūtra》, Śariputra asks Avalokiteśvara how one who wishes to practice the profound perfection of wisdom should train. In reply, Avalokiteśvara says: A bodhisattva should correctly view these five aggregates as empty of intrinsic existence.
The 《Verse Summary of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines》 says:
One who knows that phenomena do not intrinsically exist is practicing the supreme perfection of wisdom.
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Consequently, a yogi views the emptiness of the self
And that which belongs to the self, and thereby becomes free.
Therefore, the root of all problems is the ignorance that superimposes intrinsic existence. There is only one consciousness that can uproot it by apprehending things in a way that explicitly contradicts it. That consciousness is the wisdom that knows selflessness, the absence of intrinsic existence.
As this is so, if you refute this way of apprehending things, then you will have to admit, albeit unwillingly, that you are refuting the view of reality.
At the point where Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says, "There is no second door to peace,"
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four hundred Stanzas"》 says:
The extinction of attachment is the cause of attaining nirvâna and, except for the view of the absence of intrinsic existence, there is no other teaching that can cause that extinction of attachment. Thus, selflessness—characterized by the absence of intrinsic existence—is the one and only door to peace. As a gateway to the city of nirvâna, it is alone, and nothing can match it.
Although there are the three doors of liberation called "emptiness," "signlessness," and "wishlessness," still only the view of selflessness takes priority. If you know phenomena without exception as selfless and thereby extinguish every attachment to all things, then how could you ever long for anything or apprehend signs in anything?
Because of this, selflessness alone is the one and only door to peace.
Therefore, the 《Equipment for Enlightenment》 explains:
Because phenomena do not intrinsically exist, they are empty.
Further, because phenomena are empty, what use are signs?
Inasmuch as they have overcome all signs
Why would the learned wish for such phenomena?
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Thus Candrakirti clears up the apparent contradiction between scriptural explanations that there are three doors to liberation and other texts which explain that the view of emptiness of intrinsic existence is the only door to liberation. He uses scripture and reason to prove that just this view is the door to liberation.
Why should the mere negation of intrinsic nature imply the refutation of the object of wisdom? It should not, for such knowledge remedies the conceptions of the two selves assigns and it lacks even a trace of such a misconception.
If you regard as defective even such a conception, and refute all conceptuality of any sort—good or bad—then it is evident that you want to set up the system of the Chinese abbot Ha-shang.
22.214.171.124.2.2 Refuting an overly restricted identification of the object to be negated
Opponent: The object to be negated is an intrinsic nature that has three attributes:
(1) causes and conditions do not bring it into being,
(2) its condition is immutable, and
(3) it is posited without depending on some other phenomenon.
For, Nãgàrjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
It is not reasonable that a nature
Should arise from causes and conditions.
If it did arise from causes and conditions
Then a nature would be something that is made.
How could it be suitable
For a nature to be something that is made?
A nature is not fabricated
And does not depend on another.
Reply. In general, if someone claims that internal and external things—e.g., seedlings—have "intrinsic nature" in this sense, then Mādhyamikas indeed must refute such. However, here, identifying the object to be negated means identifying the fundamental object of negation. When you refute the fundamental object of negation, then the Madhyamaka view—knowledge that phenomena lack intrinsic nature—develops in your mind-stream.
Fallacies arise if we follow this opponent's interpretation. Since the partisans of non-Madhyamaka Buddhist schools have already established that compounded phenomena are produced by causes and conditions and are mutable, we should not have to demonstrate to them the absence of intrinsic nature. They also should have recognized that things lack intrinsic nature. So how can this be the unique Madhyamaka object of negation?
Many Madhyamaka texts adduce arguments such as: If things existed essentially, then they could not depend on causes and conditions, they would have to be immutable, and so forth. However, these statements indicate fallacies that would be entailed if things existed essentially; they do not identify the object of negation on its own terms.
It is the case that if something existed ultimately, existed in reality, or truly existed, then it could not depend on causes and conditions, and so forth; however, that is not what ultimate existence means.
For example, even though being a potentails being impermanent, impermanence is not the proper meaning of pot; rather you have to say that it means a "bulbous splay-based thing able to perform the function of holding water."
Likewise, if something existed ultimately, etc., it would have to be a partless thing; still, here in Madhyamaka we do not suggest that "partless thing" is the fundamental object of negation. Since partless things are merely imputed from the unique perspective of advocates of philosophical tenets, such notions are not the fundamental cause that binds embodied beings in cyclic existence.
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Further, even if you determined that those partless things lack intrinsic nature and then meditated on that, this would not at all counter the ignorant conception which has operated from beginningless time. Therefore, even optimal and direct knowledge of that would not overcome the innate afflictions.
