菩提道次第廣論卷二十二

第三依此能破於相續中生見之理分三,一 決擇補特伽羅無我,二 決擇法無我,三 修習此見淨障之理。

1.3.2.3 How to use that procedure to generate the right philosophical view within your mind-stream.
This third section describes how to develop the right philosophical view in your mind-stream using a Prāsangika procedure. Within this section there are three parts:
1.3.2.3.1 How to determine that there is no self [i.e., essential selfnature] in the person
1.3.2.3.2 How to determine that there is no self in phenomena
1.3.2.3.3 How to eliminate afflictive and cognitive obscurations by becoming accustomed to those views

初又分三,一 正決擇我無自性,二 顯由此成我所無性,三 此諸正理於餘例明。

1.3.2.3.1 How to determine that there is no self [i.e., essential selfnature] in the person.
This section has three parts:
1.3.2.3.1.1 Actually determining that the self [i.e., person] lacks intrinsic existence
1.3.2.3.1.2 Teaching that what the self owns is also thereby established as lacking intrinsic existence
1.3.2.3.1.3 How to apply those lines of reasoning to other phenomena as well

初又分二,一 立喻,二 合義。  

1.3.2.3.1.1 Actually determining that the self [i.e., person] lacks intrinsic existence.
This has two parts:
1.3.2.3.1.1.1 Giving the example
1.3.2.3.1.1.2 Showing what the example illustrates

今初  

1.3.2.3.1.1.1 Giving the example

◎入中論釋引經說云﹕「言我是魔心,汝昔起是見,此行蘊皆空,此中無有情,如依諸支聚,假名說曰車,如是依諸蘊,說世俗有情。」

A sūtra cited in Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says:
"Self" is a demonic mind.
You have a wrong view.
These composite aggregates are empty;
There is no living being in them.
Just as one speaks of a chariot
In dependence upon collections of parts,
So we use the convention "living being"
In dependence upon the aggregates.

此如依自車輪等支假名為車,依於諸蘊假名為我或曰有情。

Taking as an example the imputation of a chariot in dependence upon its parts, such as its wheels, the Buddha states that the self or living being is also imputed in dependence upon the aggregates.

先說車喻。此中分四,一 顯車無性而為假有,二 於彼斷諍,三 由名差別皆得成立,四 依此速得正見勝利。

Therefore, I will first explain the example of the chariot. The explanation of the example has four parts:
1.3.2.3.1.1.1.1 Showing that the chariot exists imputedly, without intrinsic existence
1.3.2.3.1.1.1.2 Eliminating objections to that
1.3.2.3.1.1.1.3 How to establish the chariot under various names
1.3.2.3.1.1.1.4 The advantage that you find the view quickly by using this example

今初

1.3.2.3.1.1.1.1 Showing that the chariot exists imputedly, without intrinsic existence

◎《入中論》云﹕「如車非許離自支,亦非非異非具支,非依他支非支依,非聚非形此亦爾。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
A chariot is neither asserted to be other than its parts, nor to be non-other. It does not possess them. It does not depend on the parts and the parts do not depend on it. It is neither the mere collection of the parts, nor is it their shape. It is like this.

如車與自支,於一異等七中皆無故唯假有。我與取蘊說亦如是。

Thus he says that just as a chariotis a mere imputation since it does not exist in these seven ways—one with its parts, different from its parts, etc.—so it is also for the self and the aggregates.

此中若車有自體性,則以正理觀性有無,於一異等七相之中,定有所得,然於彼七皆非有故,定無自性。

If the chariot had an essential or intrinsic nature, it undoubtedly would be established by reasoned knowledge that analyzes whether it exists intrinsically in any of the seven ways. However, since it is not established by such knowledge in any of the seven ways, it does not intrinsically exist.

言車支
- p.501 -
者,謂軸輪轄等,車與彼支自性非一。

The parts of a chariot are the axle, the wheels, the nails, etc. The chariot is not intrinsically one with those parts.

若性一者,如支眾多車當亦多,如車是一支亦當一,作者作業皆當成一,有此等過。

If it were one, there would be fallacies such as the following: just as the parts are plural, so the chariot also would be many; just as the chariot is single, so the parts also would be single; agent and the object would be the same.

又與自支體性非異,異如瓶衣各別可得,不可得故。

Nor is a chariot intrinsically separate from its parts because if it were it would be seen separately, apart from them, like pot and cloth, yet it is not.

亦當無有施設因故。

Also, there would be no reason to impute it in relation to those parts.

能依所依二品自非支依,如酪在盤,亦非依支,如天授在帳。若性各異,此二容有無別性故。

Two of the positions involve positing a chariot and its parts as basis and dependent. A chariot is not the basis for its parts, like a bowl holding yogurt, nor does it rest in its parts, like Devadatta in a tent, because such relationships could be demonstrated only if a chariot and its parts were essentially separate, but they are not.

此中非破互有,是破能依所依有實自相。

Here we do not refute mere mutual existence; we refute a basis and dependent that exist by way of intrinsic character.

所擧二喻亦就他許,謂有自相能依所依,如此一切當知皆爾。

Even the two examples just mentioned refer to situations in which the other party accepts that there are intrinsically characterized bases and dependents. All similar cases should be understood in this way.

又具支者亦不應理,若車具支,應如天授具足牛等異體可取。

The possibility of possession is also untenable. If you hold that a chariot possesses its parts just as Devadatta possesses oxen—i.e., as objects other than himself—then just as the oxen and Devadatta are seen separately,

如是車與自支各異亦應可取,然不可取故無具義。

a chariot and its parts should likewise be seen separately, yet they are not. Thus, there is no such possession.

如云天授有耳,車有支者亦不應理,已破異性故。

It is also unreasonable that a chariot should possess its parts just as Devadatta possesses his ear because we are now refuting intrinsic difference.

若此具支有自性者,應是一性前已破故。

For things that exist essentially, this type of possession would involve intrinsic oneness, and we already refuted that.

天授有耳,於名言有,此非所破,車亦許爾,故是破除自相之具。

Again, we do not refute the conventional existence of Devadatta's merely having an ear, and the same applies to the chariot. Thus, we refute intrinsically characterized possession.

◎餘二執者,如云﹕「若合聚為車,散住車應有,無有支無支,形車亦非理。」

As for the two remaining positions, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
If the mere collection of the parts were a chariot,
Then a chariot would exist even while its parts lie in pieces.
Without the whole, the parts do not exist.
Hence the mere shape also cannot be the chariot.

此有二執,謂以支聚及形差別安立為車。其中唯以支聚為車不應道理。

Some consider the mere collection of the parts or the distinctive shape of the parts to be the chariot. It is not tenable for the chariot to be the mere collection of its parts.

此中有二,一違正理,謂輪等支分離散布,完聚一處亦應有車,以為支聚即是車故。

There are two points to be made here: (1) It is contrary to reason. A chariot would exist even in a complete collection of separated parts—wheels and such, lying in pieces—since the mere collection of parts is a chariot.

二違自許,謂自部實事諸師,許無有支唯許支集。

(2) It contradicts their assertions. Buddhist essentialists assert that there are no wholes, but only mere groups of parts.

若爾,支亦應無,無有支故,是則亦無唯支合集,是故支聚亦不成車。

If this were so, even parts would not exist because that which has parts, i.e., wholes, would not exist. Therefore, since even mere groups of parts would not exist, the collection of parts could not be a chariot.

破支聚為車,是此論師所許不須簡別,聚合是車施設事故。

The assertions of the master Candrakirti make it unnecessary to add qualifications to the refutation of the chariot's being the mere collection of its parts. This is because the collection is the basis of imputation of the chariot.

說蘊是我所施設事,非是我故。

For, he says that since the collection of the aggregates is the basis to which the self is imputed, it cannot be the self.

若唯支集不
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許為車,以支合時形狀差別立為車者,

Objection: I do not claim that the mere collection of the parts is the chariot; rather, I posit as the chariot the distinctive shape of the parts when they are arranged.

此如前說無有支者,支亦無故,唯以支形安立為車,不應正理。

Reply: In saying this, you contradict your own assertions. As explained above, since you assert that what has parts does not exist, parts also would not exist. Therefore, it is unreasonable to posit the mere shape of the parts as the chariot.

過違自許,亦字顯示非僅支聚為車非理。

The word "also" in the verse just cited means that it is not just the mere collection that cannot be the chariot.

又許形為車,為散支形耶為支聚形耶。

Furthermore, if you say that such a shape is a chariot, then is the chariot the shape of the individual parts or the shape of the collection?

若散支形與先未合時形,無異形耶抑異先形有別形耶。

If the former, is it a shape no different from the shape of the parts prior to their being assembled? Or is it a shape unlike their shape prior to assembly?

初有過云﹕「如汝各支先有形,立為車時形亦爾,如支分散不名車,如是合車亦非有。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 points out a fallacy in the first position:
If you say that the shape that each part already had
Is what we know as a chariot,
Then just as there is no chariot when the parts are unassembled,
So it is also when they are assembled.

此謂先未合時與後合時,輪等形狀全無差別。

Also, the shapes of the wheels and such have no features after assembly unlike those they had prior to assembly.

如分散時,其車非有,如是合時亦應無車。

Therefore, just as there is no chariot when the parts are separate, there is no chariot when they are assembled.

若後合時與先未合輪等支形,有別異形立為車者,亦有過失。

Suppose that the chariot is some other shape—apart from that of the wheels and such prior to assembly—which appears later when they are assembled, and is unlike the shape of those earlier parts.

如云「若現成車時,輪等有異形,可取然非有,故唯形非車。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states this fallacy:
If now while the chariot itself is here,
There were a different shape in the wheels and such,
Then it would be evident, but it is not.
Therefore, the mere shape is not a chariot.

謂前後時,若輪軸等有別異形,理應可得,然任何觀終不可得,故異前形後形為車不應正理。

If there were something different, some dissimilar feature, between the shape of the wheels, axle, and such before assembly and their shape after assembly, then this would have to be evident. Yet no matter how you look you do not observe such. Hence it is not reasonable for some shape of the parts after assembly unlike the shape of the parts prior to assembly to be the chariot.

若各支形不許為車,以諸支分合聚總形立為車者,亦有過失。

Objection: I do not claim that the individual shapes of the individual parts are a chariot; I consider the general shape of the collection of the parts to be a chariot.

如云「汝聚無實故,形應非支聚,若依非實法,此中何有形。」

Reply: Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states this fallacy:
According to you, collections do not exist at all,
So the shape cannot be that of the collection of parts.
How could you see a chariot in the shape
Of something that does not exist at all?

此謂依支聚之形名車非理,聚非實故,依假支聚施設形狀不應理故,一切假有所施設事要實有故。

This means that it is unreasonable for the shape of a collection to be a chariot because, inasmuch as collections do not substantially exist, it is untenable to impute shape to a collection. For, you essentialists hold that all imputedly existent phenomena have substantially existent bases of imputation.

又支集聚無實自性,若有自性與能聚支,不能出於自性一異。

A collection of parts does not have an essential or intrinsic nature—it lacks substance. If it did intrinsically exist, it would have to be either one with or different from the parts comprising the collection. Whichever you assert, we can refute you as explained above in the case of the chariot.

若許爾者,如破車時悉能破故,然於自宗假有所依不許實有,支聚假形是車所依,車是依彼假施設法,非唯所依即許為車,

In our own system, we do not assert that the bases of imputation of imputedly existent phenomena are substantially existent. The shape of the collection of the parts is the basis to which the chariot is imputed. However, since the chariot is an imputedly existent phenomenon which is imputed to that shape, we do not consider the mere shape of the collection to be the chariot.

故破聚形為車,亦於所破不須簡別。

Therefore, in refuting the position that the shape of the collection is the chariot, we do not have to add any qualification like "ultimate" to what we are refuting.

依無實聚,立無實形,無不應理,

Objection: There is no reason that we cannot impute the chariot to a shape which lacks true existence and which depends upon a collection that lacks true existence.

則依無實因無明種等,生無實果行及芽等,一切應理。

Reply: In that case, you must agree that there is no reason not to accept the production of all effects lacking true existence—compositional factors, seedlings, and the like—independence upon causes that lack true existence—ignorant consciousness, seeds, and so forth.

如云「如汝
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所許此,則依無實因,當知生一切,無實性諸果。」

As Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
As this is what you assert,
You should also understand that all effects
That have untrue natures are produced
In dependence upon untrue causes.

又此車喻,亦破色等八塵合集,立為瓶等。

This example of the chariot also precludes positing the mere aggregation of the eight particles—form, etc.—to be composites such as pots.

又破依於八種實塵,假立瓶等。

It also refutes the imputation of pots and such in dependence upon the eight substantially existent particles;

又破依於實有色等形狀差別,假立瓶等,

and it refutes the proposition that pots and such are located in the distinctive shapes of substantially existent forms and such.

以色等塵自性無生,彼無性故實有非理。

Why? Since form and such are not intrinsically produced, they have no intrinsic nature, and thus itis untenable for them to be substantially existent.

如《入中論》云﹕「由彼色等如是住,覺為瓶等不應理,性無生故色等無,形為瓶等亦非理。」

Accordingly, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
It is therefore unreasonable to claim that an awareness of a pot
Arises in relation to a particular configuration of form.
Since they are not produced, form and such also do not exist.
Therefore, it is unreasonable for a pot to be the shape of a collection of forms.

若謂瓶若如車,非自支分合集形者,則腹大等應非瓶相,彼是形故。

Qualm: If, like a chariot, a pot is not the shape of the aggregation of its parts, this would imply that it is not definitively characteristic of a pot to be round-bellied and so forth, for these qualities constitute a shape.

答,若法大腹長頸等相,許彼為瓶,非大腹等形狀為瓶。若異此者,理亦應許腹頸是瓶。

Reply: We hold that what is round-bellied, long-necked, and so forth is a pot, but we do not accept that the round-bellied shape is a pot; otherwise, we would have to agree that bellies and necks are also pots.

◎第二於彼斷諍。

1.3.2.3.1.1.1.2 Eliminating objections to that

諸實事師於彼難云,若以觀察有無自性之理,如前所說七門求車,由彼無得理應無車,則諸世間應無施設車名之處,然此非理,現見可云車來買車車持去等,故有車等。

Essentialists' objection: When you use reason to analyze the question of intrinsic nature, searching for the chariot in the seven ways just explained, and you do not find it, then the chariot must not exist. Yet if this were so, then conventional designations of chariot would not be made in the world. This is not tenable; witness expressions such as "Fetch a chariot," "Buy a chariot," and "Make a chariot." Therefore, things such as chariots do exist.

入中論釋答說,彼過唯實事師有,及自宗非有。

Reply: Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 shows that this fallacy befalls only you essentialists, not us.

初者,謂世間名言說車來等,若如汝許理應皆無,以汝安立諸法為有,要以正理尋求有無自性而後安立,然以彼理七相推求車不可得故,汝又不許有餘方便安立事故,故車應無。諸實事師所設徵難,現在自許講中觀者,說中觀宗許有此難,若許如是,定犯一切名言建立皆無之過。

First, if it were as you say, then worldly conventions such as "Fetch a chariot" could not exist. For, when you posit things as existing, you use reasoned analysis to search so as to see whether they have intrinsic nature; yet when sought by such reasoning, the chariot is not found in any of the seven ways. Since you advance no other method for establishing things, chariots would be nonexistent. An undeniable fault of such assertions is that they make it impossible to give any presentation of conventional phenomena.

若以尋求有無自性正理推求無所得者,車應非有。

It seems that nowadays some who claim to advocate the meaning of Madhyamaka put forward as the Madhyamaka system an argument made by advocates of true existence: "When reasoning searches to see whether a chariot has intrinsic nature and fails to find a chariot, then a chariot does not exist."

二自無過者,如云﹕「或於實性或世間,雖以七相皆不成,若不推察就世間,此依自支而假設。」

The following passage from Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 shows how our position does not have this problem:
This chariot is not established in the seven ways,
Either in reality or for the world.
Yet without analysis, just for the world,
It is imputed in dependence upon its parts.

義謂,若以尋求有無自性正理推求於七相中車,就二
- p.504 -
諦俱不可得,雖於七相以理未得,豈能破車。

The meaning of this is as follows: When reasoning searches to see whether the chariot intrinsically exists, it is not found in any of the seven ways. This is the case in terms of both of the two truths. But when reason fails to find it in those seven ways, does this refute the chariot?

以許有車,非由觀察有無自性正理所立,是捨正理觀察,唯以世間尋常無損諸名言識之所成立,故建立彼是依自支立為假有。

How could it? Reasoning that analyzes whether things intrinsically exist does not establish the assertion of the chariot; rather, leaving reasoned analysis aside, it is established by a mere, unimpaired, ordinary, conventional—i.e., worldly-consciousness. Therefore, the way a chariot is posited is that it is established as existing imputedly; it is imputed in dependence upon its parts.

若作是念,修觀行師如是觀察,以彼正理車無所得,雖車無性,然車支分自性應有。

Objection: When a yogi analyzes in this way, reason does not find a chariot; hence, the chariot does not exist essentially or intrinsically. However, its parts do exist intrinsically.

燒布灰中尋求縷線,汝誠可笑。

Reply: You are searching for threads in the ashes of incinerated cloth—it is ridiculous.

如云﹕「若時其車且非有,有支無故支亦無。」若無有支,亦無支故。

If the whole does not exist, neither do the parts. As Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" says:
When the chariot itself does not exist,
Neither the whole nor its parts exist.

若作是念,彼不應理,車雖散壞,輪等支聚猶可得故。

Thus, if the whole does not exist, the parts also do not exist. Qualm: This is untenable because when the chariot is destroyed, the collection of parts—wheels and such—is still evident.

然此非爾,唯先見車,乃執輪等是車之輪,餘則不執。

Reply: No, for only those who have seen the chariot before will think, "These wheels and so forth are those of a chariot." Others will not think that.

如車壞時,輪等與車全無係屬,非車之支,是故非無有支之車而有車支。

When the chariot is destroyed, the wheels and such are not associated with a chariot and thus they are not parts of a chariot. Therefore, neither the chariot as a whole nor the parts of the chariot exist at that time.

爾時其車支及有支,二俱非有,然彼輪等待自支分可名有支,餘分為支,故無有支不能立支。

At that point, in terms of the chariot, neither the whole nor the parts exist. However, the wheels, etc., are wholes in relation to their own components and these components are their parts. Hence you cannot posit parts without a whole.

又無有支無支之義,如云﹕「譬如燒車無支分,慧火燒有支無支。」如此譬喻,應當了知。

Moreover, you should use the example of the chariot to understand that parts do not exist without wholes. As Candrakirti's 《Commerttary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
When a chariot is burned, its parts do not exist.
As in this example, when the fire of the analytical mind burns wholes, the parts also do not exist.

◎第三由名差別皆得成立。

1.3.2.3.1.1.1.3 How to establish the chariot under various names.

《入中論釋》云﹕「此宗非但由世共許假立車名顯然成立,即此諸名差別,由無觀察世間共許而當受許。」

Candrakirti's Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary states:
Our position very clearly establishes the conventional designation of a chariot in terms of what is familiar to the world; what is more, you should also assert any of the chariot's various names in terms of what is familiar to the world, without analysis.

如云﹕「即此有支及有分,眾生說車為作者,眾生又許為受者。」此說車待輪等諸支諸分。

It is thus:
That same chariot is known as a whole, as a composite, and as an agent.
Living beings are established as appropriators of the five aggregates.

共許名為有支有分。如是觀待輪等所取之事,說名作者,觀待所受,說名受者。

In relation to parts and components such as wheels, a chariot is established as the referent of the conventions "whole" and "composite." Likewise, it is designated with the nominal convention "agent" with reference to its activity of appropriating wheels, etc. and with the nominal convention "appropriator" in relation to the appropriated parts.

自部有說唯許諸支諸分合集,異彼別無有支有分,不可得故。

Some Buddhists claim that mere groups of components and parts exist, and that since nothing different from that is evident, wholes and composites do not exist.

如是唯說有業而無作者,又異所取不可得故,說有所取而無受者,彼皆倒說世間世
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俗。若爾,支等亦當無故。

Likewise, they claim that only actions exist, but agents do not, and that since nothing different from appropriation is evident, appropriation exists but the appropriator does not. In terms of the conventions of the world, these positions are inaccurate because, were they accurate, even parts and such would not exist.

入中論於此密意說云﹕「莫壞世許諸世俗。」

With that point in mind, Candrakirti said, "Do not destroy the conventions familiar to the world."