Thus, when making philosophical determinations, make your principal task to determine that an object as conceived by innate ignorance does not exist. Ancillary to that, refute objects of acquired misconceptions.
If you do not understand this, and fail to eradicate the perspective of innate ignorance, then, when you refute a personal self, you will only refute a self that is permanent, unitary, and independent. When you refute an objective self, you will only refute things that are imputed by the advocates of philosophical tenets—such as objects that are partless particles, partless moments of experience, or a natural substrate with three gunas ("strands") asserted by the Samkhyas. This is completely inappropriate.
If you think otherwise, then when you make philosophical determinations, you will establish nothing more than this shallow selflessness. As philosophical determinations are made for the purposes of meditation, when you meditate you will have to meditate only on this.
Therefore, even if you actualized such a selflessness in meditation and consummated your cultivation of it, nothing would come of it. It would be extremely absurd to claim that you can overcome innate afflictions by seeing as nonexistent the two selves imputed by acquired misconceptions.
Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self,
But we do not consider this the basis of the conception of "I."
It is therefore astonishing to claim that knowing this selflessness
Expunges and uproots the view of self.
Also, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
To elucidate this very point, the irrelevance of such to innate afflictions, by way of an example:
Someone sees a snake living in the wall of his house. To ease his concern, someone else says, "There is no elephant here."
Alas, to others it is ridiculous To suppose that this would dispel the fear of the snake.
Candrakirti refers to the selflessness of the person, but it is the same for the selflessness of objects; he could have added:
When knowing selflessness, some eliminate an acquired conception of self,
But we do not consider this the basis of ignorance.
It is therefore astonishing to claim that knowing this selflessness
Expunges and uproots ignorance.
Question: In the statement by Nāgārjuna set forth above, he says that the defining characteristics of a "nature" are not being fabricated and not depending upon something else. Was he speaking hypothetically or does such a nature exist?
Reply: The Buddha posits a "nature," saying, "This is the reality of Phenomena." It is not fabricated and does not depend on something else.
Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 establishes that it exists, citing a sūtra source:
Is there a nature that has such qualifications as the master Nāgārjuna claims? Yes, it is the "reality" of which the Bhagavan spoke extensively, saying, "Whether tathâgatas appear or not, the reality of phenomena remains."
What is this "reality"? It is the nature of things such as these eyes.
And, what is their nature? It is that in them which is neither fabricated nor dependent upon something else;
- p.453 -
it is their identity as known by knowledge free from the impairment of ignorance. Does it exist or not? If it did not exist, for what purpose would bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections? Why would bodhisattvas undergo hundreds of hardships in order to know reality?
Question: Did you not previously argue that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature?
Reply: Even phenomena that are not internal mental constructs lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature. Have we not given this answer several times? Therefore, what need is there to speak of other phenomena in terms of such a nature? Even reality, the ultimate truth, has no intrinsic nature at all.
For, Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
The "final nature" is the unfabricated fundamental entity which is ineluctably present in fire in the past, present, and future; it is not the later occurrence of something that was not there before; it does not depend on causes and conditions like the heat of water, or here and there, or long and short. Does fire have such a nature? It neither essentially has it nor essentially lacks it. Nevertheless, to avoid frightening listeners, I reify it and say, "It exists conventionally."
Thus Candrakirti refutes the view that this nature exists essentially; he says that it exists conventionally.
Objection: He does not assert that it exists, for he says that he reifies it in order to avoid frightening listeners.
Reply: That is not reasonable. He also spoke of other phenomena, having imputed them for that same reason. So if the final nature did not exist, those other phenomena also would not exist.
As cited earlier, Candrakirti proves that the final nature exists, making the argument that if it did not exist, then it would absurdly follow that pure conduct is senseless.
Also, Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
Not only does the master Nāgārjuna assert this nature, others also can be made to accept it. Thus he posits this nature as established for both parties to the debate.
If it were otherwise, then you would have to hold that in Madhyamaka it is impossible to attain freedom.
This is because (1) candrakirti says that to attain nirvana means to perceive nirvana, and he says that nirvāņa is considered a true cessation and that true cessations are ultimate truths; and
(2) ultimate truths would not exist. In his Commentary on the 《Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning》, Candrakirti takes pains to prove that when you attain nirvāņa, you must perceive the ultimate truth of cessation.
- p.454 -
Accordingly, compounded phenomena such as eyes are not natures in the sense of being essentially existent, nor are they natures when reality is posited as the final nature. So they are neither sort of nature. Ultimate truths are natures when reality is posited as the final nature, but what establishes them as such natures is that they are non-fabricated and do not depend upon something else. They do not at all exist as natures in the sense of being essentially existent. Thus, they exist merely conventionally.