如於勝義無有支等,支等亦無,如於世俗支等可有,有支亦有,作如是說不壞二諦。

Therefore, what we advocate does not violate the principle of the two truths: Ultimately, just as wholes and so forth do not exist, neither do parts and so forth; conventionally, just as parts and so forth exist, so too do wholes and so forth.

◎第四依此速得正見勝利。

1.3.2.3.1.1.1.4 The advantage that you find the view quickly by using this example.

《入中論釋》云﹕「如是觀察世間世俗雖皆非有,若不推察,共許有故。修觀行者以此次第,觀察世俗速疾能測真實淵底。」

Candrakirti's 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 says: These worldly conventionalities do not exist when analyzed in that way, but exist only through being taken for granted, without being subject to scrutiny. Therefore, when yogis analyze these worldly conventionalities through this very process, they will very quickly fathom the depths of reality.

如何而測,「七相所無如說有,此有觀行師未得,此於真實亦速入,此中如是許彼有。」

How?
"What does not exist in the seven ways—how could it exist?"
Thinking thus, yogis do not find the existence of the chariot
And thereby easily enter into reality as well.
Hence, you should also assert the establishment of the chariot in that way.

此說由其觀車正理,速測真實無自性義,故彼正理極為切要。

This means that it is through such an analysis of the chariot that you quickly fathom the deepest meaning of reality—that there is no intrinsic nature. Thus, it is evident that this is a very crucial point.

觀擇實義諸瑜伽師,作是思擇而生定解。

Yogis who in this way analyze how things exist will develop certainty, thinking:

所謂車者,若有自性,由一異等七相門中,尋求有無自性之理,正推求時定無猶豫,七隨一中而能獲得,然於彼中皆無所得。

"If this 'chariot' existed intrinsically, then when I search with reasoning that looks to see whether it exists intrinsically in any of the seven ways—same, different, and so forth—I should undoubtedly find it in one of those seven ways. Yet I do not find it in any of those seven ways.

雖由如是未能獲得,然車名言不可遮止。

It is apparent that—despite its not being found—I cannot repudiate the convention of the chariot;

故言車者,唯由無明眩翳壞慧眼者分別假立,非自性有,此瑜伽師於真實義速能悟入。

still, 'chariot' is imputed only by way of the mind's eye being corrupted by films of ignorance. It is not intrinsically existent. Such yogis easily enter into reality.

頌言,「此於真亦爾。」亦字顯亦不壞世俗。

The words "as well" in Candrakirti's phrase "enter into reality as well" show that this analysis does not harm conventionalities.

破車自性最決斷者,七相推求,此最顯了破斥之理亦極明顯。

As a system for delineating alternatives in the refutation of a chariot's intrinsic existence, the investigation of these seven ways clarifies the possibilities and greatly clarifies the refuting arguments.

故依此理,易於通達車無自性。

Thus, it is easy to realize that a chariot lacks intrinsic existence using this analysis.

總依前說車之建立有三功德,一,易破增益諸法自性常見功德。二,易破無自性緣起非理斷見功德。三,此二功德以何觀察易於生起修觀行者推察次第。

In brief, there are three advantages to presenting this topic as explained above, beginning with the chariot: (1) the advantage that it is easy to refute the eternalist view that superimposes intrinsic existence on phenomena, (2) the advantage that it is easy to refute the nihilistic view that dependent-arising is invalid in the absence of intrinsic existence, and (3) the yogi's investigative process, which establishes the first two advantages by carrying out analysis in just such a manner.

初者,唯破一異而破有性,此理太略,難以通達,廣則太勞,七相推察極為相稱。

To elaborate on these three: (1) When you use a highly condensed method of refuting intrinsic existence, refuting just same and different, it is difficult to understand; it again becomes difficult when there are too many alternatives. Thus, the sevenfold analysis is quite appropriate.

第二者,從初破時即於所破
- p.506 -
簡別而破,由此門中雖破自性,不壞名言有能所作。

(2) In that you refute an object of negation with an added qualification during the initial refutation, you refute intrinsic existence without damaging the conventional existence of actions and agents.

第三者,若有自性,決定不出一異等七相,次於彼等一一逐次顯其違害,見七相中皆有妨害。由破能徧,所徧亦破,先知此已,次於無性多引定解。

(3) After you have developed certainty that the pervaded—intrinsic existence—does not extend beyond the pervader—the seven ways, such as one and different—you then show that each of those seven is contradicted. When you determine that every one of those seven is contradicted, this negates the pervader, whereby the pervaded is also negated. After you have done this once, you then repeatedly develop decisive certainty that there is no intrinsic existence.

此後觀見如是無性,然車名言不可遮止,便覺甚奇,業惑幻師幻此車等,極為希有。

After that, when you see that you cannot repudiate the convention of the chariot even though there is no intrinsic existence, you think, "Oh, it is amazing how the magicians of karma and the afflictions conjure up these illusions, such as chariots!

以從各各因緣而生,無少紊亂,各各自性亦非有故。

Each arises, without even the slightest confusion, from its own cause and conditions; each lacks even the slightest trace of essential of intrinsic existence."

如是能於緣起之義自性無生獲定解故。

You will be certain that dependent-arising means that things are not intrinsically produced.

如《四百論釋》云﹕「瓶等諸法,從自因生為一為異,五相觀察雖皆非有,然依緣假立,而能盛取蜜及水乳,作用皆成寧非希有。」

As Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says:
Pots and such do not exist under the fivefold analysis as to whether they are the same as their causes or other than their causes. Nevertheless, through dependent imputation, they can do things like hold or scoophoney, or water, or milk. Is this not wonderful?

又云﹕「若無自性,然亦可得,如旋火輪,自性皆空。」

And: What lacks intrinsic existence—and yet is evident—is empty of intrinsic existence, like the circle of a whirling firebrand.

第二合義分二,一 合無自性義,二 合由名差別成就義,

1.3.2.3.1.1.2 Showing what the example illustrates.
This discussion of what the example of the chariot illustrates has two parts:
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1 The example illustrates how the person lacks intrinsic nature
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.2 The example illustrates how the person is established under various names

初又分四,一 破我與蘊性一品,二 破我與蘊性異品,三 由此亦能破諸餘品,四 依彼能見補特伽羅猶如幻化。

The example illustrates how the person lacks intrinsic nature has four parts:
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.1 The refutation of the position that the self is one with the aggregates
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.2 The refutation of the position that the self is different fro the aggregates
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.3 How those arguments also refute each of the remaining positions
1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.4 How the person appears like an illusion based on that refutation

今初

1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.1 The refutation of the position that the self is one with the aggregates

◎總凡世間現見一法,心若決定彼為有對,遮其無對,若是無對,則遮有對。

In the general case, we see in the world that when a phenomenon is mentally classified as accompanied, it is precluded from being unaccompanied, and when it is classified as unaccompanied, it is precluded from being accompanied.

由此道理,總於一異或於一多,遣第三聚。

In general, therefore, same and different, as well as single and plural, eliminate any further alternative because the unaccompanied and the accompanied are respectively single and plural.

有對無對即一多故。

When you resolve that in general something must be either one or not one,

若能總於一多決斷,別於自性若一若異,亦能決斷,

then you will also resolve that for the particular case of what exists essentially, it must be either essentially one or essentially different.

如是若我或數取趣有自性者,亦不能出若一若異,故當觀察我與取蘊,為一性耶抑為異性。

So if a self or a person existed essentially or intrinsically, it could only be one with its aggregates or different from its aggregates.

修瑜伽者先觀我蘊二是一性有何過失,於計一品當求過難。

Hence, a yogi analyzes, thinking, "Is this self essentially one with the aggregates? Or is it essentially different?" At first the yogi looks for something that would contradict the position of oneness, thinking, "If self and the aggregates were established as intrinsically one, what could contradict this?"

佛護論師於此
- p.507 -
宣說三種過失,謂計我無義,我應成多,應有生滅。

Buddhapālita gives three arguments that contradict that position: (1) It would be pointless to propound a self, (2) there would be many selves, and (3) the self would be subject to production and disintegration.

其中初過,若許我蘊二性是一,妄計有我全無義利,以是蘊異名故,如月及有兔。

To elaborate:
1. If the self and the aggregates were held to be intrinsically one, then there would be no point in asserting a self because it would be identical to the aggregates, like the moon and the rabbit-bearer.

《中論》亦說此義,《二十七品》云﹕「若除取蘊外,其我定非有,計取蘊即我,汝我全無義。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 also makes this point:
When there is no self
Except for the appropriated aggregates,
The appropriated aggregates are the self.
In that case, the self that you propose does not exist.

第二過者,若我與蘊自性是一,一數取趣如有多蘊我亦應多,如我唯一蘊亦應一,有斯過失。《入中論》云﹕「若蘊即我故,蘊多我應多。」

2. If the person and aggregates were intrinsically one, then just as one person has many aggregates, one person would also havo many selves. Or, just as there is no more than one self, there would also be one aggregate. These are the fallacies given in Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way":
If the aggregates were the self, then since
There are many aggregates, the self would also be many.

第三過者,《十八品》上云﹕「若蘊即是我,我應有生滅。」

3. Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 states:
If the aggregates were the self,
Then the self would be subject to production and disintegration.

《二十七品》云﹕「取性應非我,我應有生滅。」

And:
What is appropriated is not the self;
They arise and disintegrate.

應知此中取即說蘊。

You should understand that "what is appropriated" here refers to the aggregates.

如是許我剎那生滅當有何過,《入中論本釋》說三過失,一過,憶念宿命不應道理,二過,作業失壞,三過,未作會遇。

Qualm: What fallacy is there in holding that the self is subject to momentary production and disintegration? Reply: Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 and 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 give three fallacies in this position: (1) recollection of past lives would be untenable, (2) actions done would perish, and (3) you would encounter the effects of actions that you did not do.

初者,若我剎那生滅,我之生滅應自性有,前後諸我自相應別。

To elaborate: 1. If the self arose and disintegrated moment by moment, then, since the self would be essentially arising and disintegrating, former and later selves would be distinct in their intrinsic character.

若如是者,佛不應說爾時我是我乳大王,我乳之我與佛之我二相別故。

In that case, the Buddha would not have said, "In that life, at the time I was King Māndhatr..." because the self of King Māndhātr and the self of the Teacher would be distinct in their intrinsic character.