"Fabricated" means "produced" in the sense of a new occurrence of something that did not exist before; "to depend upon something else" means to depend on causes and conditions.
Since forms and so forth are neither type of nature, when you speak of cultivating the path in order to view the final nature, "nature" has the sense of reality. Therefore, Candrakirti says that pure conduct is not senseless.
Moreover, he explains that his utter lack of an assertion that phenomena have a nature in the sense of essential existence does not contradict his incidental assertion of a final nature.
Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary says:
Objection: Alas, utterly wrong! You do not assert real things at all, but also incidentally assert a nature that is non-fabricated and does not depend upon something else. You are saying things that are blatantly contradictory.
Reply: In saying this, you miss the point of the 《Fundamental Treatise》. This is what it means: If eyes and such—dependent-arising that are evident to ordinary childish beings—
were their own nature, then pure conduct would be senseless because even inaccurate consciousnesses could know that nature.
Because they are not their own nature, pure conduct for the sake of viewing that nature does have a purpose.
Further, I say that this nature, as compared to conventional truths, is non-fabricated and does not depend upon something else. Only something that ordinary childish beings do not see is suitable to be the nature.
Therefore, the ultimate is neither a thing nor a non-thing; by nature, it is simply peace.
Here "thing" and "non-thing" refer to essential existence and utter nonexistence, as explained above in the section on dualism.
Now when you as an ordinary being determine that phenomena lack even a particle of essential or intrinsic nature, you find that emptiness—emptiness of intrinsic nature—is an attribute of the phenomena, such as form, that serve as its substrata.
Thus, it is not contradictory for both substrata and attribute to be objects of a single mind. Since you have not stopped dualistic appearance, that emptiness is a nominal rather than actual ultimate truth.
By accustoming yourself to that view which knows the absence of intrinsic nature, you will know it by perceiving it. For such a consciousness, all mistaken appearances stop. Mistaken appearance here means the appearance of intrinsic existence where there is no intrinsic existence.
Therefore, since the consciousness directly perceiving that reality does not perceive substrata such as forms,
neither that reality nor its substrata exist from the perspective of that mind.
So emptiness and forms, etc. must be posited as reality and substrata from the perspective of some other mind, a conventional mind.
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As this is so, an ultimate truth is posited where, in addition to the stilling of all elaborations of essential existence, there is also a sheer stoppage of all elaborations of mistaken appearances, appearances of intrinsic existence where there is none.
Thus, while we assert a final nature, how could we be forced to accept an essentially existent nature?
Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 says:
Driven by the impairment of ignorance, ordinary beings perceive a certain aspect in things. As noble beings who are free from the impairment of ignorance do not see that mistaken aspect, there is something else that serves as their object. That very entity is posited as the final nature of those things.
Also: Things' lack of intrinsically existent production is not anything. Thus, since it is just a non-thing, it has no essence. Therefore, it is not the intrinsic nature of things.
Some [Tibetans] do not posit ultimate truth as the sheer elimination of the elaborations of the objects of negation, e.g., the two selves. Instead they hold that, as the object of a mind that non-mistakenly knows how things exist, the ultimate appears to exist under its own power—just as things such as blue and yellow appear to an ordinary mind.
Ascertaining that it does exist in that way is the view that knows the profound.
They also claim that it is a misstep with regard to the correct view to regard external and internal phenomena—the bases with regard to which living beings cling to the two selves—as lacking intrinsic existence.
These assertions stand outside the sphere of all the scriptures, Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. They accept that it is necessary to stop the conception of self, the root that binds all living beings in cyclic existence.
They then assert that you do not stop the conception of self by realizing that there is no intrinsic existence in the substrata it apprehends as a self; rather, you stop it by knowing as truly existent some other unrelated phenomenon.
This is no different from the following scenario: Suppose that there is no snake in the east, but someone thinks that there is and is terrified. You say to the distressed person, "You cannot stop your idea that there is a snake by thinking, 'In the east there is no snake at all.' Rather you should think, 'There is a tree in the west.' That will stop your idea that there is a snake and will end your distress."
Hence, you who wish the good for yourselves should stay far away from such wrong views.
You should work on the method for eradicating the way that ignorance apprehends things, this ignorance being the root of all that binds you and degrades you in cyclic existence.
Regarding this method, the texts of the father, the noble Nāgārjuna, and his spiritual son Aryadeva clearly set forth vast collections of arguments that build deep and certain knowledge of the definitive scriptures and how it is that the meaning of these scriptures cannot be otherwise interpreted. Relying on these texts by Nāgārjuna and Aryadeva, cross to the other side of the ocean of cyclic existence.
To avoid missteps in reaching the Madhyamaka view, it is most crucial to refute wrong ideas about the object of negation. For that reason I have given an extended explanation.
◎ - p.456 -