譬如天授念宿命時,不作是念我是祠授,若不爾者,前者所受後者能憶,雖性各異,然不相違。

For example, it would be like Devadatta trying to recall his past lives and mistakenly remembering, "I became Yajñadatta." Otherwise, if you argue that it is not contradictory for earlier experience to be remembered by a later self despite the former and later selves being different in their intrinsic character,

則天授所受祠授不憶,亦當宣說不同之理,然不可得。

then you have to explain why this situation is different from Yajñadatta's not remembering Devadatta's experience. However, you cannot find a rationale for this.

此如破他生之理,若他許種芽皆有自性而為因果,乃可難云,如此可成因果,則從火燄亦當生黑暗。

This is similar to the argument that refutes production from other. To the assertion that seed and seedling exist essentially or intrinsically, yet differ as cause and effect, we reply, "If it were possible for such intrinsically different phenomena to be cause and effect, then even a flame would produce darkness."

然非許異皆有彼難。

This does not wipe out the assertion that seed and seedling are merely different.

若爾,彼經顯示佛與我乳二為一耶。

Did that sūtra teach that the Teacher and Māndhātr are one?

彼經唯是遮他相續,非顯是一,故彼經云﹕「爾時彼者莫作異念。」此即月稱論師所許。

That Passage refutes otherness of continuum, but does not teach that they are one. According to Candrakirti, this is why the sūtra ends by saying, "Do you think that the person in that lifetime was someone else? Do not look at it that way."

誤解彼經有作是云﹕「佛與彼諸宿生有情應是一人。經云,我於昔時
- p.508 -
為彼說二是一。又有為法剎那壞滅,是一非理,故彼二常。」

Some who are mistaken about such sūtra statements hold the following position: The Buddha and those living beings from his earlier lives are one. Saying, "I, in a former life, became this being," the sūtra means that those two, the Buddha and the earlier beings, are one and the same. Also, since anything that is compounded disintegrates moment by moment, and hence cannot be the same, both the Buddha and those earlier beings are permanent.

此是前際四惡見中第一惡見。

Of the four wrong views based on theories about the past, this is the first.

為破此故龍猛菩薩於《二十七品》云﹕「說過去已生,彼不應道理,昔時諸已生,彼即非是此。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 refutes it:
"I was born in the past"
Is an untenable claim.
It is not this very person
Who was born in those earlier lives.

若如是者,則一眾生應成六趣,彼等漸受六趣身故,前後諸人是常一故。

If it were as such persons claim, then one rebirth would turn into all six rebirths because living beings take up their respective bodies in six types and the former and later persons would be permanently one.

如是亦破前後性別。

Nāgārjuna also refutes the assertion that former and later persons are essentially distinct.

若我有性,前後諸人或是一性,爾時應常,或是異性,則成斷見。

If the self had an intrinsic nature, then former and later selves would either be essentially one, which would entail eternalism; or else they would be essentially different, which would entail nihilism.

故諸智者不當許我有實自性。

Therefore, the learned should not assert that the self has intrinsic nature.

二過作業失壞者,謂若許我一一剎那自相生滅,前我作業後我受果,如下當破。

2. Actions done would perish. Some claim that if the self was in each moment arising and disintegrating by way of its own intrinsic character, then later selves would still enjoy the effects of the actions of earlier selves. I refute this assertion in (3) below,

先造業果應無人受,作業之我未受果前已滅壞故,無餘我故。

so here I argue that if this were the case, there would be no experience of the effects of previously accumulated karma because the self that is the agent of an action would disintegrate prior to the experience of its effect, and there would be no other self to have such experience.

前後諸法其自性異,故除前我別無後來異性之我,前未受果果無受故。

Since earlier and later things are not essentially different, there is no later self that is essentially different from the former. If the effects were not experienced by the earlier self, then the effects must not be experienced.

若謂是一相續,下亦當破,故不能斷業失壞過。

I refute below the reply that such former and later selves are in the same continuum; hence, you cannot escape the fallacy that actions that were performed would perish.

三過未作會遇者,若謂前我雖已壞滅,然由後我受所作果,無失壞過。

3. You would encounter the effects of actions that you did not do. Some claim that although the earlier self disintegrates, the later self enjoys the effect; hence, the fallacy of wasting actions that were performed does not arise.

若爾,諸餘補特伽羅未作少業,當受彼業果報因緣,亦當受餘補特伽羅作業之果,以此自性補特伽羅所作業果,由彼異性補特伽羅而受用故。

If this were the case, then a person could enjoy the effect of karma accumulated by another person, even without accumulating even the slightest karma capable of causing the experienced effect. This is because, according to you, the effects of karma accumulated by an essentially existent person are experienced by another, essentially different person.

《入中論》云﹕「未般涅槃前剎那,無生滅作故無果,餘所作者餘應受。」

As Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states: Prior to nirvâna there would be no karmic effects, Because agents that arise and disintegrate in the very moment of an action would not exist to experience its effect. Each person would get what others accumulated.

又《入中論》雖尚說有餘三過失,然唯破除自部所許,今為破共,故不摘錄。

Candrakirti mentions three other fallacies, but they seem to refute only the assertions of other Buddhists. Since I am advancing a general refutation, I will not give them here.

以上二理,《二十七品》云﹕「若此是餘者,無前亦應生,如是前當住,前未死當生,前斷業失壞,餘所作諸業,當由餘受果,此等皆成過。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 also gives those two arguments:

月稱論師即錄業壞等二,言「若此是餘者」,義謂昔
- p.509 -
生時我與現在我二性若異。

This gives the two fallacies that Candrakirti uses, the wasting of actions and the experiencing of the effects of actions performed by others. The phrase, "If this self were different," means "If the self of an earlier lifetime and the presentself were essentially different."

若爾於前全無依託,不依前者後亦當生。

If this were the case, then since the present self would not in any way rely upon the self of the earlier life, it would arise without depending upon that former self.

又如造瓶,衣無須壞,後我生時前當不壞而常安住,又前不死當於此生。

Also, just as a cloth does not disintegrate when a pot is created, the former self would remain without disintegrating when the later self was born. We could be born here in this life without dying in our earlier lives. This is what that passage means.

若謂前後生我體性雖別然無業壞及未造業會遇之過,相續一故。

Objection: The selves of former and later lives are essentially distinct, yet these fallacies—that actions would perish and that you would encounter the effects of actions not done—do not arise because there is a single continuum connecting the selves of different lifetimes.

此同各別自相未成尚待成立,若自性異是一相續,不應道理。

Reply. It is not established that the selves within a continuum are distinct in their intrinsic character, so it seems that you will have to prove it. It is not tenable for things that are essentially different to constitute a single continuum.

猶如彌勒鄔波笈多,《入中論》云,「真實相續無過者,前觀相續已說過。」

For example, it is like Maitreya and Upagupta. As Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" states:
If you claim that there is no fallacy in a continuum that exists in reality,
I already explained the fallacies of such a continuum when I analyzed this above.

前如何觀察者,即彼論云﹕「彌勒近護有諸法,是餘性故非一續,諸法若由自相別,是一相續不應理。」

As to how it was analyzed, that same text states:
Because the phenomena [aggregates] associated with Maitreya and Upagupta
Are different, they are not included in one continuum.
It is not reasonable that what is distinct in its intrinsic character
Should be included in a single continuum.

謂若自相各別如二相續,不可立為是一相續。

If phenomena are distinct in their intrinsic character, then, like two different continua, they are not to be posited as a single continuum.

第二十七品云﹕「若天人各異,相續不應理。」

Also, the twenty-seventh chapter of Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says: If a human and a deity were different, It would be untenable for them to be a single continuum.

總謂若自性異,應堪觀察實性正理之所思擇,然以彼理詳審思擇,下無塵許堪思擇事。

In short, whatever is essentially other must be asserted to withstand analysis by reasoning that analyzes the way that it exists. There is nothing, not even the slightest particle, that withstands analysis when such reasoning analyzes in detail.

故自性異,前所造業後若受果,則異相續一切皆同,無可分別。此於一切處,皆當了知。

Hence, if a later self experiences the effects of karma accumulated by an earlier and intrinsically different self in the same continuum, this cannot be distinguished from the completely parallel case of selves that are in different continua. You must realize that this argument applies to all such cases!

◎若爾,自宗前時所受後時憶念,二者非一,如異相續,則憶先受及先造業,後者受果不應道理。

Qualm: Since the one who experiences in a past life and the one who remembers in a later life are not the same, the recollection of earlier experiences and the enjoyment of the effects of previously accumulated karma are untenable even in our own system, just as in the case of persons of different continua.

答云,無過。是一相續此宗無違,唯於他宗是一相續不應理故。

Reply: We do not incur that fallacy. For, in the systems of others who do not assert essential existence it does not work for the experiencer and the rememberer to be in the same continuum, but in our system it is not contradictory for them to be in the same continuum,.

如滿瓶酪置茅屋內,鴿住屋頂,雖鴿足爪未入酪瓶,然彼爪跡於酪可得。

For example, if a dove has been on the thatched roof of a house in which there is a container of yogurt, one can see its footprints there in the yogurt even though its feet did not enter the container of yogurt.

如是現法補特伽羅未往前世,然憶宿受亦無相違。

Similarly, the person of this life has not gone back to a former life, yet it is not contradictory that such a person should remember experiences there.

《四百論釋》云﹕「諸因果法應離分別一性異性,由因差別果相顯現,唯有諸行相續無常,能取假我隨念宿生應正道理。

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 states:
We dispense with any notion that causes and effects are the same or different. If there is only an impermanent stream of conditioned factors brought about by their particular causes, then it is reasonable to say that the imputedly existent self that appropriates that stream of factors remembers its lives.

於彼諸法皆無自相,若有如是諸緣現前變為餘
- p.510 -
相無不應理。

Things do not exist by way of intrinsic character; it stands to reason that they encounter various conditions and are changed.

是故當知,諸法因緣皆無自相,作用差別不可思議。

Therefore, you should carefully examine the astonishing fact that things have causes that do not exist by way of their intrinsic character.

如稀酪器置於屋中,多草覆頂,鴿居其上跡雖可得,然足入酪理定非有。」

Inside a house, you can see in a container of yogurt—as though it were in wet clay—the footprints of a dove that has been on the heavily thatched roof. Yet the dove's feet have not at all entered the container.

《入中論》中,當廣研求,當釋正義。

Look in Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 for an extensive treatment of this point. For now, we will explain the implications in ordinary language.

如是若許我蘊是一,《二十七品》云,「云何所取法,而成能取者,」此是大過。

The claim that the self is one with the aggregates is completely demolished by Nāgārjuna's challenge, "How could the appropriated become the appropriator?"

如名言云,此數取趣受如是身,蘊是所取,我是能取。

Since we use the conventional expression, "This person took up this body," the aggregates are the appropriated and the self is the appropriator.

若許彼二是一,作業作者亦當成一。

If you say that those two are one, then object and agent would be one;

能斫所斫,瓶及陶師,火與薪等,皆當成一。

hence, cutter and what is cut, pot and potter, fire and fuel, etc. would also be one.

如十品云﹕「若薪即是火,作者業成一,以此火薪理,我與所取等,及瓶衣等俱,無餘盡當說。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 states: If fuel were fire, Then agent and object would be one.... The entire process is explained For the self and the appropriated aggregates Using fire and wood as analogies, Along with pot and cloth and so forth.

《入中論》云﹕「取者與取理非一,業與作者亦當一。」

Also, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states: It is clearly not right for the appropriator to be one with what it appropriates; If it were thus, then object and agent would be the same.

如是若許我蘊是一,許我無義,我當成多,作及作者理當成一,造業失壞,未造會遇,說憶宿生不應道理。有六過故,不當許一。

Thus, if the self were one with the aggregates, there would be six fallacies: it would be pointless to assert a self; there would be many selves; object and agent would be one; actions that were performed would perish; the effects of actions not done would been countered; and the statements by the Buddha about remembering past lives would be invalid. So do not assert that the self and the aggregates are one.

◎第二破異品。

1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.2 The refutation of the position that the self is different fro the aggregates

若我與蘊二性非一,而許性異,當有何過。

Question: The self and the aggregates are not intrinsically one, but what fallacy is there in asserting that they are intrinsically different?

第十八品出此過云,「若我異諸蘊,應全無蘊相。」

Reply: Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 states the fallacy in this:
If the self were other than the aggregates,
It would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.

若我自性異蘊而有,應不具蘊生住滅相,如馬異牛不具牛相。

If the self were essentially different from the aggregates, it would not have the aggregates' characteristics of arising, remaining, and disintegrating. For example, a horse is something other than a cow, and so does not have the characteristics of a cow.

若謂如是,明顯句論立他比量難,謂彼應非設我名言處非我執境,是無為故,如虛空花,或如涅槃。

If someone still thinks this, take from Candrakirti's 《Clear Words》 this syllogism based on what others accept: "The aggregates cannot be the basis for the conventional imputation of a self and cannot be objects apprehended as a self, because the self is non-composite—like a flower in the sky or nirvana."

佛護論師說,我若不具生滅之相,即應是常,常則無變,全無作為,計執有我,毫無義利,流轉還滅皆不成故。

If the self did not arise and disintegrate, then it would be permanent. Since there is no way to avoid the implication that the self would be permanent, it would be pointless to impute a self because, as Buddhapālita points out, it would be impossible to engage in virtue or turn away from nonvirtue.

若離諸蘊變礙等相,自性異者應如是可得,譬如色心異相可得,然不可取,
- p.511 -
故無異我。

Furthermore, if the self had an intrinsic nature different from the defining characteristics of the five aggregates—e.g., being suitable to be form—then this would have to be evident, just as form and mind, for example, are observably different. Since the self is not apprehended in that way, it has no other meaning apart from the characteristics of the aggregates.

《第二十七品》云﹕「我離所取蘊,異者不應理,若異無所取,應見然不見。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
It is just not correct for the self
To be other than the appropriated aggregates.
If it were other, it could be apprehended
Without the appropriated aggregates, yet is not.

《入中論》云﹕「故無異蘊我,除蘊不執故。」

And Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says: Therefore, there is no self other than the aggregates Because without the aggregates, it is not apprehended.

故諸外道增益離蘊異義之我,是未了解我唯假名。

Non-Buddhist philosophers, not realizing that self is a mere name

又見與蘊一不應理,由邪宗力妄興增益,非彼相續名言諸識見如是我。

and yet seeing that it is untenable for it to be one with the aggregates, superimpose a self which is something other than the aggregates as a matter of tenet. However, the ordinary conventional consciousnesses in their mind-streams do not see it that way.

以如是理,乃至能見我與諸蘊,若自性異有諸過難,得堅定解應當修習。

You should repeatedly practice so as to reach solid certainty that arguments such as these contradict the existence of a self that is essentially different from the aggregates.

若未於此一異品過,引生清淨決定了解,縱自決斷補特伽羅皆無自性亦唯有宗,終不能得清淨見故。

For, if you do not develop genuine certainty about the critique of the positions of one and different, then even though you may decide that the person lacks intrinsic existence, it will be just an unproved proposition; hence, you will not obtain the authentic view.

◎若欲觀察有無真實補特伽羅,當觀真實補特伽羅與蘊一異。

Seeking to analyze whether the person exists in reality, you should analyze whether the person, if existent in reality, would be one with or different from the aggregates.

若計是一,究竟過難,謂火薪等作者與業皆當成一。

If the person were one with the aggregates, then there are conclusive criticisms, such as the implication that agent and object—e.g., fire and fuel—would be one.

此等若一,即以世間現量能破,立敵二宗諸不共許不成過難。

If fire and fuel are held to be one, you must use mundane valid cognition to refute that position; a tenet that is not shared by both parties is not an effective critique..

如是若異,應如色心各別可見,未見是事,此以常識不取為難,宗派不共不成過難。

Likewise, there is the argument—to the position that the self and the aggregates are different— that if they were essentially different, then, like form and mind, they would have to be seen as separate, yet they are not. This is presented in terms of the non-apprehension of such a difference by ordinary consciousnesses. Unique tenets are not an effective critique.

故於觀察真實義時,一切過難究竟根本,要至立敵相續之中,無有損害名言諸識。

Therefore, even when you analyze reality, the final basis for any critique derives from the unimpaired conventional consciousnesses in the mind-streams of both parties.

故云「於真實時世無害」者,是如前說,於真實義不許為量,非於觀察真實義時,無有損害名言諸識,不許為難。

The passage from Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 "The world has no critique in the context of reality," indicates, as explained above, that worldly consciousnesses are not valid cognitions of reality, but this is not to deny that unimpaired conventional consciousnesses can give evidence of contradiction in contexts where reality is under analysis.

若不爾者,各別所許諸不共量既不能害,

For, if they could not, then there would be no basis from which to critique the unique claims of others.

諸至教量有許不許,種種非一,即共許者,了非了義多不合順。

There are various positions on the use of scripture in debate— some accept it and some do not; among those who accept it, there is disagreement about what requires interpretation.

彼復尚須以理證成,餘有何理,可為顯說。

Hence you must use reasoning to prove things. And what other kind of reasoning can you use?

又於他許,謂若許彼亦應許此,若不許此亦莫許彼。

To the assertions of the other party, you can say, "If you assert this, then you must also assert that," and, "If you do not assert this, then do you also not assert that?"

如是因相,若無正理何能決定,是故能破能立,一切根本究竟,要至
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立敵無損名言諸識,違彼而許見自內心能違害故,不可違越。此乃中觀因明一切共規。

But how can there be certainty without a reason that is derived from shared conventional experience? Therefore, when you trace all the roots of probative and critical arguments back to their source, you arrive at the unimpaired conventional consciousnesses of the two parties. If someone asserts something that contradicts those consciousnesses, then both parties will see that their experience refutes it. As this is so, the system of all Mādhyamikas and Prāmānikas is not to go beyond this.

雖則如是,然名言識亦無成立無性等過,猶如現量雖能成立聲是所作,然非現量成立無常。

Nevertheless, we avoid the fallacy that conventional consciousnesses would establish the absence of intrinsic existence and such. It is similar to the case of perception establishing that sound is a product, yet not necessarily establishing that sound is impermanent.

總其能破能立根本,究竟雖須至於現量,根本所立豈須由於現量而成。

In brief, the ultimate root of probative and critical argument derives from perception, but it does not follow that perception must establish the root probandum.

◎第三由此亦能破諸餘品。

1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.3 How those arguments also refute each of the remaining positions

若有異性如盤中酪,或我依蘊,或蘊依我,可有能依所依二品,然無異性,故無所依及以能依,如前說車。

If the self and the aggregates were intrinsically different, there would be two ways in which they could be basis and dependent, like yogurt in a bowl. Either the self could exist in dependence upon the aggregates or the aggregates could exist in dependence upon the self. However, as in the explanation of the chariot, since they are not intrinsically different, they do not exist as basis and dependent.

《入中論》云﹕「蘊非有我我無蘊,何故若此有異性,觀察於此乃可成,無異性故妄分別。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
The self does not intrinsically depend on the aggregates
And the aggregates do not intrinsically depend on the self.
While such conceptions could be correct if they were intrinsically different,
Since they are not intrinsically different, those are misconceptions.

又我與蘊具足品者,當知亦如車說。

The position that the self possesses the aggregates is also similar to what was explained with regard to the chariot, so it should be understood accordingly.

即前論云﹕「非我具色何以故,由我無故無具義,非異具色異具牛,我色俱非一異性。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 states:
We do not hold that the self possesses the aggregate of form. Why?
Since the self does not exist, possession by the self is meaningless.
If they are different, then it is like having cattle; if not, then it is like having form.
However, the self is neither the same as nor different from form.

言具牛者,如云天授具足諸牛。言具色者,如云天授具足妙色。

"Having cattle" is, for example, Devadatta's having oxen. "Having form" is, for example, Devadatta's having form.

若爾唯蘊合集即是我耶,此亦非理,說依五蘊假施名我,其所依事即能依法,不應理故。

Is a mere group of aggregates the self? This is also incorrect because the self is said to be imputed in dependence upon the five aggregates and it is not tenable for the basis of imputation to be the object imputed.

《入中論》云﹕「經說依蘊故,唯蘊集非我。」

The 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》:
The Buddha's discourses state that the self depends upon the aggregates.
Therefore, a mere group of aggregates is not the self.

又唯蘊聚,即是我者,《入中論本釋》俱說業與作者成一之過。

Furthermore, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 and 《Explanation of the "Middle Way" Commentary》 state the fallacy that if a mere collection of aggregates were the self, agent and object would be one.

許一一蘊是我所取,當許五蘊俱是所取,則諸蘊聚亦所取故,說蘊積聚是我所依,非即是我,則蘊相續顯然亦應如是而許。

This is because anyone who claims that the self appropriates the individual aggregates must accept that it appropriates all five aggregates; hence, it would appropriate the collection of the aggregates as well. This passage from the 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 means that the collection is the basis to which the self is imputed, but is not the self; this makes it clear that you must also assert such with regard to the continuum of the aggregates.

若謂彼等雖皆非我,然如配合輪軸等時,得一殊形安立為車,色等合聚於殊特形,應立為我。

Objection: Those are not the self; rather, I posit the self as the particular shape of the collection of form and so forth. For example, when a chariot's wheels, axle, and so forth are assembled, this is considered a chariot if the distinctive shape of a chariot is found.

若爾,形狀唯色乃有,應於心等不立為我。

Reply: Only what has form can have shape, so consciousnesses, etc. could not be posited as the self.

《入中論》云﹕「形為色有故,汝唯說色我,心等聚
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非我,心等無形故。」

The 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》:
Is it a shape? Since only what has form has shape,
For you that alone would be called “self.”
Collections of consciousness and so forth
Would not be the self since they have no shape.

是故如車於七種相皆無自性,然依有支假名為車,我與諸蘊一異等性,七中皆無,然由依蘊假名為我。

Just as a chariot does not intrinsically exist in any of the seven Ways, but is still posited in dependence upon its parts, the self does not intrinsically exist in any of the seven ways—one with the aggregates, different from the aggregates, and so forth—yet is still imputed in dependence upon the aggregates.

二者相似,經以彼二說為法喻,故此善成。

This proves what the Buddha stated succinctly, treating chariot and self as example and exemplified.

◎第四依彼能見補特伽羅猶如幻化。

1.3.2.3.1.1.2.1.4 How the person appears like an illusion based on that refutation

如幻之義,略有二說,一說勝義諦如幻,謂唯可言有而破諦實,二說色等幻,謂自性雖空,現有色等現境如幻。

"Illusion" is said to have two meanings. Statements that the ultimate truth is like an illusion, for instance, mean that although it is established as merely existent, its true existence is negated. Statements that forms and such are illusions mean that what appears as a form, while being empty of intrinsic existence, is like an illusion.

今說後義,又後義中有前幻義,前中不定有後幻義。

It is the latter of these that I am concerned with here. The latter also carries the meaning of "illusion" in the former sense; it is not always certain that the former usage carries the meaning of "illusion" in its latter sense.

修後幻法要依二心,一取現境,二決定空。

How do you establish this latter sense of "illusion"? You use two kinds of awareness—one that apprehends an appearance and one that ascertains emptiness.

喻如變幻所現象馬,要眼識見,如所幻現實無象馬,意識決定。

For example, how can you know that an appearance of a horse or elephant is an illusory or false appearance? You need both a visual consciousness that sees an illusory horse or elephant and a mental consciousness that knows that the horse or elephant does not exist as it appears.

依此因緣乃能定解所現象馬是幻或妄,如是補特伽羅等,於名言識顯現無遮,及以理智決定了彼自性本空,依彼二心乃能定解補特伽羅是幻或妄。

Likewise, to be certain that the person, for instance, is an illusory or false appearance, you need both the undeniable appearance of the person to a conventional consciousness and the ascertainment by reasoned knowledge that the person is empty of essential or intrinsic existence.

此中理智不能成立顯現為有,其名言量不能成立自性為空,此即雙須尋求有無自性理智與取色等名言諸識所有因相,故若色等不現如幻,其取色等諸名言識任運而有,生此方便不須劬勞。

Reasoned knowledge does not establish that the appearance exists, while conventional valid cognition does not establish that it is empty of intrinsic existence. Consequently, you need both reasoned knowledge that searches to see whether things intrinsically exist and conventional awarenesses that apprehend forms and such as existent.

當以觀察有無自性之正理,多觀色等,於破自性起大定解,次觀現境乃現如幻。

While some say that there are many ways to make form appear like an illusion, it is unnecessary to exert yourself at techniques for generating such, for such appearances spontaneously present themselves to the conventional consciousnesses that apprehend those forms. Analyzing them often with reasoning that examines whether they intrinsically exist, you develop a strong certainty that intrinsic existence is refuted. Then, when you see an appearance arise; it appears like an illusion.

無餘決擇幻空之理,昔諸智者說以理智於現有法唯遮自性生滅等空,名如虛空空性,次性雖空現似有性色等顯現,名如幻空性。

There is no separate way to set up an illusion-like emptiness. Earlier teachers used the term "space-like emptiness" to refer to an emptiness that is the mere elimination, by reasoned knowledge, of intrinsic production, cessation, and so forth in the appearing subject. They used the term "illusion-like emptiness" to refer to the subsequent appearance of forms and such, which appear to be intrinsically existent while being known as actually empty of intrinsic existence.

如是臨修禮拜旋繞及念誦等行品之時,先以觀性有無之理,觀察彼等破除自性,以彼定解智力攝持,次修彼事學習如幻,於此
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幻中,修禮拜等。

Thus, even when you are engaged in the behavioral aspects of the practice—prostrating, circumambulating, and reciting, etc.—you should first use reason to analyze whether those practices intrinsically exist, and refute their intrinsic existence. By engaging in those practices under the sway of certainty that the practices do not intrinsically exist, you learn to raise illusion-like appearance and to do those practices within that appearance.

知此宗要定中當修如空空性,由彼力故,於後得時,善解現境如幻空理。

If you understand this vital point, you will have a solid understanding of how the force of having cultivated space-like emptiness in meditative equipoise gives rise to illusion-like emptiness in the post-equipoise state.

此如前說,若不善知所破量齊,唯以正理觀一異等,見一異等有妨難時,便謂全無補特伽羅等及謂補特伽羅等法,如兔角等一切作用皆空無事成大斷見,當知即是正見歧途。

Also, as explained above," if you fail to limit the object of negation when you use reason to investigate whether the self and the aggregates are one, different, and so forth, then when you see the arguments that contradict those positions, you will think, "Persons and such do not exist at all," or, "Things such as persons are non-things, empty of all function, like the horns of a rabbit and such." This is a nihilistic view. Therefore, you should be aware that this is a point where you may slip with regard to the correct view.

如云「如是則三有,云何能如幻。」

Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says:
If this were so, then how could it be said
That existence is like an illusion?

《四百論釋》云﹕「若能如實見緣起者,當如幻化,非如石女兒。

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 comments:
When you see dependent-arisings as they are, they are like creations of a magician—not like the son of a barren woman.

若此觀察破一切生,說諸有為皆無生者,爾時此非如幻,石女兒等乃能量度,我因恐怖無緣起過,不能順彼,當不違緣起順如幻等。」

Qualm: Because this analysis completely refutes production, it teaches that compounded phenomena are not produced.
Reply: If that were so, then they would not be like illusions. If you could comprehend things with examples such as the son of a barren woman, then it would follow that dependent-arisings do not exist. I am wary of this, so I do not make that comparison; rather, I compare them to illusions and such, examples that do not contradict those dependent-arisings.

故尋求有無自性之理智,執有幻義雖亦是過,然以彼理觀察破除自性之後,於諸法上定當引生執有幻義,非是過咎。

Thus, there would be a fallacy if the reasoned knowledge that searches to see whether things intrinsically exist were to apprehend the merely illusory as existent; yet you definitely must develop—in place of the intrinsic existence that is refuted under rational analysis—an apprehension of the existence of things that are merely illusory. So there is no fallacy.

《四百論釋》云﹕「是故如是周徧思擇,諸法自性皆不成就,諸法別別唯餘如幻。」此說須餘如幻義故。

For, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Four Hundred Stanzas"》 says that an illusory object must be left as a remainder:
So, when you analyze in this way, things are not established as intrinsically existent; hence, the illusoriness of individual things is left as a remainder.

又若破除苗芽自性乃至正理作用未失,爾時若以正理觀察應不應理,雖於苗芽不執有性,然於苗芽無自性義念為諦實,及於性空顯現如幻念為諦實。

When you refute the essential or intrinsic existence of a seedling, as long as the effectiveness of the reasoning does not deteriorate, reason analyzes whether intrinsic existence is tenable. You do not develop an apprehension of the seedling as intrinsically existent. However, if you think that the seedling's lack of intrinsic existence is truly existent, or that the illusion-like appearance of that which is empty of intrinsic existence is itself truly existent,

此執有過,亦是正理之所破除。

this is a misapprehension that you must refute using reasoning.

若不執實,但取有幻,決不當謂取幻亦復有執著故,應當棄捨。

Some think that, beyond this, even the apprehension of the illusory as existent involves clinging to the apprehension of illusoriness, and thus must be eliminated.

若不爾者,緣起定解一切皆無,成大過故,如前廣說。

Pay no heed to this notion, or else you will incur a great fallacy; namely, that any certainty about dependent-arising would be impossible. I have already explained this several times.

此復定是未能分辨如幻義有與諦實有二者差別。

This is undoubtedly a case of failing to distinguish between the existence of the illusory object and the true existence of the illusory object.

◎又先觀境以理分析覺境非有,次於觀者亦見如是。

When your analysis of an object uses reason to obliterate it, you first think, "It is not there." Then, as you also see the analyzer [yourself] in that same way,

再次於能決定無者亦復非有,任
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於何法,此是此非,皆無能生定解之處。次覺現境杳茫無實,由是未分自性有無與僅有無,以諸正理盡破一切之所引生。

there is no one even to ascertain that nonexistence. So, with no way to determine what something is or is not, it begins to seem that what appears has become vague and indistinct. This comes about based upon reason refuting everything, without distinguishing intrinsic existence and its absence from mere existence and its absence.

如此之空,是為破壞緣起之空。

Thus, this sort of emptiness is an emptiness that destroys dependent-arising.

故證此空,引覺現境杳茫顯現,畢竟非是如幻之義。

Therefore, illusoriness as we use the term definitely does not refer to the rising of a vague, indistinct appearance brought on by this kind of realization.

故以正理思擇觀察,覺補特伽羅等,於自性境無少安住,

Therefore, upon reasoned analysis, you come to think, "This person lacks even the slightest essential or objective existence."

依此因緣,此諸現境查茫顯現并非難事,如此顯現,凡諸信解中觀宗義,少聞顯說無性法者,一切皆有。

On that basis, it is not difficult simply to have these appearances seem vague and indistinct. That sort of experience comes to everyone who aspires to an understanding of Madhyamaka tenets and hears a little of the teaching that shows how things lack intrinsic nature.

然最難處,謂盡破自性及以無性補特伽羅,立為造業受果者等,至心定解,而能雙立此二事者,至最少際,故中觀見最極難得。

Still, it is difficult to develop certainty about both (1) the complete refutation of essential or intrinsic nature and (2) the presentation of those very persons who lack intrinsic nature as accumulators of karma, experiencers of the effects of karma, and so forth. It scarcely happens that someone combines the capacities to posit both of these, so it is very difficult to find the Madhyamaka view.

然若未得如斯正見,定見增長,則於行品定解損減。

Without that combination, it is undeniable that as certainty about the philosophical view increases, certainty about the behavioral aspects of the practice decreases;

若於行品定解增長,則其定見決定損減,則於二品,無餘方便能正引生勢力均等廣大定解,是故決定或墮妄執實有自性,增益常見有事見邊,或墮妄計諸法作用一切皆空,損減斷見無事見邊。

insofar as certainty about the behavioral aspects increases, certainty about the view decreases. There is no way to develop equally strong certainty about both. Therefore you will definitely fall either into one extreme—the superimposition conceiving intrinsic existence, the eternalist view, the view of things as existing intrinsically—or else the other extreme—the mistaken denial holding that things are devoid of the capacity to perform functions, the nihilistic view, the view of things as utterly nonexistent.

如《三摩地王經》云﹕「爾時無罪具十力,勝者說此勝等持,三有眾生猶如夢,此中無生亦無死,有情人命不可得,諸法如沫及芭蕉,猶如幻事若空電,等同水月如陽焰。全無人從此世歿,而更往去餘世間,然所造業終無失,生死異熟黑白果。既非常住亦非斷,無實造業亦無住,然既造已非不觸,亦無他造自受果。」

Thus, the 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》 says:
Then the Conqueror, who is without sin and endowed with
The ten powers, explained this supreme concentration:
The states of cyclic existence are like a dream;
Herein there is neither birth nor death.
Living beings, humans, and even life are not found.
These things are like foam, like a plantain tree,
Like an illusion, like a flash of lightning,
Like the reflection of the moon in water, like a mirage.
There is no one who dies in this world
And passes or migrates to another.
Still, actions done are never lost,
And virtuous and nonvirtuous effects ripen in the world.
Neither permanent nor falling into annihilation,
Actions neither accumulate nor endure.
Yet you cannot do actions without meeting their effects.
Nor do you experience the effects of others' actions.

謂以正理雖不能得若生若死補特伽羅,然諸法如幻生黑白果。

Thus, even though reason does not find the person who makes the passage at birth and death, virtuous and nonvirtuous effects do occur among illusion-like phenomena.

故造業已定觸其果,非不領受。又無他人所造諸業,其餘補
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特伽羅不造而遇領受其果,如此所說當獲定解。

So you should be certain of what that sūtra says, that those who have done actions will not fail to contact or experience their effects and will not encounter the effects of actions they did not do, those effects being felt or experienced by the other persons who did those actions.

求定解法如前所說,令善現起正理所破。

Seek this assurance in the following manner: As previously explained, form a clear concept of the object that reason will be refuting.

次善思惟,自心無明,如何增益自性之理,當善認識。次當思惟若有此性,決定不出一異道理及於雙方妨難之理,分別思察。引生觀見妨難定解,後當堅固定解補特伽羅全無自性,於此空品應多修習。其次補特伽羅名言不可遮止,令於心現,即安立此為造業者及受果者,作意思惟諸緣起品,於無自性緣起得成,於成立理當獲定解。

Then focus on how, if there were such an intrinsically existing person, it could only be one with or different from its aggregates, and how reason contradicts both of those positions. Develop certainty in seeing this critique. Finally, solidify your certainty that the person does not even slightly exist intrinsically. In the phase of meditating on emptiness, practice this often. Then, bring to mind the conventional person who is undeniably apparent. Turn your mind to dependent-arising, wherein that person is posited as the accumulator of karma and the experiencer of effects, and be certain of how dependent-arising is possible without intrinsic existence.

若覺彼二現相違時,當善攝取影像等喻,思不違理,謂如形質所現影像,雖所現為眼耳等事皆悉是空,然依鏡質緣合則生,若此眾緣有缺則滅,如彼二法同於一事不可遮止。

When they seem contradictory, think about how they are not contradictory, taking an example such as a reflection. A reflection of a face is undeniably a conjunction of (1) being empty of the eyes, ears, and such that appear therein and (2) being produced in dependence upon a mirror and a face, while disintegrating when certain of these conditions are gone.

如是補特伽羅雖無自性若微塵許,然造業者及受果者,又依宿業煩惱而生,皆無相違,當淨修習。如是道理,於一切處皆當知之。

Likewise, the person lacks even a particle of intrinsic nature, but is the accumulator of karma and the experiencer of effects, and is produced in dependence upon earlier karma and afflictions. It is not a contradiction. Practice this thought and understand that it is like this in all such cases.

◎若爾,了知彼影像等隨所顯現決定是空,即是通達彼無性者,則諸異生現證無性,皆成聖者。

Qualm: Does certainty that reflections and such are empty of what appears constitute knowledge that they lack intrinsic existence? If so, then the perceptions of ordinary beings would constitute knowledge of emptiness; hence, they would be noble beings.

若非通達,彼等何能為無性喻。若彼諸喻無自性義,更須依因而通達者,隨別安立彼之喻等觀察推求,當成無窮。

If not, then how can reflections work as examples of the lack of intrinsic existence in those persons and such? If you have to use a reason that proves the absence of intrinsic existence even to understand the examples, then there would have to be an endless regression when you examine issues such as what to posit as examples for those examples.

先有答云﹕「雖已現證諸影像等無自性義,然非聖者,唯達少分有法空故,

Reply by an earlier scholar. Although ordinary beings have perceptual knowledge that reflections and such lack intrinsic existence, they are not noble beings because they only know the emptiness of a limited subject.

聖須現證一切諸法皆無自性。」

In order to become a noble being, one must have perceptual knowledge that all phenomena lack intrinsic existence.

然不應理。《四百論》云﹕「說見一法者,即見
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一切者,以一法空性,即一切空性。」

Our position: That reply is not right because Aryadeva's 《Four Hundred Stanzas》 says that one who knows the emptiness—the lack of intrinsic existence—of one thing can know the emptiness of all phenomena:
Who sees one thing
Is said to see everything.
The emptiness of one thing
Is the emptiness of everything.

此說通達一法無性空性,即能通達諸法空故,故達影像本質雖空,不執實質,然於影像執為實有,有何相違。

Therefore, someone who knows that a reflection is empty of being a face does not apprehend it as truly being a face, yet does apprehend it as a truly existent reflection. What contradiction is there in that?

又諸童稚不善言說,見質影像於彼戲等,彼等是執實有本質。

When young, pre-verbal children see reflections of their faces, they play with them and so forth; hence, they do apprehend them as truly being faces.

若諸高邁已善言說,雖知彼等實無本質,本質所空,然即執彼現似本質影像有性,是諦實執。

Older, verbal persons are certain that insofar as those reflections are not faces, they are empty of being faces; yet they apprehend as intrinsically existent those very reflections that appear to be faces. That apprehension is a conception of true existence.

此於自心現有,領覺能成,雖其如是,然亦堪為無性喻者,謂隨所現即彼性空,故所顯現實無彼性現量可成,即彼為喻。

Experience in our own mind-streams proves that this is how we see reflections. Nevertheless, reflections and so forth are appropriate examples for the lack of intrinsic existence. Why? We use those examples because perception establishes that they are empty of the entity they appear to be, and thus they are not really what they appear to be.

若隨所現即彼性空,於芽等上以量成者,即是通達苗芽無性,故與影像理非全同。

When valid cognition establishes this "emptiness of really being what it appears" in relation to seedlings and such, then it knows the seedlings' lack of intrinsic existence; in this way seedlings and such are different from reflections and such.

以此當知,「如此瓶等真無性,而於世間共許有,」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Just as things such as pots do not exist in reality,
Yet do exist in terms of what is familiar to the world...

對實事師安立瓶等,為無性喻,亦如影等取少分空,非取瓶等無自性空,以如前說車等譬喻尚多成彼無自性故。

As an example of the lack of intrinsic existence, he states "things such as pots" to the advocates of intrinsic existence. Yet, as in the case of reflections and such, he refers to a limited emptiness and not to their lack of intrinsic nature. This is because, as explained previously, many proofs of the lack of intrinsic existence use chariots and such as examples.

如是如幻,有觀看者,於象馬等執為諦實,幻師了知象馬虛妄,亦少分空。

Similarly, in the case of a magician's illusion, the spectators apprehend it as truly being a horse or an elephant; the magician's knowledge that the horse or elephant is false is knowledge of a limited emptiness.

又夢所見依正等事,醒時執彼如所現事空而虛妄,及於夢時能如是執,

In a dream, you see an environment and its inhabitants. Upon waking, you understand that they are false in that they are empty of what they appear to be. Even while asleep you may apprehend them in that way.

然此皆是執其夢中所現男女,為餘真實男女所空,非是通達夢無自性,如同了解影像無質。

In either case, you understand that what appears to be men and women in a dream is devoid of being other men and Women. Nevertheless, this does not constitute knowledge that the dream is empty of intrinsic existence. It is comparable to being certain that there is no face in something such as a reflection.

又如前引,「於幻陽燄等假立,此就世間亦非有。」

As cited earlier, Candrakirti's Commentary on the "Middle Way" says, "Things that are ascribed to mirages, magicians' illusions, and so forth do not exist even for the world."

謂於陽燄幻夢執水象馬及男女等,俗名言量皆能違害,了知無彼所執義者,非是通達法無性見。

This means that ordinary conventional valid cognition discredits consciousnesses that apprehend as existent the water, horses, elephants, men, women, and so forth in mirages, illusions, and dreams. Therefore, the knowledge that the objects conceived of by those consciousnesses do not exist is not the view that knows the lack of intrinsic existence.

如是前說彼諸幻義,亦當諷詠甚深經偈而正思惟,此如《三摩地王經》所說而思。

So, you should reflect upon the meaning of illusoriness as explained above, reciting the poetry of the profound sūtra collections. Take this statement from the 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》:

如云「猶如陽燄尋香城,及如幻事並如
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夢,串習行相自性空,當知一切法如是。

Like a mirage, a phantom city, or an illusion, meditation associated with signs is empty of essence. Know that all phenomena are this way.

猶如淨空所現月,影像照顯澄海中,非有月輪入水內,當知諸法相皆爾。

The moon shines in a clear sky and its reflection appears in a clear lake, yet the moon has not moved into the water. Know that the character of all phenomena is like that.

如人住於林山內,歌說嬉笑及號哭,雖聞谷響而無見,當知一切法如是。

People in a wooded mountain range hear echoes from song, speech, laughter, and weeping, but what seems to be there is not. Know that all phenomena are this way.

歌唱妓樂如是哭,依此雖有谷響現,彼音於響終非有,當知一切法如是。

Although echoes arise from song, music, and even weeping, the tones of those songs and so forth are never in the sound of the echo. Know that all phenomena are this way.

猶如夢中受欲行,士夫醒後不可見,愚夫希樂而貪著,當知一切法如是。

When people who have something that they want in a dream awake and do not see it, they are fools to desire it and to cling to it. Know that all phenomena are this way.

如諸幻師化諸色,象馬車乘種種事,如所顯現悉皆無,當知一切法如是。

When magicians conjure up forms, creating various horses, elephants, or chariots, what appears to be there does not exist at all. Know that all phenomena are this way.

猶如幼女於夢中,自見子生尋即死,生時歡喜死不樂,當知一切法如是。

When a young woman sees the birth and death of son in a dream, she is delighted at the birth but not at the death. Know that all phenomena are this way.

猶如夜分水中月,顯現無濁澄水中,水月空偽不可取,當知一切法如是。

When reflections of the moon appear at night in clear, clean water, they are empty and vain, ungraspable. Know that all phenomena are this way.

猶如春季日午時,行走士夫為渴逼,於諸陽燄見水聚,當知一切法如是。

A person tormented by thirst, traveling at midday in summer, sees mirages as pools of water. Know that all phenomena are this way.

如於陽燄全無水,有情愚蒙欲飲彼,終不能飲無實水,當知一切法如是。

Although water does not exist in a mirage at all, a deluded being wants to drink it. It is false and undrinkable. Know that all phenomena are this way.

如於鮮濕芭蕉樹,若人剝彼欲求實,內外一切無心實,當知一切法如是。」

Someone may peel away the watery trunk of a plantain tree looking for a pith, but neither inside nor outside is there any pith at all. Know that all phenomena are this way.

◎第二合由名差別成就義。

1.3.2.3.1.1.2.2 The example illustrates how the person is established under various names

如依輪等假名為車,其諸支分名為所取車為取者,如是依於五蘊六界及以六處假名為我,彼為所取我為取者。

When a chariot is imputed in dependence upon things such as wheels, those parts are the appropriated and the chariot is the appropriator. Likewise, when a self is imputed in dependence upon the five aggregates, the six constituents, and the six sources, they are the appropriated and the self is the appropriator.

又如安立車與車支為作者及業,如是我取蘊等有作用故,名為作者,蘊等是我所取業,故名為所作。

Also, just as a chariot and its parts are posited as agent and objects, the self is the agent because it takes up the aggregates and so forth; the aggregates and so forth are the objects because they are what it adopts.

《入中論》云﹕「如是以世許,依蘊界六處。許我為取者,取業此作者。」

Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Likewise, in terms of what is familiar in the world,
The self is held to be the appropriator
In dependence upon the aggregates, constituents, and six sources.
The appropriated are the objects and this self is the agent.

此亦如車觀真實義,我於七相皆不可得無少自
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性,然未觀察許世俗有。

Also, as in the case of the chariot, when you analyze reality a self is not found in any of the seven ways. Thus, while it lacks even the slightest trace of intrinsic existence, without analysis it does exist conventionally.

◎第二顯示由此亦破我所。

1.3.2.3.1.2 Teaching that what the self owns is also thereby established as lacking intrinsic existence.

如是若以尋求有無自性之理尋求我時,於彼七相俱不可得,破我自性,爾時云何能以正理得此即是我之眼等,由是我所亦無自性。

When reason searches to see whether the self intrinsically exists, it does not find it in any of the seven ways. Thus, when it has negated the intrinsic existence of the self, how could reason find "the eye that belongs to the self," etc.? Accordingly, what the self owns also lacks intrinsic existence.

修觀行者,若全不見我我所性,能脫生死,此下當說。

When yogis do not see any intrinsic existence in either the self or what the self owns, then they are liberated from cyclic existence. I will explain this below.

《十八品》云﹕「若我且非有,豈能有我所。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 says:
If the self does not exist,
How could there be something owned by the self?

《入中論》云﹕「由無作者則無業,無我故亦無我所,故由見我我所空,彼瑜伽師當解脫。」

And Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Since objects do not exist without agents,
What the self owns does not exist without the self.
Therefore, yogis are liberated through seeing
That the self and what it owns are empty.

由已通達我無性力,亦能通達我所無性,並其斷疑,如前已說,應當了知。

On the strength of knowing that the self lacks intrinsic existence, you understand that what the self owns also lacks intrinsic existence. You should be able to understand this point, and how to eliminate qualms about this point, based on what I have said above.

◎第三此諸正理於餘例明。

1.3.2.3.1.3 How to apply those lines of reasoning to other phenomena

如觀我蘊等同觀車,如是瓶衣等事亦當了知,

Those arguments also apply to other things. Just as the analysis of the self and the aggregates follows the pattern of the analysis of the chariot, you should realize that this is also the case with things like pots and cloth.

謂以尋有無自性之理,觀瓶衣等與自色等,為一異等七相尋求,於七相中雙就二諦,俱不可得,然就名言,無觀察識安立為有。

When reasoning that searches for intrinsic nature searches in the seven ways by analyzing whether pots and such are one with or different from their forms, etc., they are not found in those seven ways in terms of either of the two truths. Instead, they are posited from the perspective of a non-analytical, conventional consciousness.

如三律儀經云﹕「世與我諍,然我不與世間諍論,以於世間許有許無,我亦許爾。」自許正理不破世間,共許事故。

This is because the Buddha takes up positions without using reason to refute what the world knows, as is demonstrated by his statement in the Chapter Teaching the Three Vows:
The world debates with me; I do not debate with the world. Whatever is held in the world to exist or not to exist, I also hold as such.

如《入中論》云﹕「若瓶及衣帳,軍林并鬘樹,宅舍與車乘,客店等諸法。眾生由何門,說有知彼有,何故以能仁,不與世諍故。又諸支德貪,能相及薪等,有支有德貪,所相火等義。彼如觀察車,七相皆非有,其餘如世間,共許而為有。」

Accordingly, Candrakirti's 《Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 says:
Whatever it is—pot, cloth, tent, army, forest, rosary, tree,
House, small chariot, guest house, or any such thing—
You should know the conventions used by these worldly beings.
Why? Because the Master of Sages does not debate with the world.
Part, quality, attachment, defining characteristic, fuel, etc.,
As well as whole, qualified, attached [person], definienda, fire, etc.—
These objects do not exist in the seven ways under analysis like that applied to the chariot.
On the other hand, they do exist in terms of what is familiar to the world.

謂此世間眾生,由何門故宣說彼等,亦莫觀察唯當知有,

Whatever they may be, the conventions used by these worldly beings should be known only as existent, without analysis.

此復云何,謂彼支分及有支等。

What are these conventions? They are parts and wholes, etc.


- p.520 -
瓶為喻,瓶是有支有德所相,瓦等是支,大腹張口及長頸等是為能相,衣等亦爾。

Take a pot, for example: Pot is the whole, the qualified, and the definiendum; pieces of pot and such are the parts; blue and so forth are the qualities; and bulbous, water-holding, long-necked, etc. are the defining characteristics. Other examples, such as cloth, are handled in the same way.

貪是堅執,其有貪者是彼所依,《釋論》說為有貪補特伽羅。

In that passage, "attachment" refers to intense attachment and clinging; "attached [person]" refers to the basis of that attachment, because Jayananda's 《Explanation of [Candrakirti's] "Commentary on the "Middle Way"》 explains that "attached" refers to a person who has attachment.

火是能燒,薪是所燒,

"Fire" is the agent of burning, and "fuel" is the object burned.

由依支故,假名有支,及依有支假名為支,乃至待火假名為薪,及以待薪假名為火。

Wholes are imputed in dependence upon parts and parts are imputed in dependence upon wholes, and so it is with each of the other pairs, quality/qualified, etc. up to and including fuel and fire. Fuel is imputed in reliance upon fire, and fire is imputed in reliance upon fuel.

《十八品》云﹕「依業名作者,依作者名業,除此緣起外,未見有餘因。」

Nāgārjuna's 《Fundamental Treatise》 states:
Agents arise in dependence upon objects,
And objects arise in dependence upon those very agents.
Apart from this, we see no way
For agents and objects to exist.

又云﹕「由業及作者,餘法盡當知。」

And:
All other things should be understood
By way of what I explained about agents and objects.

謂當了知能生所生,行走行者,能見所見,能相所相,能量所量,此等一切皆無自性,唯是互相觀待而立。

Therefore, produced and producer, path and traveler, viewed and viewer, valid cognition and object of comprehension, etc.—everything should be understood not as existing essentially but only as existing in mutual dependence.

由是因緣,如於一我云何觀察,能知性空及無自性作用皆成,安立二諦。

Accordingly, understand how to posit the two truths so that one thing—such as the self—is empty of intrinsic existence under such analysis, yet can act and be acted upon in the absence of intrinsic existence.

次以彼理觀一切法,易能通達一切無性,故於前說法喻二事,當獲定解。

If you do this, then by extending that understanding to all phenomena, you can easily know their lack of intrinsic existence. Therefore, be certain about the example of the chariot and its meaning as I explained it above.

《三摩地王經》云﹕「如汝知我想,如是觀諸法,一切法自性,清淨如虛空。由一知一切,一能見一切,故盡說多法,於說不生慢。」

As the 《King of Concentrations Sūtra》 says:
As for your perception of the self,
Extend that sort of understanding to everything.
The essence of all phenomena is pure, like the sky.
You can know them all by way of one;
You can see them all by way of one.
No matter how many things you can explain,
Do not be arrogant about it.

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菩提道次第廣論卷二十二終